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Abstract 
This thesis invites geographers to pay more attention to public policy research by 
addressing the need to rethink fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. By applying 
―Simandan‘s wise stance in human geography‖ and ―Grix‘s building blocks of social 
research design‖, I developed a conceptual framework that unites two 
incommensurable ontological and epistemological research positions in geography—
the positive and normative positions. I used the framework to investigate two key 
research questions. First, does fiscal decentralization actually work in Ghana? 
Through quantitative analysis of empirical revenue and expenditure data (1994-2011) 
of local governments in Ghana, this study reveals significant issues of inefficiency, 
inequity, and unaccountability. Local governments generate less revenue, and 
therefore depend largely on central government transfers for developing their 
jurisdictions. Worse yet, these transfers are highly unpredictable in terms of amount 
and timing. Even though a multivariate regression analysis revealed that these 
transfers are apolitical, the actual disbursement formula tends to focus on equality 
instead of equity. Additionally, the unclear expenditure assignments in each locality 
make accountability difficult. In view of these problems, I addressed the question: 
why is fiscal decentralization held out as a good thing in Ghana? By drawing lessons 
from Foucault‘s and Escobar‘s critical discourse analysis, I traced a genealogy of 
Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization.  I found that the policy is held out as a good thing in 
Ghana because of the triangular operation of multiplicities of power, knowledge, and 
truth regimes at the local, national and international scale. I concluded that although 
nation-states remains a necessary causal link in fiscal decentralization policy process in 
Ghana, direct and indirect international involvement have profound effect on these 
policies. Therefore, rethinking fiscal decentralization involves acknowledging the 
complex intermingling effects that global, national, and local territories produce.   
Keywords:  Fiscal decentralization, Ghana, Mixed Methods, local government 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
It is especially important in the effort to frame public policy in a way that is properly responsive to 
human needs and predicaments. The question is always: How will the general rule work in practice? 
                                                                                                             Elliot Richardson 
 
Underlying the words of Richardson is a fundamental geographic idea: that the 
practicality of public policy varies across space. Differences in culture, economy, 
politics, and physical geography across space may inhibit the generalizability or 
practicality of public policy. I evaluate this claim by examining the practicality of fiscal 
decentralization1 in the context of Ghana. I am focusing on fiscal decentralization 
because of two main reasons. First, I recognize that finance is the ‗lifeblood‘ of policy 
(Asibuo, 2000). Therefore, the success of other forms of decentralization policies2 
depends largely on effective fiscal decentralization policies. Second, fiscal 
decentralization is a timely research topic because it is increasingly evident as a key 
variable in both recent policy documents and practice of developing economies in 
attempts to redefine and improve governance (Smoke, 2001; 2003). Developing 
countries have endorsed fiscal decentralization policies based on its theoretical appeal 
(World Bank, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). But the question of ‗will the 
general rule work in practice?‘ has been given less attention in geographic research.  
 
The impact of geographers on such policy research has been limited compared to 
other social, political and environmental scientists. Such limitation can be attributed to 
the emphasis on linguistic and theoretical issues to the neglect of practical social 
                                                          
1 Fiscal decentralization involves transferring revenue and expenditure functions from central to sub-national level of 
local government.  
2 I discuss the forms of fiscal decentralization in the chapter 2 
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research in the last two decades (Martin, 2001). In relation to this research project, 
there is an extensive literature that examines the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and its effects on growth, income distribution, poverty, and 
corruption (e.g., see Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, (2003) and the articles in the 2009 
special issue 2 of Environment and Planning: C journal). However, only one study 
examines in depth the role that the discipline of geography can play in fiscal 
decentralization research (see Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez, 2012). I 
argue that all policies (including fiscal decentralization policies) are of geographical 
concern because they are designed in a given space, and implemented through time3. 
Consequently, space and time are two essential concepts within the geography 
discipline (Thrift, 1996; Massey, 1999). 
 
Therefore, this research project is partly inspired by the need to re-emphasize practical 
policy studies in geography. My argument is that as Geographers, we need to develop 
a sense of intellectual cohesion around key social issues and problems, bringing the 
different theoretical and methodological approaches together to bear on key social 
policy problems. As Geographers, we should avoid allowing (or even exploiting) our 
diversity of approaches to form non-communicating cliques and specialisms within 
the discipline. We also need to pay more attention to detailed empirical work on 
                                                          
3 Thrift (1977:448) confirms the importance of space and time in the discipline of Geography when he noted that ―the 
essential unit of geography is not spatial; it lies in regions of time-space and in relation of such units to the larger spatio-
temporal configurations. Geography is the study of these configurations‖. Again, in his book on Spatial Formations, 
Thrift (1996: 1) wrote that ‗it is neither space nor time that is central to the study of human interaction order, but time-
space‘. He enforced this point by later suggesting a dyadic conception of time and space; ‗TimeSpace‘ (May and Thrift, 
2001:3). Another popular geographer called Doreen Massey points out the essence of treating space and time equally. 
She wrote that ―not only would I argue that we need to think in terms of space-time/time-space, but also I would 
propose that any conceptualization of space has a (logically) necessary corollary in a particular ‗matching‘ 
conceptualization of time‖ (Massey, 1999; 264). Treating Space and Time together is difficult, because each have diverse 
conceptualization by virtue of the great diversity of ontologies and epistemologies within the geography discipline. 
However, for the purpose of this research project, I consider space and time together, but as given categories, instead of 
their being socially constructed. Thus, to better understand fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana involves more than 
understanding where and for what reasons the policies were implemented (spatial components). It involves concurrently 
looking at ‗the where‘ (spatial) and the timing (the period of policy design and implementation, as well as the aftermath 
of such policies).    
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public policies, where greater attention is directed to methodology and the quality of 
evidence. Therefore, apart from reevaluating the appropriateness of fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana, this research project demonstrates the feasibility of 
integrating seemingly incommensurable research methods to understand social issues.    
 
Having established my research intentions, it is worth mentioning that the basic 
theory of fiscal decentralization postulates public sector allocative efficiency, equity 
and accountability as benefits (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). However, differences in 
the degree to which countries have devolved fiscal resources and expenditure 
responsibilities to local and regional governments‘ present researchers with a puzzle. 
Some authors such as Treisman (2006), Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), Panizza 
(1999), Oates (1972), among others, have proposed plausible models for the 
determinants of fiscal decentralization. To these authors, the origins of fiscal 
decentralization are the outcome of myriads of factors: history, culture, politics, and 
even physical geography. For instance, in Eastern European Countries (EECs) such as 
Russia, political and economic failures of the autocratic, highly centralized socialist 
regimes motivated fiscal decentralization reforms while in Latin America, fiscal 
decentralization has been used as a tool to reinforce the transition to democracy 
(Rodríguez- Pose and Krøĳer, 2009; Artana, 2007). For many developing countries, 
fiscal decentralization is used as a possible way of escaping from the traps of 
ineffective and inefficient governance, macroeconomic instability and inadequate 
economic growth (Bird, 2010; Bird and Vaillancourt, 2008; Smoke, 2001; 2003). 
Therefore, it is worthy to find out what really compelled Ghana to implement fiscal 
decentralization, and with what results.  
Additionally, one missing piece of the research puzzle and another reason for this 
research project is that most scholarly literature on public policy (hence fiscal 
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decentralization) neglects its wider context and practice. They tend to focus solely on 
state institutions, the policies and its implementation processes (Hills and Hupe, 1993; 
2006). The same applies to a number of published papers on fiscal decentralization 
policies of Ghana (Ankamah, 2012; Ahwoi, 2010; Antwi-Bosiako, 2010). However, 
the impact of such public policies goes beyond the institutions of the state. Policies 
often seek to target groups of people. There are positive or negative impacts on 
people‘s lives. In addition, public policy is not isolated from the rest of society. 
Cultural norms and trends, and the reactions of citizens and media do influence the 
course of public policy. Events of local, national and international significance 
influence the policy decisions as well as their implementation.  
 
I argue that a way of thinking about fiscal decentralization — a way not centered on 
institutions, or structures, or procedures — opens up the possibility of fresh insights 
into solving the research puzzle presented above. I support my argument by using 
Foucault‘s (1980) ideas on the production of discourse. Foucault raises questions 
about the practices of government and how public policy is formed, shaped and 
reshaped. Analysis of discourses has the potential to show the link between political 
rhetoric, and how discourses are created and maintained. Foucault‘s take on 
discourses is insightful when applied to the discourses on policy in the Third World4. 
Advancing on Foucault‘s  meaning of discourse, a vital deduction for my research is 
that discourse is not about saying ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘, when asked a seemingly simple 
question such as: Is fiscal decentralization efficient or not? Foucauldian discourse 
analysis involves identifying why the question arises. It is about discussing why society 
makes any of the ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ choices and the effect of the choices made (Huxley, 
                                                          
4 Foucault provided two meanings of the term discourse. First, discourse includes all forms of representation and not 
merely written and spoken words.  Second, discourse is not simply about something (fiscal decentralization, politics, 
efficiency) but constitute those things (Cresswell, 2009). 
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2009). Discourse is about examining why fiscal decentralization is a common theme in 
policy documents. It is about how and why sub-themes like efficiency, equity, and 
accountability exist in Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization policy documents. 
 
From the foregoing discussion, I raise two key questions in attempt to rethink fiscal 
decentralization policies, using Ghana as a case study. These are: 
 Why was Ghana compelled to implement fiscal decentralization? 
 Has fiscal decentralization actually worked in Ghana? 
 
The first question of why points to the spatial component of this research5. The 
second question relates to the concept of time as it seeks to look at the aftermath of 
fiscal decentralization policy in Ghana. The rest of the research project is designed to 
address these two questions. In chapter two, I address fiscal decentralization as a 
concept, and present a brief overview of its policy in Ghana. In chapter three, I survey 
literature that addresses questions similar to the two main questions of this research 
project — why are developing economies compelled to adopt fiscal decentralization? and do fiscal 
decentralization policies actually work? I identify methodologies employed in the literature 
reviewed in both chapters and situate my methodology for addressing the two key 
questions. I conclude chapter three by establishing a conceptual framework for my 
research project. In chapter four, I establish a methodology for addressing the two 
main research questions based on my framework and lessons from methodogies 
presented in the literature. I present my findings and analysis in chapter five. My 
conclusion, recommendations and future research are captured in chapter six. 
 
                                                          
5 The spatial component points to the possibility of Global North-Global South linkages in the transmission of policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: CONCEPTUAL REVIEW AND ITS 
OVERVIEW IN GHANA 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I review the literature on fiscal decentralization. I start by explaining 
the meaning, forms, and theoretical appeal for decentralization in general. I then 
discuss fiscal decentralization. Finally, I narrow my scope of discussion to Ghana‘s 
decentralization system6 and focus on the country‘s fiscal decentralization policies.  
 
2.2 The Meaning and Forms of Decentralization 
Decentralization defies a single meaning. As a concept, decentralization is used 
differently in the literature. Some of the meanings tend to be more general, 
emphasizing shifting decision-making power and authority from central government 
to local level of governments (Asfaw et al 2007; Dauda, 2006). Others suggest partial 
or total distribution of decision-making authority and power, and specific functions 
from central government to the local levels (Ezeani, 2004). A commonly cited 
meaning of decentralization is provided by Rondinelli et al (1989), and it specifies the 
transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority from central 
governments to local units. On the basis of the degree of power transferred from 
central government to lower levels, various forms of decentralization may be 
identified. I notice little agreement in the literature as to the different forms of 
decentralization. However, Rondinelli's model which involves four forms of 
decentralization namely deconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatization 
                                                          
6 Ghana‘s decentralization system is also termed as the local government system.  
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(Rondinelli 1980) remains the most frequently cited conceptual framework in the 
field. 
 
De-concentration is a type of administrative decentralization that involves a transfer of 
administrative authority and responsibility to lower sub-national institutions without 
decision-making authority (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). Manor (1999) finds that 
de-concentration is a very useful first step because it permits the deployment of 
bureaucratic capacity in the field. He cautioned against what happened in the 
Philippines where local governments were elected before any meaningful de-
concentration had taken place. As a result, newly elected mayors hired readily-
available low-skilled staffs. Notwithstanding, deconcentration is often described as a 
tool used by the central government to establish more control at the local level since 
the local governments only implement the agenda set by the central government.  
 
The second form of decentralization is delegation. Delegation is also a type of 
administrative decentralization. It involves semi-autonomous transfer of decision 
making and implementation authority from the central to the local government 
(Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). Delegation normally implies a transmission of tasks 
and administrative responsibilities related to specific functions, usually defined by 
central authorities. In this sense, the decentralization of tasks does not necessarily 
mean a shift of decision making authority. This is because the local agents are only 
given the role of executing decisions that have previously been made at a central level 
(Lauglo 1995). 
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Another form of decentralization is privatization or market decentralization. Privatization 
involves government giving up responsibility for certain functions and transferring 
them to private enterprises so as to ensure increased competitiveness and efficiency 
(Savas, 2000; Lauglo, 1995). Privatization is premised on the assumption that 
efficiency and competition is best achieved by the private sector, which is not always 
the case.   
 
The form of decentralization that was introduced in Ghana‘s 1992 constitution 
(recent) is termed as devolution or political decentralization.  Sub-national governments 
within a devolved decentralized system are autonomous in decisions making and 
implementation within their jurisdiction. Their total decision-making and 
implementation authority is usually backed by law (Ezeani, 2004; Rondinelli and 
Cheema, 1993). This is the form of decentralization that is entrenched in the 1992 
constitution of the Republic of Ghana. All local governments in Ghana are legally 
mandated to carry out executive, deliberative and legislative functions in their locality7, 
while the regional and central government play supervisory roles. It is worth 
mentioning that the central level has three arms of government performing similar 
roles—executive, legislature and judiciary arms. 
 
The form of decentralization that is relevant to this research project is fiscal 
decentralization (FD). FD focuses on the fundamental problem of allocating 
expenditure and revenue responsibilities among levels of government (Shah, 1994). 
                                                          
7 Deliberative function involves Local Governments (MMDAs) initiating, discussing, and formulating local level 
development plans. With their executive authority/functions, they execute plans, programs and strategies for the 
effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district. Their legislative function 
ensures ready access to the courts and public tribunals in the district for the promotion of justice (362). Also, they 
initiate, sponsor or carry out studies as may be necessary for the discharge of any of the functions conferred by this law 
or any other enactment (See Section 10 of Ghana‘s Local Government Act—Act 462 for a full list of these 3 functions). 
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Some authors refer to FD as the devolution of authority for public finances and the 
delivery of governments services from the national to sub-national levels (Tanzi, 
1996). Others reason that FD is a requirement for, and basis of implementing all other 
forms of decentralization (Asibuo, 2000). Their argument is that the success of all 
policy designs, institutional arrangement, and implementation depends fundamentally 
on finance. Of course, finance is very vital in every undertaking. It played a key role in 
this research project. That partly explains why this research project focuses on FD. 
 
 There are two basic interrelated themes under fiscal decentralization. The first is 
about the distribution of revenue mobilization and expenditure responsibility under 
the centralized / decentralization alternatives. Here, the question of ―who collects and 
gets what?‖ in terms of revenue and expenditure becomes an issue between the 
central and local government (Musgrave, 1983). Second, is the issue of the degree of 
financial autonomy of local governments relative to the degree of their dependency on 
central transfers (Davey, 2003). I discuss these two key themes in chapter six. 
Figure 2.1: Forms of Decentralization 
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Literature reviewed on the five forms decentralization indicates how degrees of 
decentralization relate to levels of central control. Figure 2.1 depicts the forms of 
decentralization and their consequent degree of central and local level authority. 
Where the central authorities wish to exercise control, they may choose de-
concentration or a delegated system rather than a devolved one.  
 
2.3 Geographical Arguments for Decentralization 
In the literature, decentralization is justified as providing economic, social and political 
benefits8. All these justifications have geographical manifestations. Therefore, as a 
Geographer, I focus on the relationship between decentralization and geography. This 
relationship is usually presented as a straightforward one in the literature. The logic 
presented is that the higher the level of geographical complexity and ethnic diversity, 
the higher the relative gain from moving to a decentralized system of public good 
provision (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2002; Panizza, 1999). This is because differences 
in geography, the degree of geographical fragmentation, are alleged to have an effect on 
both preferences and access to public service provision. In terms of access, 
geographical fragmentation works as a spatial decay factor for centrally provided 
public goods (Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez, 2012). That is, centralized 
                                                          
8 The economic justification of decentralization argues from the dimension of maximizing welfare and efficiency (Bird 
2010; Tanzi, 2000; Loockwood, 2002 and Besley & Coate, 2003). For instance, Bird (2010) asserts that from a neo-
classical economics perspective, the most important potential benefit from decentralization is the increased efficiency, 
and a consequent welfare gain that comes from moving governance closer to the people.  
Also, decentralization is argued to be a tool for enhancing grassroots participation, with social and political benefits. 
Participation of the locals is associated with the idea that development is for, with, or by the people (Dick-Sagoe, 2012). 
Socially, participation enables self -actualization, enhances social solidarity in decentralized localities, and serves as a tool 
for human development (Dick-Sagoe, 2012). Participation also has political values. Participation in local politics is 
evident through local election of local government representatives. The argument for electing locals as government 
representative is two-fold. First, the elected know exactly the locals‘ needs, and hence may represent or address those 
needs accordingly. Second, the elected becomes accountable to the locals. Some authors argue that accountability plays a 
key role since decentralization may be the best way to create incentives for politicians to differentiate adequately between 
the needs of different groups of their citizens and therefore optimize the provision of public goods (Seabright, 1996). 
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provision of collective goods suffers from distance decay as one move away from the 
center.  
 
 
However, I acknowledge that the relationship between decentralization and geography 
is not a simple one. As Lora et al. (2003) argue, geography plays a fundamental role on 
the economic and social development as well as the institutional design of countries; 
yet, this effect could be enhanced (or diminished) in the presence of better physical 
infrastructure or communications. Other authors are more optimistic. For instance, 
Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez (2012) reveal in a recent study that there is 
a strong correlation between geographical factors and fiscal decentralization. They 
acknowledged that while the development of infrastructure (in transportation, 
communications, etc.) tends to reduce the effect of geography on decentralization, 
their effect is rather small and often statistically insignificant. All these differing 
arguments point to the discursive nature of decentralization policies. Consequently, I 
focus on fiscal decentralization in attempt to simplify the complexity between 
geography and fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
2.4 Theoretical Justification of Fiscal Decentralization 
The theoretical appeal for fiscal decentralization draws largely on the foundational 
contributions by Stigler (1957), Musgrave (1959), Oates, (1972) and Marlow (1989). 
Just like decentralization, all these appeal have geographical manifestations. The core 
logic of the theoretical appeal is based on the following: if growth and poverty issues 
are to be taken into account, one should be concerned about efficiency-supplying 
services up to the point at which the welfare benefit to society matches its cost (Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 2002). Consequently, fiscal decentralization is an issue of considerable 
  12  
 
practical importance facing many developing economies and has been championed by 
international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (World 
Bank, 2003). I briefly review some of the arguments of these scholars. 
 
According to Marlow (1989), the degree of fiscal decentralization affects public 
finance in two main ways. First, fiscal decentralization increases competition in the 
public sector, leading to a relatively lower tax burden. The point Marlow makes is that 
with people and capital being geographically mobile in pursuit of fiscal gains, the 
greater the numbers of alternative tax jurisdictions, the less likely that ‗excessive‘ taxes 
will be levied. The second point is that fiscal centralization restricts local 
governments‘ ability to generate revenue since a growing national share of total 
government money weakens the relative significance of local governments.  
 
After conducting an empirical study for 42 countries, Oates (1972) argued that fiscal 
decentralization would tend to increase total public resource mobilization through 
taxation. His study reveals a strong and statistically significant negative association 
between fiscal centralization and tax revenue. The quantitative method used involved 
regressing tax revenue (size of public sector) on a fiscal centralization ratio (central 
revenue as proportion of the total)9. In another but related empirical study, Oates 
(1985) explored the same issue again for 43 countries (18 industrial and 25 
developing). The results proved that for the entire sample, the rank correlation 
between the size of the public sector and the extent of centralization is strong and 
significantly negative. In other words, more centralized governments have a smaller 
public sector.  In contrast, a relatively decentralized public sector is typically large in 
terms of revenue mobilization. The two multi-country studies by Oates lend support 
                                                          
9 Some scholars point out dangers of fiscal decentralization, and argue the possibility that centralized delivery of services 
might enable scale economies and that this in turn means that a centralized government needs less tax money than a 
decentralized government (Prude‘homme, 1995; Klagge and Martin, 2005) 
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to the claims that fiscal decentralization improves efficiency in tax revenue generation. 
My analysis evaluates some of these claims by answering the two basic questions of 
this research. I provide an overview of decentralization in Ghana with emphasis on 
fiscal decentralization before my analysis (chapter five).  
 
2.5 Decentralization in Ghana: The Local Government System 
This research project is a case study of Ghana, a tropical country situated on the west 
coast of Africa and located between latitudes 4° N and 11º N and longitude 1° 12' 
east and 3° 15' west of the equator (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Map of Ghana Showing Regions and MMDAs 
 
Source: Author, 2013 
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Ghana has a multi-party democratic political system10 with a presidency, a cabinet, a 
parliament, an independent judiciary system and a vibrant free press. These constitute 
the central level, with day-to-day functions administered through an established 
bureaucracy—ministries, departments and agencies. For administrative and political 
purposes, Ghana is divided into ten regions. The country also has a local government 
structure (see figure 2.2 for administrative fragmentation). Local government in 
Ghana is as old as colonial rule. It can be traced to the British Indirect Rule System, 
which centered on native authorities made up of Traditional Chiefs or local royalty 
(Ayee, 1999). However, devolution (political decentralization) did not occur until the 
1988 Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) Local Government Law 207, 
which was the landmark legislation that provided the legal framework for the start of 
Ghana‘s local government system of today. In the current Constitution of 1992, the 
PNDC Law 207 has been strengthened as an entrenched provision in Chapter 
Twenty, while Article 240 specifically provides the broad framework for Ghana‘s 
decentralization (Adusei-Asante and Hancock, 2012). In the last decade, the passages 
of other relevant laws have also augmented Article 24011. 
Ghana‘s local government structure consists of Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) 
coordinating between the national government and Metropolitan Municipal and 
District Assemblies (MMDAs). The MMDAs have within them sub-urban, zonal and 
town councils (see figure 2.3). Currently, there are 216 MMDAs. The details of the 
MMDAs per region are indicated in Figure 2.3. Within the structure, MMDAs appear 
to be the most ‗influential‘ as they are entrusted with wide political, administrative, 
                                                          
10 There are two dominant parties in Ghana: the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP). These two parties combined obtain about 99% of the total votes cast during each 4-year periodic elections. 
Therefore, I use only these two parties in my analysis. 
11 These include but are not limited to : the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462); the Local Government Service Act 
2003 (Act 656); the District Assemblies Common Fund Act 455, the National Development Planning Systems Act 480 
and the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies Standing Orders (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992; 
Kyei Baffour 2009; Antwi– Boasiako 2010; Ahwoi 2010) 
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and fiscal authority at the local level (Gyimah–Boadi 2009). My research project 
focuses on the practicality of the fiscal authority given to the MMDAs. 
 
Figure 2.3: Local Government Structure of Ghana 
 
 
2.6 Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana 
In other to ensure that MMDAs discharge their mandated responsibilities, Section 240 
(2, c) of Ghana‘s Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) provides that each MMDA 
shall have a sound financial base with adequate and reliable sources of revenue 
(Asibuo, 2000). Specifically, MMDAs under the ―new local government act, 1993‖ 
(Act 462) are empowered to collect revenue and make expenditure decisions so as to 
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carry out their assigned functions including development (Ayee, 1999). I briefly 
highlight some of their revenue sources. 
 
2.6.1 Sources of Revenue for Financing Local Government in Ghana 
Local Government finance provisions are defined in Article 245 and 252 of the 1992 
Constitution and Section 34, Part VII and Part VIII of Act 462. The MMDAs in 
Ghana are financed from three main sources: 
1. Internally generated fund (IGF), that is from the MMDAs sources; 
2. Central government transfers to MMDAs, which also takes several forms;  
3. Financial assistance from donor agency including non-governmental 
agencies and voluntary private organizations to the district (Decentralization 
policy review final report, February 2007). 
 
2.6.1.1 The Internally Generated Fund/ Owned-Source Revenue 
 Autonomous financial responsibility has been recognized as the core of the concept 
of decentralization (Rondinelli et al 1984). Therefore, the 1992 constitution designates 
the MMDAs as the rating authority and empowers them to levy and collect local taxes 
so as to carry out their assigned functions. The various forms of taxes are: 
Local taxes: Local taxes are either general rates that are levied uniformly within the 
entire district for general purposes or special rates that are levied over a particular area 
of the district for the purposes of undertaking specific approved projects. Examples 
of rates include the basic rate and the property rates.  
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Basic rates are general rates payable by all eligible payers above eighteen (18) years. 
This rate charged is by law, and determined by a rate assessment committee of the 
MMDAs. Section 95(1) of the Local Government Act indicates that ―a District 
Assembly shall make and levy sufficient rates to provide for that part of total 
estimated expenditure to be incurred by it during the period in respect of which the 
rate is levied and which is to be met out of money raised by rates‖ Allowing each 
MMDA to decide its rate might produce an interesting geography. In practice 
however, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development has pegged the 
rates for all MMDAs, again reinforcing the question of whether or not what is 
documented theoretically can actually be practiced. 
Property rates are taxes levied by MMDAs on landed properties or immovable 
properties owned privately in their jurisdiction. The amount is paid based on the 
assessed value of the property, which is multiplied by a per cedi payable rate 
depending on the category of property. 
Fees and fines: In accordance with the section 27 of the Local Government Act of 
1988 (PNDC Law 207) and within the guidelines set by the central government, 
MMDAs levies fees on a range of items. User fees are charged for real use of local 
public services and facilities. Currently, the list of services from which MMDAs 
charge users is extensive. Examples are market tolls, lorry park fees, and public latrine 
fees.   
Licenses and rents: Licenses are rights given by local authorities to individuals that 
allow them to undertake all kinds of economic and social transactions. These license 
charges are used by the MMDAs essentially to carry out developmental projects in the 
district. Examples of this are beer and wine sellers, and self-employed artisans 
(Korkor and Kroes, 1992). 
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 The owned-source revenue provisions are available to ensure a more self-reliant 
political and administrative decentralization. Such revenue sources are designed to 
discourage existing tendencies towards over-dependence on external sources of 
finance and control of central government thus enhancing the discretionary autonomy 
of the MMDAs. Interestingly, the central government maintains the exclusive 
authority to raise the most lucrative and easy to gather taxes, such as income taxes 
(Ahwoi, 2000). For this reason, many local governments are highly constrained in 
their ability to raise revenue. Here again, I raise the main question: will the generally 
documented rule for fiscal decentralization work in practice?  
 
2.6.1.2 Central Government Grants and Transfers 
Grants are non-compulsory receipts from a higher order government, an international 
organization or a foreign government. There are two basic types of grants, namely 
general and specific grants. General grants are used to support either general 
expenditure or finance a budget in accordance to the recipient‘s preference while 
specific grants are tied to specific objectives and handed down according to specific 
guidelines. Central government grants to local governments are an integral part of the 
local government revenue structure. For many MMDAs, financial transfers from the 
government remain the most significant revenue source. The major ones are the: 
 
(i)The District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) 
The DACF is a major source of information/data for my empirical analysis. This is 
partly because it forms the bulk of MMDAs finance. Also, data is readily available for 
analysis. The DACF is a statutory arrangement backed by the 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana in Article 252 (clause 1 and 2) and the District Assemblies Common Fund Act, 
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2003 (Act 455). The Act stipulates an annual allocation of not less than 5% (currently 
7.5%) of the total revenues of Ghana to MMDAs. The amount is paid in quarterly 
installments.  
The DACF is the source of funds mainly geared towards the finance of capital 
projects. In principle, there is no control on the use of the funds but in practice, 
guidelines are issued which in turn limits the freedom of the MMDAs (Appiah, 1999). 
The distribution of the fund is therefore based on the recommendation of the 
administrator of the fund which has to be approved by parliament before 
disbursement to the MMDAs can proceed (Osei-Akoto et al, 2007). According to 
Fynn (2011), there are five main factors that influence DACF sharing among the 
MMDAs. These factors include: 
The Reserve Factor is an outright deduction before the formula is applied. This 
reserve includes: Members of Parliament (MPs) fund, Regional Coordinating Councils 
(RCCs), Reserve (Contingency and Monitoring). Monies used to pay for the allocation 
of the fund comes from the reserves. In the guidelines prepared by the Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), the reserve is 10% of the 
DACF and the remaining 90% disbursed to MMDAs as governed by the guidelines 
and formulae. Apparently, 35% of the DACF allocated to MMDAs is earmarked for 
specific purposes and the remaining 65% of the funds must first and foremost cater 
for construction of facilities at both the district and community levels where they are 
lacking (Local Government Act 462, 1993). 
The Equality Factor ensures that the MMDAs have access to specified funds. It 
involves a straightforward division of a portion of the fund by the total number of 
MMDAs in Ghana. 
The Needs Factor is meant to address the current imbalances in development. It 
involves health, education, water availability, and water quality indicators. 
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The Responsiveness Factor is designed to motivate the MMDAs to generate and 
collect more internal revenue. Therefore, a percentage increase in MMDAs owned-
source revenue will cause an increase in the responsive factor of the DACF. 
The Service Pressure Factor assists in improving existing services, which, as a result of 
population pressures, are deteriorating faster than predicted. 
 
The DACF has increased, instead of reducing the control of the center over the 
MMDAs‘ functions. The decisions of the DACF have been usurped by the central 
government so that the MMDAs remain initiators without finance to implement their 
decisions (Aryee, 2003). Consequently, the introduction of the DACF has made the 
MMDAs reliant on DACF proceeds rather than acting as an incentive to mobilize 
resources locally. The MMDAs also suffer from irregularity in the disbursement of 
DACF funds, lack of transparency and lack of discretion afforded to district authority 
over the allocation of funds. Antwi-Boasiako (2010) observed that even though local 
governments are given autonomy over finance, the central government dictates how 
money should be spent at the local level. MMDAs have very little fiscal autonomy. 
They derive approximately 85% of their budget from donors and central transfers. 
The largest source is the DACF, which is mostly spent on salaries. While salaries are 
completely non‐discretionary, DACF transfers are often discretionary in practice. 
Here lies the question of motive for implementing the DACF: Is it to enhance 
political decentralization or reduce it? Are there any factors that can affect such 
transfers, such as ―pork-barrel politics‖? My analysis in chapter five examines these 
questions.  
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 The DACF comes with associated problems such as delays in the release of funds as 
well as other mandatory deductions at the source. These mostly limit the efficiency of 
the MMDAs and also slow their work processes in the implementation of projects. 
Again, the question: ―will the general rule work in practice?‖ can be raised. My 
analysis will highlight the implication of some of these problems. 
 
(ii) Ceded Revenue 
Revenue sources that used to be tapped by the central government, but have been 
transferred to the MMDAs in pursuit of decentralization are termed as ceded revenue. 
These sources are entertainment duty, casino, revenue, gambling, betting, 
advertisements and daily transport tax. The ceded revenue is centrally collected by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the total ceded revenue is transferred to the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development which shares it among the 
MMDAs using a formula approved annually by cabinet or parliament.  
 
2.6.1.3 The District Development Fund  
The District Development Fund (DDF) was established in 2006 as an alternative to 
Internal Generated Fund to support MMDAs programs.  The Fund is being operated 
by a secretariat working under a Board appointed by the MMDAs. The DDF is a pool 
of funds from donor communities (mostly developed countries and international 
organizations), with a component contribution from the Government of Ghana to 
support existing development agenda of the MMDAs.  
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2.6.1.4 Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) Sources 
Other sources of revenue are NGOs and voluntary private organizations. They often 
fund local developmental projects based on self-help initiatives and local 
contributions in cash, kind and labor. While these sources have been important in 
implementing several local projects in many developing countries, there are often 
preconditions for assistance such as project type, size and need orientation, local 
project implementation ability, proper financial accountability and ensuring 
permanent information of the voluntary donors to preserve their willingness to help 
(Appiah, 1999).  I now shift my focus towards how MMDAs revenue is utilized. 
 
2.6.2 Expenditure Fiscal Decentralization  
Expenditure assignments are the first pillar in the framework of Fiscal 
Decentralization (FD). A clear delineation of service delivery responsibilities for each 
tier of government is of critical importance for efficiency and accountability. 
Problems in the assignments of expenditures may lead to: poor accountability as it is 
hard to judge the responsible agent and place a clear responsibility; duplication of 
efforts; conflicts between tiers of governments; dissatisfied citizens; and ultimately 
hesitation and resistance to continue and deepen the decentralization process. 
 
The expenditure function in Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization is based on the ‗principle 
of subsidiarity‘, which suggest that functions should be assigned to the lowest level of 
government that is capable of efficiently undertaking the task. MMDAs have two 
major expenditure classification systems: the main and supplementary budget 
expenditure classifications. The main budget of the expenditure classification covers 
seven major expenditure headings namely, personnel emoluments; traveling and 
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transport expenditure; general expenditure; maintenance, repairs and renewals; 
miscellaneous expenditure; subventions and capital expenditure. The supplementary 
expenditure classification covers five major sectoral headings namely, education; 
health and sanitation; local government and rural development; agriculture and; 
economic activities. I discuss these components in chapter five. I now shift my focus 
to a review of relevant literature in chapter three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a literature survey that addresses the two main questions of this 
research project: ‗do fiscal decentralization policies actually work?‘ and ‗why are 
developing economies compelled to adopt fiscal decentralization?‘ This survey 
involves identifying the methodologies employed, and the conclusions reached by 
authors examining the reasons why countries implement fiscal decentralization. I draw 
lessons from the methodologies identified, and use those lessons to guide my 
methodology. I also review the aftermath of the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization policies. I conclude this chapter by establishing a conceptual 
framework for rethinking fiscal decentralization policies. Before addressing the two 
questions, let me briefly draft a theoretical foundation for the questions. 
 
3.2 Understanding Theories in Geography: Positive, Normative or ‘A Wise’ 
Approach 
It is not uncommon for geographers (economic geographers, demographers, etc.) to 
act as advisors on government policies. In this role, they do not only report research 
findings but also make recommendations. It is vital then to understand when 
geographers make objective-evidence based statements about how the world works, 
and when they are making value-judgments about what policies should be enacted. In 
this sense, geographers are faced with two basic policy questions: descriptive factual 
questions, and prescriptive value-based questions. A similar set of policy questions 
also emerge in this research project. First, does fiscal decentralization work, and the 
related epistemological question, how do we know it works (i.e., what is the material 
factual evidence?) Second, why do countries feel compelled to implement fiscal 
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decentralization, and the related question, why is fiscal decentralization held out as a 
good thing? The first question draws on positive understandings of theory, whereas 
the second one draws on normative understandings of theory. Let me expand these 
two ways of understanding theorization in geography further and relate it to the fiscal 
decentralization literature.  
 
3.2.1 Positive Stance: An Approach Used to Evaluate Fiscal Decentralization 
Policies 
In his paper ―Alternatives to Positive Economic Geography,‖ King (1976: 300) 
highlighted three suppositions of the role of positive understanding of theory in 
economic geography. First, the methodological approach of natural science can be 
adapted directly to geography, where the geographer is viewed as taking the stance of 
an ―observer of social reality‖. The geographer in such observer position assumes that the 
world works in a particular way, and outcomes are not really right or wrong, but 
instead simply are. Second, the goal of the positive economic geographer is to derive 
laws and theories, using principles of natural science to arrive at objective testable 
conclusions, a goal that was popularized during the 1950s Quantitative Revolution in 
geography12. Here, the geographer becomes an ―analyst or interpreter of his subject matter‖. 
Third, the geographer generates ‗value-free‘ and ‗neutral‘ research. To sum it up, a 
researcher who takes up a positive stance assumes an objective observer or analyst 
position, uses scientifically proven or verifiable research procedures (like hypothesis 
testing of empirical data) to explore a real or material world out there, and seeks to 
develop or verify theories or model. For fiscal decentralization studies, the positive 
                                                          
12The theoretical change towards positivist approaches in geography was championed by geographers such as Kimble 
(1951) and Schaefer (1953). 
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approach is used to evaluate a set of assumptions or theories about the policy13. What 
are these theoretical arguments? 
 
3.2.1.1 Does Fiscal Decentralization Work? Theoretical Arguments in the Literature 
A number of scholarly literatures exploring the practicality of fiscal decentralization 
policies assume the positive stance to understanding theory. Usually, their point of 
departure is some existing theories, assumptions or even suggestions in the literature 
about what may or may not cause fiscal decentralization to work. Such existing 
theories suggest a number of possible reasons why some countries are more fiscally 
decentralized than others. Basically these reasons can be reduced to three factors: 
geographical (including territorial size and cultural/ethnic diversity), historical (i.e. 
institutional inertia and colonial legacy), and economic. I briefly review literature on 
these factors to see how they have been evaluated using the positivist stance in 
research. 
 
Geographical Factors 
Territorial Size of a Country: The relationship between fiscal decentralization and spatial 
extent of a country is usually presented as a straightforward one in the literature. The 
main argument is that fiscal decentralization will be greater in territorially larger states 
(Treisman, 2006). The key is that certain central supervisory functions cannot be 
provided as effectively in territorially extensive countries. As John Stuart Mill asserts: 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that this is the norm in economics as well, the discipline most responsible for the theories justifying 
fiscal decentralization. Most economic geographers no longer adhere to this position. However, for the purposes of 
checking the internal validity of claims about fiscal decentralization, it is useful that I adopt a positivist mindset. I am 
actually taking the theorists who have created models that suggest fiscal decentralization will ‗work‘ at their word, and 
using the tools that those theorists understand as the most appropriate ways to assess or falsify (in the Popperian sense 
of the word) these theories.  
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‗There is a limit to the extent of country which can advantageously be governed, or 
even whose government can be conveniently superintended, from a single center‘ 
(Mill, 1991). For Mill, this constituted a reason for fiscal decentralization in large 
countries such as the USA and Canada. 
 
Ethnic/Cultural Diversity: The theory here is that the more ethnically diverse a country 
is, the more likely it will adopt fiscal decentralization. The logic presented is that the 
higher the level of ethnic diversity, the higher the relative gain from moving to a 
decentralized system of public good provision and finance (Arzaghi and Henderson, 
2002; Panizza, 1999). This is because culture diversity is alleged to have an effect on 
both preferences and access to public service provision. In terms of access, ethnic 
diversity works as a spatial decay factor for centrally provided public goods (Canavire-
Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez, 2012). The second set of theoretical arguments 
originates with practical politics. Where ethnic divisions are politicized, especially in 
territorially compact countries, decentralizing authority over such contentious policy 
issues as education and culture may help prevent ethnic clashes. Such policy 
decentralization is a key feature of consociational democracy14 (Lijphart, 1993). Such 
policies must have some fiscal component to be credible. Thus, to preserve stability, 
central elites in more ethnically divided societies may choose a higher level of fiscal 
decentralization.  
 
 
Historical Factors 
Colonial legacy: The British and French are among the major powers that have 
colonized many countries in the world within the last two centuries. They introduced 
systems of government and administration that reshaped political life of their 
                                                          
14 Consociational democracy is a design of democratic institutions thought to help preserve peace in divided societies 
  28  
 
colonies. The styles and strategies of political control differed markedly. Various 
writers have contrasted the British willingness to introduce indirect government by 
devolving considerable decision making power to elected legislatures of colonial 
settlers, to the French who controlled every decision of their colonies in the early 19th 
Century (Tocqueville, 2000; 1833). When they withdrew from their colonies more 
than a century later, Britain was more prone than other empires to leave behind 
federal/fiscal structures. Similar to France, the tradition in Spain‘s overseas dominions 
is usually seen as one of over-centralization, with considerable powers of taxation and 
expenditure held by the capital city.  As a result, Spain‘s legacy to Latin America was a 
tradition of extreme centralization in governmental decision making (Nickson, 1995: 
15). In the post-independence years, local government was neglected and even 
suppressed. As Wiarda and Kline (1996: 45) noted, Latin America‘s ―local 
governments had almost no power to tax or to administer local social programs‖.  
 
Institutional Inertia/Democracy: Democracy is alleged to strengthen local government‘s 
fiscal autonomy for two main reasons. First, democracy enhances participation in a 
fiscally strong local government society (Treisman, 2006). Second, fiscally strong local 
governments might serve as a check on abusive central authorities (Tocqueville, 
1969). More recently, the fall of authoritarian governments has led to either 
spontaneous dissipation of central power or the deliberate assertion of local rights. In 
Eastern European Countries (EECs) such as Russia, political and economic failures of 
the autocratic, highly centralized socialist regimes motivated fiscal decentralization 
reforms while in Latin America, fiscal decentralization has been used as a tool to 
reinforce the transition to democracy (Rodríguez-Pose and Krøĳer, 2009; Artana, 
2007). Burki et al (1999: 1) argue that fiscal decentralization in Latin America since the 
early 1980s has been ―part of a broader trend toward democracy in the region‖. 
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Economic Factor  
Economic development: Fiscal decentralization is assumed to be positively related to 
economic development for two reasons. First, fiscal decentralization may itself be ‗a 
superior good, the demand for which is likely to grow with per capita income‘ (Tanzi, 
2000). As people become richer, more educated, and more urbanized, they may have 
more time and a greater motivation to participate in making local political decisions. 
They may also become more skilled at organizing to pressure the central government 
to devolve authority and fiscal resources. A second reason is that increases in 
development may induce a shift in tastes towards public goods and services that are 
most efficiently provided locally. Musgrave (1969: 797) suggested that as societies 
grow more affluent, provision of public goods becomes more efficient at local or 
regional scale. Also, as population density rises with urbanization, the risks of crime or 
accident may also rise at a disproportionate rate, requiring greater proportional of 
public spending on policemen, firemen, and health inspectors to achieve the same 
level of public safety (Treisman, 2006). In effect, some economically developed 
societies might use fiscal decentralization as a policy to efficiently meet the 
increasingly diverse consumption needs of their economies. 
 
Having discussed the key arguments for fiscal decentralization, I now shift my focus 
to considering how researchers have evaluated these claims for fiscal decentralization. 
However before I shift the focus of the literature review, it is worth mentioning that 
other authors raise questions about these theoretical appeals. For instance, Lora et al. 
(2003) argue that the effect of geography (territorial size and ethnic diversity which 
ties into the ‗distance decay‘ principle) on policies like fiscal decentralization could be 
enhanced (or diminished) in the presence of better physical infrastructure or 
communications. In other words, these policies reduce the ‗friction of distance,‘ that 
is, the cost and timeliness of movement and communication. Also, the use of fiscal 
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decentralization to reduce ethnic clashes within countries is not guaranteed. This is 
because central governments may be more interested in retaining fiscal resources at 
the center instead of decentralizing such resources to avoid ethnic clashes. And, even 
if they do decentralize fiscal resources and decisions, this may fail to prevent ethnic 
violence, as in the case of Lebanon in 1975 (Treisman, 2006). In the same way, 
democracy is not always positively linked to fiscal decentralization as there are 
prominent examples of highly centralized yet democratic countries (e.g., France). 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Does Fiscal Decentralization Work? A Review of Positive Empirical Approaches  
A number of scholars have empirically tested the theoretical arguments of fiscal 
decentralization using positivist quantitative methodology. Specifically, the scholars 
have explored the relationship between fiscal decentralization and its theoretical 
determinants and implications (geography, politics/democracy, economic growth, 
equity, efficiency, accountability, poverty etc.). In this review, I focus on these 
literatures: Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez (2012), Morgue et al (2012), 
Treisman (2006), and other economic literature. In these literatures, I identify the 
methodology and data author(s) used to measure fiscal decentralization, and what the 
policy seeks to achieve. I also point out some strengths and weakness in their 
approach where necessary.    
 
 
First, I consider the empirical research of Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2012) on the role of geography as a determinant of fiscal decentralization. Their point 
of departure was two theoretical models built by Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi and 
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Henderson (2002)15. Based on the models, they develop a hybrid model that suggest 
that geographical differences (which they refer to as geographical fragmentation and ethnic 
fractionalization) are expected to have an effect on both preferences and access to public 
service provision. They propose that preferences are due to differences in the physical 
environment (altitude and climate), while access is based on the economic costs of 
provision or distribution due to distance decay. 
 
To confirm or refute their proposition, they use regression analysis. In terms of data, 
they put together an unbalanced panel dataset for 91 countries for the period 1960-
2007 from secondary sources. One problem with their data was missing observations 
on some variables, which lead to variation in sample size across estimations. They 
average the values for 5 year periods in order to smooth the data over the macro-
economic cycle and also focus on the long run effects. 
 
Prior to measuring fiscal decentralization, Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2012) acknowledge that in practice, the data available to them do not allow for 
measuring true levels of fiscal autonomy, especially at the cross-country level. They 
therefore estimate fiscal decentralization as the percentage of revenues and 
expenditures of the sub-national governments relative to the total revenues and 
expenditures of the entire public sector of the selected countries. They collect data 
                                                          
15 Panizza‘s (1999) model suggest that the size of a country has a close relation with the level of heterogeneity of 
preferences and therefore an increase in the size of the country will decrease the marginal benefits from fiscal 
centralization. Arzaghi Arzaghi and Henderson (2002) model the creation of sub-national governments (under restricted 
mobility) as being determined by balancing the fixed costs of sub-national administration with the "spatial decay" of 
goods provided from the center. For a benevolent government, their model predicts that adoption of decentralized 
structures is promoted by (1) larger income, (2) larger population, (3) higher spatial decay of local public services 
provided to the hinterland by the central government, (4) higher relative income in the hinterland region, (5) larger 
population share of the hinterland, and (6) lower fixed costs of government for the hinterland region. Sub-national 
governments are thought to be more responsive to the local constituencies than the central government. Even though 
they do not explicitly model the role of geography again it is quite intuitive that spatial decay in the provision of public 
goods can be related to intensity of physical geography. 
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available from 1960 to 200716. The data was sourced from the Government Financial 
Statistics publication by the International Monetary Fund. They argue that the use of 
large sample cross-country datasets will offset any effect that missing data may have 
on their regression analysis, and even support their argument with the literature 
(Letelier, 2005). However, I argue that there is a trade-off between cross country 
estimated analysis and country specific sub-national level analysis. While it is 
statistically relevant to deal with large sample size, it is equally important to 
understand the country-specific sub-national fiscal autonomy situation17. Canavire-
Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez (2012) did not achieve the latter. My research 
focuses on the latter, and seeks to achieve a detailed comparative analysis of fiscal 
decentralization situation in various jurisdictions of Ghana. 
 
Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez (2012) measure geography using different 
variables. First, they constructed an index of geographical fragmentation (GFI). The 
GFI was used to capture the differences in preferences due to differences in 
altitude/climate. The essence of the index is provided by the weighted probability that 
two individuals taken at random do not live in similar altitude zones, with the weight 
matrix calculated as the average distance between altitudes. The index was simply 
calculated as 1-(population per elevation × the distance between the different 
altitudes). An index of 0 corresponds to a case where all the population is settled in 
the same altitude zone, while 1 corresponds to the unlikely case where each individual 
                                                          
16 Many scholars like Pryor (1968), Oates (1972), Panizza (1999), Banful (2011), Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) 
have employed the same approach to estimate the degree of fiscal decentralization. It is a common approach. For 
instance, Feld and Schnellenbach (2008) show that the expenditure share of subnational governments or closely related 
measures is used as the fiscal decentralization variable in about 35% of models, the revenue share is used in about 10% 
of models, and the weighted average of expenditure and revenue decentralization is used in about 3% of models in their 
survey of 26 empirical studies on the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. Others are the divergence 
between central and subnational government spending or revenue (about 12%), and the tax autonomy of subnational 
governments (about 25%). 
17 Country specific geography matters because institutions, even markets, vary by location. Institutions and markets in 
turn shape outcomes. 
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lives in different altitudes. In general, geographical fragmentation will increase with 
the number of altitude-zones and the more equal weights for each group. For 
robustness, they constructed Gini distribution indexes for in-country elevation and 
climate. A lower Gini index would show that the country is more geographically 
homogenous in the sense that all areas tend to have more similar climate zones or 
elevations. They further estimated the variation (standard deviation) of the in-country 
elevation. Higher variance on elevation would indicate that the country has a more 
non-homogenous topography. Apart from the GFI, Gini distribution index and 
standard deviation, other variables included are the log of GDP per capita, infant 
mortality index, index of ethnic fractionalization (measured by ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization), indices of rule of law and corruption, and the log of area. Treating 
all these variables as independent variables, and fiscal decentralization as a dependent 
variable, Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez (2012) run a multiple regression 
analysis.  
 
Their regression results indicated that almost all independent variables positively 
influence the degree of fiscal decentralization. More especially GFI and country size 
had the strongest positive correlation with fiscal decentralization. Additionally, a weak 
negative effect was realized for the corruption variable, indicating that less corrupt 
countries (with better institutions) tend to have higher levels of fiscal decentralization. 
Also, higher levels of fractionalization lead to higher levels of fiscal decentralization. 
However, this effect holds only for the expenditure measure of decentralization, 
which implies that, the greater the ethnic diversity, the greater the difference in 
expenditure needs of the people and the greater the degree of sub-national 
expenditure decentralization. The main conclusion reached by the authors is that there 
is a clear positive effect of geographical variables on fiscal decentralization. 
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Canavire-Bacarreza and Martinez-Vazquez (2012) offer many lessons for my research 
project. First, correlation, or multiple regression is a useful approach to identifying the 
strength and direction of different variables that can affect fiscal decentralization. 
Second, the degree of fiscal decentralization can be estimated from unpaneled data 
sets by comparing the proportion of sub-national revenue to total public revenue, or 
comparing the proportion of sub-national expenditure to total public expenditure. 
Third, it is possible to construct indices to provide a common measure for variables 
within one category but with different measures (e.g. physical geography 
determinants). Finally, the positive approach is not a set of rigid procedures as 
proclaimed. Instead, one acknowledges problems associated with their datasets and 
use estimates to test one‘s hypotheses.    
 
Another vital research was undertaken by Treisman (2006). He studied the effect of 
fiscal decentralization on geography (country size, ethnic fractionalization), economic 
growth, history, and politics/democracy. He addressed the main question: How well 
do the various factors explain cross-national differences in fiscal decentralization? 
Multiple regressions were the main statistical techniques used. The main dependent 
variables were measures of the subnational shares of state expenditures and of state 
revenues, averaged for 1993-5. The independent variables included country size, 
ethnic fragmentation, colonial heritage, economic growth, and democracy. 
 
Using datasets from 66 countries, Treisman (2006) tested various hypothesis/theories 
about fiscal decentralization. He encounters data challenges, especially with ethnic 
division data. He use data compiled by Gunnemark (1991) on the share of the 
population that spoke a language other than the official language at home as a proxy, 
and the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization constructed from data compiled by 
a team of Soviet anthropologists in the early 1960s. Even though the data was 
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criticized as out-dated, he still uses it because that was the only datasets available. For 
country size, Treisman (2006) uses both the log of countries‘ surface area and the log 
of their 1994 population.  He creates dummies for colonial heritage. To measure 
economic development, he uses per capita GNP in purchasing power parity terms, as 
of 1995, as calculated by the World Bank. In assessing the effect of democracy on 
fiscal decentralization; he uses the Freedom House ratings of countries‘ political rights 
as of 1993-4. These scores, which range from 1 to 7, are based on the estimates of 
experts who rank countries on a checklist of specific aspects of political freedom.  He 
adjusts his datasets so that 7 corresponds to completely democratic and 1 to 
completely authoritarian.  
 
In his method, Treisman (2006) addressed problems of multicollinerity and 
heteroskedasticity. He acknowledges that only colonial heritage may be an exogenous 
variable, while the rest may be endogenous. For instance, ethnic divisions are often 
thought to affect the rate of growth and the prospects for democracy; country size 
may well influence whether a given state is federal while economic growth may even 
be affected by fiscal decentralization itself. He runs a series of regressions, starting 
with just the most exogenous geographical, ethnic, and historical variables, and 
gradually adding those relating to political institutions and economic development. By 
comparing how coefficients change across model, he makes some tentative inferences 
about paths of causation.  
 
Treisman‘s (2006) results vary. The results for country size were strong and consistent 
across models. Territorially larger countries—but not necessarily more populous 
ones—tend to be more fiscally decentralized. Ethnic division was negatively 
correlated with fiscal decentralization, which was a deviation from the theory. 
Moreover, after more-detailed analysis, he finds that greater ethnic division tends to 
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slow economic development, while economic development leads to greater fiscal 
decentralization. Also, by controlling for ethno-linguistic division and country size, 
the results reveal that former colonies of Britain, France, and Russia, as well as 
countries never colonized in the modern era, were significantly more decentralized 
than former Spanish or Portuguese colonies.  
 
The data, methods, and results used by Treisman (2006) provide valuable lessons for 
my research project. First, I have to acknowledge all limitations of my data and use 
proxies where necessary. While I might not face the same level of challenge Treisman 
(2006) faced with his 66 cross-country studies — especially because I use only Ghana 
as a case — there are still differences in datasets between districts and regions in 
Ghana. His approach to dealing with data limitation is therefore useful to my 
research. Second, multiple regression is a statistical technique I can use to capture the 
multiple factors that may contribute to fiscal decentralization (either IGF generation 
or even DACF transfers).  
 
At this point, I shift the focus of the literature from cross-country fiscal 
decentralization analysis to within-country analysis. Here the empirical study I review 
is Mogues et al (2012).  Their goal was to consider how efficient local governments 
are in the provision of public goods in Ghana18. The main question they address is: 
Do external grants to district government discourage own-revenue generation? To 
them, own source revenue is what defines a district‘s fiscal autonomy, and not 
revenue transfers from the central government (like DACF). To access the internal 
revenue generation performance of districts, Mogues et al (2012) use three data 
sources.  
 
                                                          
18 Their study was premised on a pioneer theory that fiscal decentralization leads to efficiency in allocation of public 
goods and services (Tiebot, 1956; Musgrave, 1958; Oates, 1972)  
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First, they obtain panel data on local government public finances from the Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD).  Districts‘ revenues were 
disaggregated by source (revenues from licenses, property taxes, external grants, etc.), 
while districts‘ expenditures were disaggregated by economic classification 
(expenditures on personnel, travel and transport, capital, etc.). The panel spans 11 
years (1994–2004) and covers all of Ghana‘s 110 districts existent at the time of the 
study. While these datasets are available for 1994-2004, more recent datasets (2005-
2012) are difficult to obtain. This is partly due to the creation of new districts from 
already existing districts, which add new observations to the panel datasets. 
    
The other two main sources of data they use are Ghana‘s 2003 Core Welfare 
Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey and the 2000 Population and Housing 
Census, primarily used to identify district socioeconomic and demographic variables. 
The CWIQ has a sample size of over 49,000 households and the data are 
representative at the district level, enabling aggregation of household information to 
the district level. The Population and Housing Census data, which represents the sub-
district level, also allow aggregation to the district level. In addition to data from these 
three primary sources, their research project uses data from the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development and the Controller and Accountant General‘s 
Department; data on the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), which were 
obtained from the DACF Administrator‘s Office; and district-level rainfall data from 
the Meteorological Services Department, all in Ghana. These diverse sources reveal 
the rich sources data available for my research project, even though more recent 
datasets (2005-2012) are difficult to obtain.  
 
In their empirical analysis, Mogues et al (2012) employ basic statistical techniques to 
explore the characteristics of their datasets. They use a simple component bar graph 
  38  
 
to show the trend (1994-2004) in relative percentage contribution of internal (IGF) 
and external sources (DACF especially) to total revenue of districts. The results reveal 
that there has been a gradual decline in the IGF component over a decade, from 46 
percent in 1994 to 10 percent in 2004. They conclude that the result is not what one 
would expect in light of efforts to strengthen the fiscal position of district 
governments. Using a simple bar and line graph, they also display the absolute and per 
capita internal revenue generation per region in Ghana (from 1994-2004). Their 
results indicate higher absolute (550,000 Ghana cedis) and per capita (0.9 Ghana 
cedis) IGF for Greater Accra region in the South, while the remaining nine regions 
performed at less than half of Accra‘s IGF.  
 
Mogues et al (2012) employ pie charts to show the detailed contribution of IGF 
components (rents, property tax, etc.) per region, and use cross tabulations to 
compare the relative contribution of IGF, DACF, and other grants to total revenue 
per region. Then using multiple regression analysis, they examine the factors affecting 
IGF performance. The dependent variable used was IGF for each district, while the 
independent variables include lagged external transfers (DACF and donor support) 
from the government, plus basic economic, demographic, social, and climatic 
characteristics of districts. Also, welfare and development features of the districts like 
poverty rate, the literacy rate, and average access to roads by households were used. 
Demographic district attributes include the degree of urbanization and population size 
and density; variables defined as the shares of Ghana‘s two largest ethnic groups 
(Akan and Ewe) and Christians in the district represent core social characteristics; and 
climatic conditions are measured by district rainfall. The authors also use Region 
dummies to control for region-specific effects, and the error term captured district 
unobserved effects. In terms of results, Mogues et al (2012) find that greater part of 
external transfers is significantly and negatively associated with local governments‘ 
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levels of IGF. Hence, MMDAs with higher externally generated revenues tend to have 
significantly lower levels of and slower growth in their internally generated revenues. 
 
There are vital lessons from the positive approach of Mogue et al (2012) for my 
research project. First, they reveal diverse sources of primary/secondary data for my 
analysis. Second, in including the district characteristics, they account for the 
factors—not central to their research question—that may influence the size of district 
IGF through mechanisms other than the incentive effects of external grants and 
transfers. Another important input for my research is the possibility of using simple 
statistics like bar graphs, pie chart, and cross tabulations to analyze data. Even though 
district level data were used by Mogue et al (2012), they were aggregated to the 
regional level to reduce the level of complexity. Hence, the analysis did not capture 
district-specific revenue and expenditure situation. I work around this limitation by 
using averages of districts at the regional level for my analysis. 
 
 There have been other empirical studies addressing the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth. Mixed results are usually obtained in these 
studies. The first set of studies, usually based in China, found a negative or negligible 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth (Davoodi and Zou, 
1998; Jin and Zou, 2005). These findings may be due to using datasets obtained at the 
early stages of implementing decentralization. At such early stages of policy 
development, the administrative capability of local governments is insufficient, local 
officials may not be responsive to preferences of local residents, and local 
governments in those countries may be constrained by central government. Also, local 
government may spend more on items with low growth effect such as social services 
(Gemmell et al, 2012). More recent studies find evidence of a positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and growth (Thiessen, 2003; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; 
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Thornton, 2007). One source of difference in results between the early, and recent, 
studies may be due to the fiscal decentralization measure used (Gemmell et al, 2012). 
Recognizing that high subnational spending and revenue shares do not necessarily 
reflect high local autonomy, and if autonomy is the key growth-enhancing characteristic 
of fiscal decentralization, then early studies probably overstated the degree of effective 
decentralization since some local revenues/expenditures are typically controlled or 
mandated by central governments.  
 
On the other hand, recent studies have focused on a more restricted measure of fiscal 
decentralization: local government spending net of conditional or discretionary 
transfers (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Meloche et al., 2004) and local revenues over which 
subnational governments have some degree of control over the tax rate, the tax base, 
or both (Akai and Sakata 2002; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Meloche et al., 2004; 
Thornton, 2007). Jin et al. (2005) use the marginal retention rate of locally collected 
revenue to reflect the degree of fiscal decentralization arguing that this captures the 
fiscal incentives for local government to promote local business development. Using 
these narrower measures of fiscal decentralization, a positive impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth has found more support. These findings 
indicate the effect that a specific measure of fiscal decentralization may have on 
research outcomes.  
 
Each of the literature discussed above draws on positive approaches to evaluating 
theories. While most of them relate directly to the discipline of geography, none of 
the authors are geographers. This may confirm the geographer‘s neglect of policy 
studies, but may also reflect the doubts cast by some in various cliques and 
specialisms in the discipline (from post-structuralist, Marxist, critical geographers, 
feminist, etc.) on the use of positive empirical approaches. My argument is that there 
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is nothing wrong in using such positive approaches in my research project as long as 
they help me address my research question(s). Already, I have pinpointed some 
valuable lessons that will serve as inputs from the literature I just discussed. When 
necessary, positive approaches should be complemented with normative approaches.  
At this point, I shift my attention to a normative understanding of theory in 
geography and how such approach can be used in my research project. 
 
 
3.2.2 Normative Stance: Exploring Why Countries Implement Fiscal 
Decentralization 
According to the Dictionary of Human Geography by Gregory et al (2009: 505), normative 
theory ‗is a theoretical claim that is prescriptive, saying what ought to be‘. It expresses 
a judgment about whether a situation is desirable or undesirable, right or wrong, 
moral or immoral. Normative approach tells us ‗what ought to be‘, instead of 
reporting ‗what is‘. For instance, to say the world would be a better place if aliens were in 
charge of fiscal policy designs and implementations is a normative statement because it 
expresses a judgment about what ought to be. Notice that there is no way of 
disproving this statement. If you disagree with it, you have no objective way of 
convincing anyone that it is incorrect.  
Normativity was ironically evident among pioneer economic geographers who 
advocated for positive approach to geography during the quantitative revolution 
(Gregory et al, 2009). For instance, location theory was underpinned by a set of ‗ideal‘ 
assumptions (ought to be‘s) such as an isotropic plain, uniform population density 
and perfect rationality. August Losch (1954:4 cited in Barnes, 2003), one of the 
principal architects of location theory, was perfectly clear about its normative 
character when he wrote: ‗the real duty of the economist is not to explain our sorry 
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reality, but to improve it. The question of the best location is far more dignified than 
determination of the actual one‘. Normative thinking is as old as locational theories, 
even older.  
Even though normative features were evident in economic geography, those features 
were only popularized in the early 1970s by Harvey (1974) and Olson (1978), who 
revealed evidence of normativity lurking in positive theories. As Trevor Barnes19 
asserts ―All theory is normative theory. Our values go all the way down, and we can 
no more escape them than avoid the smell of the air we breathe.‖ (Encyclopaedia of 
Human Geography, 2009: 506). But are all theories or writings normative as Barnes 
and Harvey point out? Not necessarily, because such a suggestion renders the term 
‗normative‘ and its associated labels like ‗right or left-wing values‘ meaningless. Such a 
response leaves everything much as it is (Olson and Sayer, 2009). It questions the very 
essence of the term ‗normative‘. 
To play safe, some contemporary geographers acknowledge the positive and 
normative. Especially from the Anglophone world, they seek to go beyond mere 
description and explanation of the spatiality of social phenomena, by incorporating a 
normative-evaluative dimension (Simandan, 2011: 188). Notable among them are 
Clive Barnette (2008) in his work on The Normative Blindspots of Nonrepresentational 
Ontologies; David Gregory (2010) on War and Peace; and Doreen Massey (2008) on 
When Theory Meets Politics. These are critical geographers who consider value-based 
research as their right and obligation. However, critical geographers have also been 
criticized for their stance.  Some scholars argue that critical geographers have either 
become increasingly reserved about making their critique, standpoints or rationales 
explicit, or even softened their critique by simply reflecting on issues (Barnes 1999; 
Wills, 2006).  Another critique is based on the fact that critical geographers regularly 
                                                          
19 Barnes, a Professor in Geography at the University of British Columbia in Canada, was a contributor to the 2009 
Encyclopedia of Human Geography 
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use terms like ―oppressive‖, ―racist‖ or ―exploitative‖ in their descriptions of social 
practices, but generally without saying why these things are bad (Olson and Sayer, 
2009). Perhaps they just subjectively happen not to like them, or object only because 
they transgress local norms. Whichever reason provided, they go against their own 
stance, that ideas about good and bad are just ―subjective‖ or dependent on one‘s 
culture. So which normative stance is worth taking, if being extremely normative or 
adopting a critical evaluative stance has these limitations? 
 
Lee and Smith (2004) offer a different suggestion of what kind of normativity 
geographers should focus on. In their introduction to Geographies and Moralities, they 
write: 
The interesting questions which arise here concern not so much the 
distinction between the ―moral‖ and the ―immoral‖, but how 
―moral‖ and ―immoral‖ come to be defined, practiced and 
reproduced in distinctive ways across space and time (2004:7). 
 
 
 The emphasis here is the importance of understanding the historical production of 
social values and norms. Here, Lee and Smith (2004) suggest the use of methods like 
discourse analysis and other normative techniques to understand why certain 
phenomena are considered ‗moral‘ while others are not. To be more precise, 
normative approaches like discourse analysis, helps uncover the sources of or reasons 
why a phenomenon is considered normal. As a point of departure for the next section 
of my literature review, normative theory can be used to understand why countries are 
compelled to implement fiscal decentralization, and its related question of why fiscal 
decentralization is held out as a good thing. 
 
 
  44  
 
3.2.2.1 Why Countries feel compelled to implement fiscal decentralization: the Literature 
It is not bizarre for fiscal decentralization literature to use terms like revenue, expenditure 
or sub-national government. Of course, revenue and expenditure form the very linguistic 
meaning of the term fiscal, while decentralization is basically about sub-national 
governance. However, when terms like equity, efficiency and accountability enter the 
forewords of the fiscal decentralization literature, then a normative stance will assert 
that there is more to the issue than the ‗dictionary meaning‘ of fiscal decentralization. 
A more important observation in the fiscal decentralization literature is that 
developing countries/economies are usually classified as adopters of the policies, 
while the adoptees are the models based on the success accounts of advanced 
countries (World Bank, 2000; Smoke, 2001; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). These 
‗appropriate‘ fiscal decentralization models are peppered with terms like equity, 
efficiency and accountability (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972).  
 
This peppering has impacted largely on developing economies. For instance, in a 
World Bank stocktaking survey in Africa by Ndegwa (2002), 13 of 30 countries 
surveyed showed high or moderate levels of decentralization as measured by a 
composite index of political, administrative, and fiscal devolution indicators.
 
Another 
13 countries showed at least some degree of decentralization, with several in the 
process of change. Although not all countries have fully revived decentralization, the 
survey revealed that no country in Africa today advocates a preference for the 
centralized state. Nearly all countries claim in one way or another to be decentralizing 
fiscal power, resources, and accountability to local levels. I wonder to what degree 
these countries‘ representatives felt compelled to adopt fiscal decentralization so as to 
manage their identity as ‗a stable country‘ to international lenders and investors. Yet, 
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as the literature indicates, the process of reform and results of recent decentralization 
are widely varied and the underlying processes not fully understood (Prud‘Homme, 
1995; Smoke 2001). Understanding the geography of the varying policy outcomes 
involves more than focusing on the technical analysis of empirically collected data, or 
scrutinizing the political and institutional state actors as evident in the public policy 
literature (Hills and Hupe, 1993; 2006), and a number of published papers on fiscal 
decentralization policies in Ghana (Ankamah, 2012; Ahwoi, 2010; Antwi-Bosiako, 
2010; Banful, 2011). Such policies are not isolated from the rest of society. Cultural 
norms and trends, and the reactions of citizens and media may influence the course of 
public policy. Likewise, events of local, national and international significance will 
impact on the activities of policy makers.  
 
I argue that Discourse Analysis is a methodology that offers a way of thinking about 
policy research which is not centered on institutions and implementation outcomes. 
Discourse Analysis creates the possibility of "detaching oneself from [the fiscal 
decentralization discourse], bracketing its familiarity in order to analyze the theoretical 
and practical context with which it has been associated" (Foucault 1986: 3). Discourse 
Analysis opens up the possibility of fresh insights into fiscal decentralization policies. 
For instance, Foucault‘s (1980) ideas on the production of discourse raise questions 
about the practices of government and how public policy is formed, shaped and 
reshaped, as opposed to institutional histories. Discourses Analysis has the potential 
to show the link between political rhetoric, and how discourses are created and 
maintained. Foucault‘s take on discourses is insightful when applied to the discourses 
on policy in the Third World20. Advancing on Foucault‘s  meaning of discourse, a vital 
                                                          
20 Foucault provided two meanings of the term discourse. First, discourse includes all forms of representation and not 
merely written and spoken words.  Second, discourse is not simply about something (fiscal decentralization, politics, 
efficiency) but constitutes that thing (Cresswell, 2009). 
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deduction for my research is that discourse is not about saying ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘, when 
asked a seemingly simple question such as: Is fiscal decentralization efficient or not? 
Foucauldian discourse analysis involves identifying why the question arises. It is about 
discussing why society makes any of the ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ choices and the effect of the 
choices made (Huxley, 2009). Discourse is about examining why fiscal 
decentralization is a common theme in policy documents. It is about how and why 
sub-themes like efficiency, equity, and accountability exist in Ghana‘s fiscal 
decentralization policy documents, if they do. Discourse analysis can help me address 
some unanswered questions in the fiscal decentralization literature. These questions 
include: why did developing countries adopted fiscal centralization in the first place? 
And now, why are they increasingly compelled to shift from fiscal centralization to 
decentralization? Since I did not find any fiscal decentralization research that deploys 
discourse analysis as method to address these questions, I shift my focus to the 
development discourse literature.  
 
Specifically, I draw methodological lessons from Arturo Escobar, who utilized 
Foucault‘s discourse analysis to address a set of development questions similar to the 
ones I raise21. Escobar (1995) addressed these three main questions:  how did the 
industrialized countries of North America and Europe come to be seen as the 
appropriate models for post-World War II societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
                                                          
21 In 1994, Escobar published a paper titled ―Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance 
of his Work to the Third World‖ where he explained Foucault‘s discourse analysis. He wrote: ―Discourses, according to 
Foucault, have systematic structures, and they should be studied archeologically by identifying the different elements of 
which they are composed, and the system of relations by which these elements form wholes. More importantly, they 
should be studied genealogically. Genealogy is concerned with the effective formation of discourse by non-discursive 
practices, such as socioeconomic factors, institutions, administrative requirements, etc. The genealogist undertakes a 
diagnosis of a current situation by concentrating on the political technologies constituted by the interrelationship of 
contemporary forms of power and knowledge. The objective of his study are those practices of modern culture 
embodied in specific technologies, their localization in different discourses, institutions and disciplines, and the 
processes by which they arise and develop.‖ This is what Foucault calls ―writing the history of the present.‖ His detai led 
studies of madness, medicine, the human sciences, the prison and sexuality are part of this history of the present. 
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America? How did the postwar discourse on development actually create the so-called 
Third World? And what will happen when development ideology collapses? He 
expressed his motivation to address these questions in his book Encountering 
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World as:  
Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and omnipresent reality of 
development: governments designing and implementing ambitious development 
plans, institutions earning out development programs in city and countryside alike, 
experts of all kinds studying underdevelopment and producing theories and 
nauseam. The fact that most people's conditions not only did not improve but 
deteriorated with the passing of time did not seem to bother most experts. 
Reality- in sum, had been colonized by the development discourse, and those who 
were dissatisfied with this state of affairs had to struggle for bits and pieces of 
freedom within it, in the hope that in the process a different reality could be 
constructed (Escobar 1995: 5)  
 
 
 
Escobar approaches the three questions through a discourse analysis of the 
components and relationships of what he calls ―the three axes that define 
development‖: its forms of knowledge; the system of power that regulates its practice; 
and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse (Escobar 1995:10). The 
production of knowledge and the planning of development by western institutions is 
something that third world countries and regions find hard to escape. He argued that 
the process of western dominance, restructuring, and establishing authority progresses 
in three stages/axes (see page 157 of his work): First, the progressive identification of 
third world problems to be treated by specific interventions. This creates a "field of 
the interventions of power." Second, is the professionalization of development; the 
recasting of political problems into neutral scientific terms (poverty indicators, for 
example), leading to a regime of truth and norms. This creates the "field of the 
control of knowledge." Third, is the institutionalization of development to treat these 
‗problems‘, and the formation of a network of new sites of power/knowledge that 
bind people to certain behaviors and rationalities. These behaviors and rationalities are 
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what societies accept as truths. Clearly, Escobar (1995) adopted his discourse analysis 
approach from Foucault‘s triangulation of the key components in a given discourse: 
knowledge, power and truth. 
 
Throughout his book, Escobar employed diverse forms of discourse analysis. The 
specific analytical methods he employed vary from historical references, case/country 
specific illustrations, a cultural critique of economics and institutional ethnography. 
Even though in some cases, he draws on his personal ethnographic study in Colombia 
during and after his PhD fieldwork22, he makes reference to empirical-based literature 
of other post-development scholars when advancing his arguments. After providing a 
brief historical overview of the professionalization of development knowledge, he 
uses the communities of Nepal and Papua New Guinea to illustrate his argument 
                                                          
22 Arturo Escobar was born in Colombia. in 1952 but migrated to the USA. In 1978 he enrolled in an interdisciplinary 
PhD program at Berkeley, arousing his interest in the social sciences and questions of power, international development 
and planning. Doctoral work, which included a year of fieldwork in Colombia, saw early expression in a brilliant article 
published in the Indian journal Alternatives, where he applied Foucault‘s notions of power to the study of international 
development (Escobar 1984). His theoretical argument - that development should be seen as a discourse of power and 
control - was new and challenging, and by the early 1990s Escobar was established as a leading thinker among a strong 
group of ‗post-development‘ theorists (Escobar, 1992, Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). In 1989, Escobar moved firmly into 
the discipline of anthropology, and became the Kenan Distinguished Teaching Professor of Anthropology in 2000. 
Escobar‘s major monograph, Encountering Development (1995) - an elaboration of the work he had been conducting since 
the 1980s - elevated him to the status of post-development icon. For many critics today, development has reached an 
impasse.  Escobar and the post development theorists have built upon the work of many others to expose how 
―…development was shown to be a pervasive cultural discourse with profound consequences for the production of 
social reality in the so-called Third World.‖ (Escobar 2000:11). In his later work, Escobar has begun to look beyond the 
failures and limitations of state, market and international aid, to a form of social change led by new social movements. 
This second strand to Escobar‘s work emerged in the mid-1990s, when he conducted a year of fieldwork on the Pacific 
coast of Colombia, the first of several periods during which he worked with Afro-Colombians (descendants from 
African slaves brought to mine gold) and their activist organizations and networks in the region (Escobar 1996). The 
coast is a hot-spot of biological diversity, and home to rights movements with a strong sense of place and territory, and 
Escobar‘s research traverses his belief in the power of these place-based social movements as alternatives to national and 
western development efforts. Some of his work in this region of Colombia is, therefore, framed in the language of 
political ecology, and geographical concepts of place and territory are critical to his analysis (Escobar 1996, 1998, 2001). 
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(page 53). In his third chapter, he employs a cultural critique of economics via the 
discourse of development economics using what he calls ―the anthropology of 
modernity‖ (61). Here, he draws on the work of Gudeman and Rivera (1990) to make 
his case. In chapter four, Escobar uses institutional ethnography as a means of 
understanding the massive development programs established by World Bank, United 
Nations, and several universities. He does this by ―investigating how professional 
training provides the categories and concepts that dictate the practices of the 
institution‘s members and how local courses of action are articulated by institutional 
functions‖ (109). Escobar extends his analysis in chapter five by focusing on the 
regimes of representation that underlie constructions of peasants, women, and the 
environment (155). He explores the contradictions and possibilities inherent in the 
processes of integrated rural development, incorporating women into development, 
and sustainable development.  
 
This brief contour mapping of Escobar‘s specific approach to discourse analysis 
reveal how complex but flexible discourse analysis can be. His anthropology of 
modernity relies on ethnographic approaches that look at social forms as produced by 
historical practices combining knowledge and power; and that seek to examine how 
truth claims are related to practices and symbols that produce and regulate social life. 
His deconstructionist approach (Sachs, 1992) analyzes the central constructs or key 
words of the development discourse, such as market, planning, population, 
environment, production, equality, participation, needs and poverty. Because of his 
anthropological background, he placed emphasis on ethnographic research. In his 
literature review, he cites a group of Swedish anthropologists who focus their work on 
how the concepts of development and modernity are used, interpreted, questioned, 
and reproduced in various social contexts in different parts of the world. One 
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example is Pigg (1992) in her work on the introduction of health practices in Nepal, 
where she deployed local ethnographies on development and modernity for analysis.  
 
These diverse ways of doing discourse analysis supports the assertion of Lees (2004: 
104), that discourse analysis is ―something like bike riding…which is not easy to 
render or describe in an explicit manner.‖ Even though Escobar was an 
anthropologist, he made some valuable contributions to the discipline of geography.  
 
3.2.2.2 Arturo Escobar‘s Contribution to Geography and its Relevance to Understanding Fiscal 
Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries 
I am not the first geographer to use Escobars‘ work to guide my research project. 
Some geographers have used his analysis as a point of departure for studies on social 
movements and development alternatives, even though some are also critical of his 
work23. His work relates with geography in at least three ways. 
First, the ideas expressed in Encountering Development, for example, highlight some of 
the spatial outcomes of the hegemonic ‗development‘ discourse since colonial times 
(Batterbury and Fernando in Kitchin et al, 2004).  As earlier discussed, the questions 
raised by Escobar are similar to the question of why developing economies are 
compelled to adopt fiscal decentralization. His normative analysis of the development 
discourse using Foucault‘s is a great methodological guide to addressing my research 
question. I have learnt that historical references, case-specific illustrations, institutional 
ethnography, critical ethnography, critical language analysis, tracing genealogy from 
                                                          
23   Many geographers like Sundberg (1998), Adams (1990) Bebbington (1996, 1997), Bebbington and Thiele (1993) Price 
(1994), Zimmerer (1993) have been inspired by Escobar‘s works to look at micro-level social movement and NGOs 
activities in localities of Latin America, where he conducted his studies. However, Escobar‘s words have been described 
as purposely harsh or provocative because they suggest an instrumental aim lying behind a universal (Western) paradigm 
in which many people, including western geographers, are complicit (Batterbury and Fernando, 2004). 
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the present, and even fieldwork are specific ways of doing discourse. I select some of 
these methods to guide my discourse analysis. 
Second, Escobar contributes to understanding local geographies and sense of place, 
perhaps because of his anthropological stance. The alternatives Escobar favors are the 
responses of indigenous/autonomous social movements, and localized strategies of 
development, rather than the radical overturning of western-dominated geopolitical 
relations by the state at a macro level, as was proposed by earlier dependency 
theorists. He argued that criticism of the ‗mainstream‘ can translate into viable 
alternatives, where new social movements emerge to create new conversational 
communities. He uses the case of U‘wa indigenous group in Colombia who have 
mobilized against the Colombian government and Occidental Petroleum to oppose oil 
exploration (Harcourt and Escobar, 2002). Escobar argue that ―the struggle for 
territory is thus a cultural struggle for autonomy and self-determination. This explains 
why for many people of the Pacific, the loss of territory would amount to a return to 
slavery or, worse perhaps, to becoming ―common citizens‖ (Escobar 2001: 162). 
Social movements are therefore intimately linked to local geographies; culture resides 
in places, even under conditions of mass globalization. Perhaps, if these movements 
are effective, then they can be an invaluable tool to use to undermine fiscal 
decentralization policies in Ghana, if inequitable, inefficient and less accountable than 
the dominant knowledge/theory claims. 
  
Third, when addressing matters of nature and the environment, Escobar makes 
further claims which are of interest to geographers working in the interdisciplinary 
field of political ecology (Escobar, 1999). Escobar‘s arguments revolve around the 
view that much of nature is now artificially produced and deeply linked with 
technology and social relations, and that these relationships are ―hybrid and 
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multiform‖ (Escobar 1999: 1). He defines political ecology as ―the contingent study of 
the manifold articulations of history and biology and the cultural mediations through 
which such articulations are necessarily established‖ (1999:3). His definition captures 
the concerns of ‗realists‘ geographers interested in the material transformations of the 
natural world by human actions (the majority of political ecologists are geographers) 
and those who perceive nature as a historically and socially constructed category. I 
argue that his definition serves as a unifying platform for the many different cliques 
and specialisms in the discipline of geography. Of course, there is nothing wrong with 
alternating between the ontological position of a ‗realist‘ and ‗social constructionist‘ in 
a single research project if each position help address a research question. In the same 
way I combine quantitative analysis of fiscal data (material/positive approach) with an 
interpretivist discourse analysis of fiscal decentralization (based more on normative 
approach).  
 
Having discussed extensively how discourse analysis can be used to understand why 
fiscal decentralization is held out as a good thing in third world countries, I now focus 
on the final part of my review, which involves developing a conceptual framework for 
my research project. The framework draws lessons across the literature discussion 
covered so far in this chapter. 
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
A point I have already highlighted and re-emphasized is that getting policy makers to 
rethink or reconsider fiscal decentralization policies involves more than scrutinizing 
the policy designs. It requires an understanding of the material and immaterial 
foundations of the whole concept of fiscal decentralization, and evaluating its 
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practicality over time. That is why I raised and reviewed two main questions in the 
literature. To reinforce these vital questions, I raise them again. First, does fiscal 
decentralization work, and the related epistemological question, how do we know it 
works? Second, why do countries feel compelled to implement fiscal decentralization, 
and the related question, why is fiscal decentralization held out as a good thing? My 
conceptual framework is built on these two main questions, as well as lessons from 
the literature addressing those questions. 
 
Specifically, I develop a framework that encompasses the building blocks of research 
presented by Grix (2002). In his paper titled ‗Introducing Students to the Generic 
Terminology of Social Research‘, Grix (2002) presents the interrelationship between the 
core concepts of social science research, namely ontology, epistemology, 
methodology, methods and sources. Understanding of these basic but relevantly 
related concepts helps students like me – and all in academia – to engage in 
constructive dialogue and criticism of each other‘s work. In his work, he presented a 
simple step-like framework about how a researchers‘ ontology, affect his/her 
epistemology, methodology, methods and even data. I modified his simple framework 
into two distinct step-like research paths, with each path addressing one of the two 
questions of my research project (see figure 3.1). The question ‗does fiscal 
decentralization work?‘ has been usually addressed by more conservative positive-
stance researchers, while the question ‗why are countries compelled to implement 
fiscal decentralization/why is fiscal decentralization held out as a good thing?‘ has 
been addressed by normative-stance researchers. The core concepts of social science 
research —ontology, epistemology, methodology/method, and data —are viewed or 
employed differently by each of the two research cliques.  
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A researcher‘s ontological position is their answer to the question: ‗what is the nature 
of the social and political reality to be investigated?‘ (Hay, 2002: 63). Examples of 
ontological positions are ‗realism‘ and ‗social constructivism‘. For social science, 
broadly speaking the former is ‗an ontological position that asserts that social 
phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors‘. 
The latter, on the other hand, is an alternative ontological position that asserts that 
social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social 
actors (Bryman, 2001). From figure 1, while positive-stance researchers view fiscal 
decentralization as objective, or real and therefore concern themselves with the 
question of whether that reality (FD) is materializing or achieving its goals; normative-
stance researchers belief that FD is socially constructed and therefore a way to 
understand it is to deconstruct it or even ask why countries are compelled to 
implement that policy in the first place.  
 
If ontology is about what we may know, then epistemology is about how we come to 
know what we know. Two contrasting epistemological positions are those contained 
within the perspectives ‗positivism‘ and ‗normative/interpretivism‘. These terms can 
be traced back, and illuminated by reference to, specific traditions in the philosophy 
of social sciences (Grix, 2002). Broadly speaking, the former ‗is an epistemological 
position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond‘. The latter, on the other hand, can be seen as an 
epistemological position that ‗is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required 
that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences 
and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action‘ (Bryman, 2001: 12–13). As indicated in figure 1, positive-stance researchers 
know whether FD is materializing or achieving its goals by adopting the positive 
approach, while adopting the normative approach helps a normative-stance researcher 
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to know why fiscal decentralization is held out as a good thing. It is clear that 
choosing one of these distinct epistemological positions will lead one to employ a 
different methodology, method and data than one would otherwise, were one to 
choose the other. Positivists wants to develop models, test hypothesis, use regression 
analysis, look at the facts and figures from policy reports and draw conclusions. 
Normativists (including critical geographers) will like to analyze discourse so as to 
reveal the powers that define FD as knowledge, and how such knowledge becomes 
the truth (norm). Therefore, it is clear to see how a researcher‘s ontological and 
epistemological positions can lead to different views of the same social phenomena of 
fiscal decentralization. 
 
Since I address two different questions in this research project, opting for a positive 
or normative research stance alone will not serve my purpose fully. I can only explore 
one of the questions at best by adopting either of the stances (see figure 3.1). That is, 
assuming the stance of normative may help me review the socially constructed nature 
of fiscal decentralization, and even reveal how developing economies are oppressed 
by these policies (as critical geographers do). But what if there is no oppression? Or 
what if fiscal decentralization has been more efficient, equitable or accountable? The 
only way I can prove that is to look at the material evidence by employing positive 
approaches. 
 
Really then, ‗a wise‘ stance for me will be one that is based on plural ontologies, 
epistemologies, methodologies, methods and data; one that does not esteem the 
normative above the positive approach but consider all as relevant to addressing my 
research question. The wise stance has a strong prescriptive component. However, 
unlike the normative stance, it is more conservative, it builds on time-tested 
  56  
 
knowledge, it acknowledges the value of tradition and of past experience (Simandan, 
2011: 190; Baltes and Smith 2008). 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework for Rethinking Fiscal Decentralization Policies 
  
Source: Adapted from Grix (2002) and Simandan (2011) 
 
 
Simandan (2011:191) in his paper on the ―Wise Stance in Human Geography‖ pointed 
out (based on Brown‘s argument)24  that the wise stance is ‗more mature and more 
comprehensive stage in one‘s path of intellectual and moral development within the 
                                                          
24 Brown (2005) argued that true wisdom presupposes the critical stance while the critical stance does not presuppose 
true wisdom. In fact, the critical stance is even critical of the nature of true wisdom 
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critical stance‘. Therefore, while I want to be critical, I do not ignore some traditional 
quantitative approaches to understanding fiscal decentralization; neither do I totally 
dismiss fiscal decentralization as a relevant policy. That is what I achieve by using the 
wise stance in addressing fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology of this research project. 
The term methodology is loosely used to refer to methods, rules, formal theories and 
postulates (Irny and Rose, 2005; Carter, 2007).  For the purpose of my research 
project, I adopt a more specific meaning of the term; one originally expressed by 
Kaplan. He defined methodology as ―the study-description, the explanation, and the 
justification-of methods, and not merely the methods themselves‖ (Kaplan cited in 
Carter, 2007; 1317).  Therefore, I describe, explain, and justify my choices of methods 
used to examine fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. I also include and justify my 
selection of data sources, sampling techniques and research methods. 
I employ mixed methods by combining discourse analysis of policy documents and 
quantitative analysis of empirical data. I was inspired to make these choices by this 
interesting quote by Hidding et al (2000:129): 
Each of us – academics, policy makers, politicians – tends to think 
within a discourse. But we do not need to be imprisoned within it. 
Moreover, being made aware of what we have been taking for 
granted...can be liberating, academically and politically.  
 
Inspired by this quote, I combine discourse analysis and quantitative analysis 
(analytical statistics like regression analysis) to explore the two main questions of 
this research project. First, is fiscal decentralization working for Ghana? Second, 
why was Ghana compelled to implement fiscal decentralization in the first place? 
Addressing the first question involves analyzing the material evidence using the 
positivist approaches. The positivist approach (involving empirical model building 
and statistical (regression) analysis) is the common (and traditional) approach in the 
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fiscal decentralization literature. To address the second question, I use discourse 
analysis and therefore assume a normative stance25 by presenting myself as an 
‗ontological constructivist‘ and ‗epistemological interpretivist‘. Ontologically, I 
acknowledge that the applicability of fiscal decentralization policies is fluid, and 
constantly revised by social actors. My interpretivist epistemology enables me to use 
some value-judgments to address my research questions. These two differing 
stances position me in ‗a wise‘ stance (Simandan, 2011; see figure 3.1). I therefore 
develop a methodology by building on the plural ontologies and epistemologies 
that characterize the ‗wise stance‘ (see conceptual framework in chapter three). 
 
4.2 Documentary Quantitative Research 
This section involves quantitative analysis of data gathered from the documentary 
records of fiscal decentralization at the national, regional and district levels. The 
purpose of this analysis is to determine whether fiscal decentralization policies in 
Ghana actually work or not. I achieve this by checking the overall internal consistency 
of Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization arguments.  These arguments parallel the theory that 
fiscal decentralization enhances efficiency, accountability and equity.  
 
Documentary research is actually not a ‗method‘ in the way that discourse analysis or 
ethnography are. Instead, it focuses on using specific data generated in the past and 
stored in archives to address research questions (Gidley cited in Seale, 2012). Once 
the required data are collected, a researcher uses a variety of methods to analyze such 
datasets with his ultimate objective in mind. In my case, I opt to use descriptive and 
analytical quantitative methods—from simple descriptive techniques averages and 
                                                          
25 Refer to chapter three for details of the normative stance 
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location quotient, to complex statistical analytical techniques like multivariate 
regression. I opt for these methods because, as already discussed in my literature 
review chapter, most authors addressing similar research questions employ the same 
statistical tools for their analysis. As Gidley (2012) indicates, a vital step in 
approaching documentary research is to explore and discuss your data sources. 
Therefore, I discuss my data sources, and issues of validity and reliability of the 
selected documents and sources.  
 
First, let me clarify a methodological debate around documentary research. Here 
again, the debate is between the two main research stances discussed in my literature 
review section: positive/realist stance and normative/social constructivist stance. The 
positive stance takes the archival documents as resources, while the normative stance 
considers the documents as a topic26. First, I adopt the positive stance and therefore 
consider the available documented reports on Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization as 
resources for understanding whether fiscal decentralization in Ghana actually works 
or not. Later in my Critical Discourse Analysis section in this chapter, I treat these 
documented reports as topics.  
 
4.2.1 Data Sources for Documentary Analysis 
I collect my documentary records from three main sources. First is a relatively long 
panel of data on Ghanaian local governments‘ public finances, obtained from IFPRI27. 
The datasets consist of MMDAs‘ revenues which are disaggregated by source 
                                                          
26 Postivists consider documentary records as real and given, that serves as evidence in answering research questions 
while the normative stance consider such documents as realities, and not a means to understanding some reality. As a 
result, normative approach seeks to understand the underlying social constructions that produce such documents 
(Silverman, 1993; Seale, 2012) 
27 I obtained these data through a formal email request for the datasets send to IFPRI. About two months after request, 
IFPRI sent an email response along with the datasets.  
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(revenues from licenses, property taxes, external grants, etc.), and MMDAs‘ 
expenditures by economic classification (personnel, travel and transport, capital). The 
panel spans 11 years (1994–2004) and covers 110 MMDAs existent at the time the 
data was gathered.  Since then, the number of MMDAs in Ghana has grown as a 
result of administrative rearrangements. The datasets were initially compiled for 
research on fiscal decentralization and public investment in Ghana. They were 
compiled from administrative data sources of the Ministry of Local Government, 
Rural Development, and Environment (MLGRDE) of Ghana, Inspectorate Division 
(under the then-leadership of Mr. Johnson Alifo). IFPRI obtained some of the data 
directly from the Ministry, while other parts of the data had been previously obtained 
from the Ministry by researchers at the Institute for Statistical Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER) in the University of Ghana, Accra.  
 
In checking the validity and reliability of such archived datasets, Scott (1996:6) 
suggested four criteria namely authenticity (is the datasets genuine?), credibility (is the 
datasets undistorted?), representativeness, and meaning (is the evidence from the archives 
clear and comprehensible?). The IFPRI dataset is representative because it covers all 
110 administrative MMDAs of Ghana during the period it was gathered. It is also 
meaningful for my research project since it contains clear statistical figures on revenue 
and expenditure performance of MMDAs, which is required to evaluate fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana. Even though it is not exhaustive (since it does not contain 
more recent datasets from 2005-2012), it provides detailed MMDAs fiscal data dating 
back to the very first year (1994) fiscal decentralization was implemented in Ghana. 
That will serve as a starting point of evaluating the efficiency of the MMDAs. In 
terms of authenticity, IFPRI gathered majority of the datasets from MLGRDE, which 
is the authority in Ghana responsible for compiling fiscal data across MMDAs. Also, 
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the fact that IFPRI consulted the Inspectorate Division (which is an External 
Auditing team of the final fiscal accounts) shows some level of reliability.  
Additionally, these datasets have been used and published by scholars, graduate 
students and institutes within or even outside Ghana28, and therefore increases its 
recognizability. However, I acknowledge that the datasets are secondary, ―raw‖ data, 
compiled and organized by IFPRI staff from both electronic sources, as well as from 
hardcopy sources available only in Ghanaian government physical archival records. 
There may be human errors during the compilation by IFPRI, or even the initial 
production of these documents by the Ministry. Also, the values in the dataset 
obtained from IFPRI were denoted in ‗old‘ cedi, not the new Ghana cedi (GHC), 
which was introduced in July 2007. I transform the figures using the new Ghana cedi 
equivalent29. 
 
In terms of more recent datasets on fiscal decentralization (2000-2012), I compiled 
them on my own. I obtained some of the datasets by personally visiting MMDAs 
offices in Ghana in the early months of 201130.  Others were obtained through email 
correspondence with the Office of the MLGRD. Some recent fiscal datasets were 
accessed through external audit fiscal reports publicly published and available online. 
Also, the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) datasets were obtained from 
                                                          
28 Recently published papers by Banful (2011), Mogues (2012), as well as a recently approved graduate thesis by Maeregu 
Kazentet (2011) of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana, and Issah (2011) of Institute of 
Social Studies, Netherlands, used similar IFPRI datasets. However, their agendas differed from what I seek to achieve in 
this research project.   
29 One new GHC is equivalent to 10,000 ‗old‘ cedi 
30 I visited some selected MMDAs to obtain some of the datasets. Since financial data at the local government level are 
considered ‗sacred‘, I had to provide an academic authority note to the Secretary of the District/Municipal Chief 
Executive (DCE), book and appointment to discuss the data I need with the chief at his convenience. After approval 
from the DCE, the data request form is sent to the appropriate department (the Budget Office, Planning Department, as 
well as the Finance office). Even after seeking the consent of the DCE/MCE, some departments refused to release the 
data I requested. I therefore had to choose other MMDAs. This explains why graduate students are reluctant to engage 
in analysis of more recent datasets. However, I still make my case with the limited datasets I gathered. Even though the 
districts were selected randomly, the ones I include in my final analysis were dependent on access to financial records. 
This may create non-response bias in my results.  
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the DACF Administrator‘s Office. Presidential election results for 2004, 2008, and 
2012 were obtained from the Headquarters of the Ghana Electoral Commission in 
Accra Ghana via email. The election results data were compiled from various 
documents supplied by the Research and Monitoring Department of the Electoral 
Commission. While these datasets may be relatively reliable because I compiled them 
on my own, I have no control over the reliability of the data gathered initially. 
Moreover, some of the MMDA-level data I gathered is not representative of the 
entire MMDAs, which totaled 216 in 2012. Notwithstanding, these more recent 
datasets, and the ones I collected from IFPRI are vital in my quantitative analysis.     
 
The other two main sources of data are Ghana‘s 2003 Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey, and the Population and Housing Census (2000, 2010) 
which are used primarily to identify district socioeconomic and demographic variables 
in Ghana. CWIQ is a standardized survey of core welfare indicators comprising a 
sample of 49,003 households nationwide, with at least 405 households randomly 
drawn from each of 110 administrative districts of Ghana existing at the time of the 
survey. The data are representative at the district level. The survey was conducted by 
the Ghana Statistical Service with methodological and financial support from the 
World Bank. Additional district- and household-level data were collected from other 
sources, including the 2000 and 2010 Ghana Population and Housing Census (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2005). Just like the IFPRI datasets, and the one I compiled, these 
sources may have reliability and validity issues. However, they are representative and 
meaningful in assessing issues of equity and accountability in fiscal decentralization at 
the MMDA level. Having discussed my data sources, I now focus on how to use these 
to verify the theoretical appeal for fiscal decentralization.  
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4.2.2 Propositions and Analytical Framework 
 
I verify two key propositions using the documentary records gathered; 
 Proposition 1: Fiscal decentralization improves internal revenue generation (IGF)  
performance among MMDAs in Ghana  
 
Examining proposition 1 is a vital starting point of my analysis because it deals with 
MMDAs‘ fiscal independence status. Even though a substantial share of MMDAs 
revenues is made up of DACF transfers from the central government, what MMDAs 
generate internally (IGF) is a more important measure of fiscal decentralization. This 
is because while DACF funds tend to be tied to particular projects or sectors, IGF are 
used in a completely flexible manner by the MMDAs. In this sense, MMDAs fiscal 
autonomy is intimately tied to their ability to generate their own resources. The more 
efficient MMDAs are in generating IGF, the more autonomous their revenues and 
expenditures (Mogues et al, 2012; Issah, 2011). This relates with the efficiency theory. 
 
There are many different ways that MMDAs IGF performance can be analyzed. Gill 
(2000) suggested some different analytical approaches. These include: 
1. Measuring total revenue against GDP: This is used for comparing countries with similar 
economic and tax structures and gives relative effectiveness of the revenue 
administration. A country which collect more taxes than another is considered to 
have an efficient revenue administration simply because both countries have 
similar economic and tax structure. Since I am dealing with different MMDAs with 
varying economic base, this is not a good measure of IGF performance for this 
research project. 
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2.  Measuring actual revenue against estimated revenue: this evaluation approach does not 
address coverage in terms of potential tax payers but is commonly used in Ghana31 
and most developing nations. If actual revenue is almost equal to, equal to, or 
better still greater than expected revenue, then the revenue performance is ‗good‘.  
3. Amount of revenue paid voluntarily against total revenue collected: This indicates voluntary 
compliance of the tax payers and used to evaluate tax payers‘ perception of their 
civic rights and responsibility. Tax payers voluntarily comply with their tax 
obligations when they perceive an efficient tax administration system in their 
jurisdiction (in terms of proper accountability to the public). ‗Ceteris paribus‘, the 
more taxes are paid voluntarily, the more efficient the tax systems are. Since there 
are no reports in Ghana that capture taxes paid voluntarily within MMDAs, this 
analytical measure is not an option for this research project. 
4. Tax-payers‘ perceptions:  This is a qualitative indicator of the perceived integrity, 
trustworthiness and efficiency of revenue administration. The better the 
perception of tax-payer, the more effective the revenue administration of a 
jurisdiction is, all things being equal. Considering that I did not actually interview 
tax-payers, this measure was not used. 
5. Cost/benefit ratio: This is the ratio of cost of administering the revenue as against 
revenue generated. The cost-benefit ratio is calculated as total annual expenditure 
of the authority expressed as a percentage of the revenue collected in the given 
period. It also shows per unit cost incurred against a unit of revenue generated and 
could be one of the best indicators. When cost exceeds benefits, revenue 
generation is inefficient, all things being equal. It is assumed to be the primary 
indicator used to estimate efficiency of revenue collection. Data for this measure is 
not available in Ghana, hence not an option for this research project.  
                                                          
31 A number of researchers have employed the comparative potential and actualized revenue approach to compare IGF 
performance in Ghana. These included former MSc thesis candidates Maeregu Kazentet (2011) of Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology, Ghana and Issah Abdul-Basit (2011) of Institute of Social Studies, Netherlands.   
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Taking into consideration the available data, my analysis uses the actual IGF collected 
against estimated or planned revenue/IGF, which is second on the list of approaches 
discussed by Gill (2000). This analysis involved the use of more recent datasets I 
personally compiled. To establish the context of analysis, I evaluate MMDAs IGF 
performance using old datasets gathered from IFPRI. My evaluation involve 
comparing what MMDAs were able to generate internally (IGF) to external transfers 
(DACF) over time. Here, MMDAs poor IGF performance is indicated by a 
decreasing proportion of IGF relative to DACF over time.   
 
Additionally, I employ a geo-statistical tool — the distribution quotient32 —to 
compare the relative spatial distribution of IGF performance in Ghana by regions. 
The concept of distribution quotient is originally used to measure the degree of an 
activity or a phenomenon in a given physical area, but have been used by some 
scholars to evaluate fiscal performance of local government across space (Issah, 
2011). In this research project, I use the concept to measure the degree of IGF 
concentration among populations of different regions. The distribution quotient can 
be calculated by dividing the percentage of IGF mobilized in a particular region by the 
percentage of total population for that region:  Thus: DQ=Y/X: where,  
Y is % share of IGF per region, and  
X is % share of population of each region.  
 
 
Relatively higher degree of IGF performance can be found in MMDAs of those 
regions with DQ greater than unity. 
                                                          
32 An alternative to the distribution quotient is the location quotient (LQ), which is usually used to measure the 
concentration of economic activities (e.g. industries) in a specific area (e.g. .region) relative to a base area (e.g.  nation). 
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 Proposition 2: Fiscal decentralization improves equity in funds disbursement 
Two key components of effective fiscal decentralization in Ghana are equity and 
apolitical transfer of DACF from the central government to MMDAs. The goal is to 
ensure that individuals within each jurisdiction enjoy a fair share of the country‘s 
resources33. Therefore, my analysis of equity will involve a careful evaluation of the 
theoretical formulae for disbursement of funds (DACF) from the central government 
to each MMDA. I explore whether the percentage of funds disbursed to each of the 
four factors (Needs, Responsiveness, Service Pressure and Equality factors) actually 
reflects equity or not (i.e. Equity in terms of whether the formula actually favors 
disbursement of funds to MMDAs which have more need for such funds). Equity in 
fiscal decentralization also involves the apolitical transfer of DACF from the central 
government to MMDAs. I therefore employ multivariate regression analysis to 
determine whether politics (election results) affect DACF transfers or not. My 
regression analysis involves the use of the more recent datasets I compiled since some 
scholars have explored evidence of political interference in DACF transfers in Ghana 
using the old IFPRI datasets (1994-2004)34. So as part of my second proposition, I use 
multivariate regression to determine if politics interfere in revenue transfer from 
central government to MMDAs. 
 
 
                                                          
33 According to Fynn (2011), the four main factors that are applied in sharing funds amongst the districts include: 
Equality: This ensures that the assemblies have access to specified funds. It involves a straightforward division of a 
portion of the fund by the total number of MDDAs in Ghana. Need Factor: this factor is meant to address the current 
imbalances in development. It involves health, education, water and road indicators. Responsive Factor: This is designed 
to motivate the MMDAs to generate and collect more internal revenue. Therefore, a percentage increase in MMDAs 
owned-source revenue will cause an increase in the responsive factor of the DACF. Service Pressure Factor: This to 
assist in improving existing services, which as a result of population pressures are deteriorating faster than predicted 
34 Banful (2011) pointed to changes in the weights as evidence of politically motivated targeting in the DACF transfers. 
Equality became more significant than equity after a changeover in government in 2004.She added that this is because 
politicians capitalize on the equality factor to transfer more funds to their target regions by simply creating more 
districts.   
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4.2.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis: DACF Disbursement Determinants 
Using multivariate regression analysis to evaluate factors affecting revenue transfer in 
Ghana is not new in the literature, as discussed in the previous chapter. In the case of 
Ghana alone, I find two recently published research papers using the same 
methodological approach35. My analysis fills three gaps in such empirical studies. First, 
I employ more recent data sets from 2004-2012, since both papers have covered 
extensive analysis from 1994-2004. Second, I conduct my analysis at a different 
geographical scale (I use average of MMDAs per region). While I acknowledge that 
such a scale will conceal some potentially relevant district-level data, it allows me (as a 
geographer) to identify how differences in the regional geographical scale may 
produce varying results36. Third, I combine independent variables of DACF used in 
both Banful (2011) and Mogues (2012), and also stress the geography of these 
variables in my results and discussion. 
 
Typically, the difficulty in constructing a regression framework for central government 
transfers to lower administrative levels is that it is unclear how the allocation decisions 
                                                          
35 These two papers are authored by Mogues et al (2012) and Banful (2011).  
Mogues et al (2012) uses rich panel data on all of Ghana‘s districts‘ local public finances over from 1994-2005 to 
investigate the way that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments affect local governments‘ incentives 
to collect internally generated revenues and funds (IGF). The two main predictor variables used in their analysis are 
public financial variables and core district characteristics. Public financial variables used are basically DACF transfers. 
The core district characteristics is made up of basic economic, demographic, social, and climatic characteristics of district 
i. Specifically, economic features, reflecting economic welfare and development, are the district poverty rate, the literacy 
rate, and average access to roads by households in the district; demographic district attributes include the degree of 
urbanization and population size and density; variables defined as the shares of Ghana‘s two largest ethnic groups (Akan 
and Ewe) and Christians in the district represent core social characteristics; and climatic conditions are measured by 
district rainfall. The authors also introduced a composite error term to control for district unobserved effect and an 
idiosyncratic disturbance. 
On a more related study, Banful (2011) studied evidence of politically motivated targeting in DACF transfers at the 
district level from 1994-2004. Her dependent variable was log per DACF disbursement, and the predictor variables 
included politics (measured using either number of district vote per wining party, or creating dummy variables for win 
and loss between the two main political parties), and district wealth measure (number of schools as a measure of 
development or equity).  
 
36 This an example of the Modifiable Areal Unit (MAU) problem 
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are made. In the case of DACF, this problem is eliminated because the formula for 
determining each district‘s allocation and hence the right functional form of a 
regression model is known. Theoretically, a number of factors determine the 
disbursement of the DACF per region at time t (DACFRT). Four of these factors are 
captured in the formulae for the disbursement. According to Fynn (2011), the four 
main factors that are applied in sharing the fund among the MMDAs include37: 
 
Equality (60%): This factor ensures that the MMDAs have access to specified funds. 
It involves a straightforward division of a portion (after deducting reserves) of the 
fund by the total number of MMDAs in Ghana. Because my analysis is at the regional 
level, I determine the actual disbursement per region by multiplying the average 
DACF per MMDAs (after applying the equality factor) by the total number of 
MMDAs per region over time. This factor is represented as b1EqualityRt-1 in my 
regression equation.  
 
 Need Factor (35%): This factor is meant to address the current imbalances in 
development. It involves access to health, education, water and road indicators. 
Because actual counting of these indicators and creating an index for them is an entire 
research on its own, I use CWIQ datasets to rank the regions from 1 to 10 for each 
development indicator, where 1 represent the region with the least need and 10 
represent the region with the greatest need (see appendix III for details)38. The need 
factor is represented as b2NeedsRt-1 in my regression equation.   
 
                                                          
37 To give readers a fair idea of the make-up of the DACF disbursement formulae, I indicate in parenthesis the average 
percentage of funds disbursed per factor from 2004-2012. 
38
 My ranking of MMDAs may affect the outcome of my regression model. However, since data on the needs factor 
index was not obtained, I made use of the only available data. 
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Responsive Factor (3%): This designed to motivate the MMDAs to generate and 
collect more internal revenue. Therefore, a percentage increase in MMDAs owned-
source revenue (IGF) will cause an increase in the responsive factor of the DACF. I 
use the average percentage increase of IGF per region for my regression analysis. I 
represent this factor by b3ResponseRt-1 in my regression model.  
 
Service Pressure Factor (2%): This is to assist in improving existing services, which 
are deteriorating faster than predicted due to population pressures. This factor is 
determined by calculating the population density per district. However, I averaged 
population density at the regional level (see appendix III). This is represented by 
b4PopDenRt-1 in my analysis.   
 
Time: Even though the four main factors discussed above make up the formula for 
the disbursement, variation over time is an equally important factor. DACF account 
reports and some empirical studies indicate proportionate decrease in disbursement of 
the funds over time, while other research indicate increases in funds over time 
(Mogues et al, 2012; Banful, 2011; DACF Report, 2004-2008).  
 
However, I use time to capture the effect of lagged predictor variables in my analysis. 
This is because the amounts of DACF transfer for a current year (t) are based on the 
previous year‘s factors (t-1). That is, service pressure, responsiveness, needs, and 
equality factors for 2004 are used to disburse DACF in 2005. Therefore, all the 
predictor variables (formula factors) have ―t-1‖ in attempt to capture for time lags for 
DACF at time t.  Finally, I introduce an error term ei, to control for regional 
unobserved effects and unexplained differences 
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From the foregoing discussion, given a formal multivariate regression model of the 
form Yi = β0 + β1 (x1)i + β2 (x2)i + β3 (x3)i + … + βK (xK)i + εi  regression, the 
theoretical model is: 
                                                                      
 
Apart from the four-factor formula, the literature on intergovernmental revenue 
sharing has highlighted other factors that influence the disbursement of DACF. One 
factor that has attracted attention among researchers because of its possible effect is 
politically motivated targeting of resources (Banful, 2011; Miguel and Zaidi 2003). 
When evident, politically motivated targeting of DACF transfers defeats the apolitical 
and equitable goal of fiscal decentralization in Ghana.  
 
Politically Motivated Targeting: I introduce another independent variable that 
captures the likely effect of politically motivated targeting on the DACF 
disbursement. I measure politically motivated targeting by comparing election results 
for the two main political parties (NDC and NPP). I use the percentage of votes cast 
for NPP (the winner in 2004) per region for my first set of analysis (2004-2008). The 
second set of analysis (2009-2010) included percentage of NDC votes per region for 
the 2008 election (because NDC won). The political factor is represented as b5PolRt-1. 
When operationalized, the model is: 
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With the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software, I run the two 
models to determine whether politics as a variable significantly affect DACF 
disbursements. I then determine the most parsimonious model for DACF transfers. 
Before determining the most parsimonious model, I test for multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. I also run some correlation tests to determine the strength and 
direction of the contribution of each predictor to DACF.  
 
4.2.4 Justification for Quantitative Analysis of Documentary Research 
Even though my analytical approaches varies from using simple statistics to complex 
model building with multivariate analysis, it offers a flexible and multi-faceted way of 
using documented reports as resources in policy studies. It is therefore not surprising 
that most scholars evaluating country-specific or cross country fiscal decentralization 
policies use some form of quantitative analysis of archived datasets39. Additionally, 
documentary research forms a vital component of triangulation of methods (Gidley 
cited in Seale, 2012). This can be seen in my use of three different specific approaches 
to evaluate the efficiency proposition in relation to fiscal decentralization. Even some 
qualitative-oriented researchers use quantitative analysis of data to provide 
background information to their qualitative analysis. For instance, Symons (2009) 
combined quantitative analysis of archived data with oral history and participant 
observation in his research on gay athletes. For my research project, my quantitative 
analysis of archived data provides a backdrop against which I foreground my 
discourse analysis of policy documents advocating for fiscal decentralization.   
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Refer to the literature review in chapter three 
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4.2.5 Summary Table for Quantitative Analysis  
Table 4.1 presents a summary of my methodology. This summary table includes my 
propositions or objectives, data sources, and main analytical techniques used to 
address the objective/proposition. 
Table 4.1: Summary Table for Quantitative Analysis 
Propositions/objective Data Sources Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
FD improves MMDAs IGF 
generation performance 
Data on IGF (expected and 
actual) and external funds 
(DACF) gathered from: 
 
-IFPRI data (1994-2004) 
-IGF from MLGRD Report 
-Audit Reports (2005-2012) 
-DACF Administrator 
 
Others include PHC (2000, 
2010) statistics on population 
Compared per capita IGF to per capita 
external funds 
 
Compare expected IGF to actual IGF 
using a line graph 
 
Computed and tabulated distribution 
quotient 
 
Compared spatial distribution of IGF 
performance using a map 
 
Fiscal decentralization 
improves equity in DACF 
disbursement  
DACF disbursement formula 
data gathered from MLGRD, 
and DACF Administrator 
Compared trends in the DACF four-
formula factor weights from 1994-2009  
using line charts 
Determining evidence of 
political motivation in 
revenue transfer 
DACF, CWIQ, PHC, and IGF 
data (see appendix III for 
details) 
 
Run a multiple regression analysis 
 
 
 
Issues of Accountability 
 
MMDAs capital and recurrent 
expenditure gathered from 
IFPRI dataset 
 
CWIQ 
 
Compared trends in capital and 
recurrent expenditure using line graph. 
 
Compared expenditure trends to 
tabulated changes in development 
indicators 
 
Note: Study did not account for 
leakages due to corruption since data 
was not available to capture those 
leakages. 
Source: Author‘s construct, 2014 
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4.3 Discourse Analysis 
Having discussed extensively my methodologies for determining if fiscal 
decentralization works in Ghana or not, I shift my focus to the question of why 
Ghana was compelled to implement fiscal decentralization in the first place. Drawing 
lessons from Escobar‘s writings in the development literature, I opt to use discourse 
analysis. Discourse analysis of public policy (fiscal decentralization in the case of my 
research) can be carried out in many ways. Popular options include discourse in a social 
context and critical discourse analysis (Tonkis cited in Seale, 2012). As the name implies, 
discourse in a social context focus solely on the social context that produces a 
discourse. Such analysis is limited to the way specific forms of text, language or 
knowledge produce different versions of truth. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) goes 
beyond the technical analysis of text to explore its socio-political and historical 
context, uses and effects. For my research project, I use the CDA approach. 
 
For my CDA, I address the following methodological questions: What is the context 
of analysis? What are my sources of data? How do I sample and gather my data? How 
do I analyze my data?  By using these questions to guide my CDA, I reveal how fiscal 
decentralization policies are and have come to be associated with equity, efficiency 
and accountability. I suggest how these policies could be different under different 
circumstances (Hammerlsy, 2003).  Just like Escobar (1995) who adapted his discourse 
analysis approach from Foucault‘s triangulation of the key components in a given 
discourse—knowledge, power and truth—I analyze the interplay of these three 
components to create fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. 
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4.3.1 Context of fiscal decentralization 
In terms of context, I have two main options. I could conduct my discourse analysis 
in a proximate or distal context (Schegloff, 1997). Proximate context refer to the features 
immediately relevant to a piece of text or interaction. An example of proximate 
context is the immediate institutions which produce and implement fiscal 
decentralization policy documents. More general aspects of social life such as class, 
gender, ethnicity or culture which affect and are affected by such policy documents 
form the distal context. Geographically, a proximate context can be the National 
Development Planning Commission, Finance Ministry, and Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development located in Accra, Ghana. These bodies are 
charged with the responsibility of production and revision of fiscal policy documents 
in Ghana. On the other hand, a distal context for my research transcends national 
boundaries to look at fiscal policy documents produced and revised by the UN-
Habitat, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Academically, the 
choice of proximate context requires that I examine fiscal decentralization through 
the lens of an economist, geographer, political scientist, sociologist or linguist only. 
But using a distal context, just as Escobar (1995) did, allows me to consider the 
history, politics, geography, language and sociological underpinnings of fiscal policies 
in Ghana.   
 
I chose distal context for this thesis because I am interested in conducting a critical 
discourse analysis which involves understanding the larger context in which fiscal 
decentralization unfolds. I examine the social, historical, political and geographical 
settings that create specific knowledge or language about fiscal decentralization 
(Tonkiss cited in Seale, 2012). The genealogy of fiscal decentralization in Ghana can 
better be traced by looking at some international discourses of fiscal decentralization. 
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As a limitation, working within a distal context is broad and time consuming, and may 
require larger data sets than working within the proximate context. Furthermore, 
access to financial policy documents is also relatively difficult for the distal context. 
That raises the question about the various sources of data available for my CDA. 
 
4.3.2 Data Sources for CDA 
Among the wide range of data available for CDA are: international fiscal policy 
documents, Ghana fiscal policy reports, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, press or 
television reports, party manifestos, and my personal accounts. Even though a wide 
range of data sources exist, researcher‘s choice of data should be based on its 
relevance to the research problem.  I prioritize fiscal policy documents (both 
international and national) because of my quest to understand why fiscal 
decentralization is held out as desirable. Unlike sources such as television reports, 
fiscal policy documents are accessible online. Here, unlike my documentary data used 
as resources in my quantitative analysis, I treat the documents as topics. I therefore 
assume a normative stance by viewing policy documents as socially constructed. 
Therefore, I consider the documents selected for my discourse as realities themselves, 
and not as a tool for understanding some other reality (Gidley cited in Seale, 2012). 
Like Escobar (1995), I am concerned with the underlying social, historical, economic, 
and geographical organizations that construct these policy documents. 
 
4.3.3 Data Sampling for CDA 
In terms of sampling, I chose four main sets of fiscal policy documents; two from 
within Ghana and two from the international community. I identify two contrasting 
discourses on fiscal policies in Ghana at two different historical moments: Policy 
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documents produced prior to the 1990s, and policy documents produced after the 
1990s. This contrast is based on the fact that the 1990s marked the period where 
‗proper fiscal decentralization‘ commenced in Ghana.  Regarding policy documents 
produced prior to 1990s, I use documents associated with the Structural Adjustment 
and Economic Recovery Programs (SAP & ERP) in Ghana, which were produced 
between 1983 and 1986. For the post 1990 fiscal documents, I select policy 
documents that explore the discourse of fiscal decentralization (preferably the 1994 
and 2011 fiscal documents). Here specific documents I consider include a number of 
legal documents listed by Ankamah (2012) in his paper on the politics of fiscal 
decentralization. These include: The 1992 constitution Local Government Act, 1993 
(Act 462); Local Government Service Act, 2003 (Act 656); National Development 
Planning (Systems Act) 1994 (Act 480); District Assemblies Common Fund Act, 2003 
(Act 455). 
 
For international documents, I consider fiscal documents that directly affected the 
policy process of decentralization in Ghana. These are basically policy framework 
documents or Working Papers of the UN-Habitat, European Charter, World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as international legal documents. 
Ankamah (2012) lists a number of international legal binding documents of Ghana‘s 
commitment to decentralization that also promotes fiscal decentralization among 
others. These include: the Victoria Falls Declaration (1999) on an African Vision on 
Decentralization; The Kigali Declaration (2005) on Leadership Capacity Building for 
Decentralized Governance and Poverty; and Commitment under the New Partnership 
for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Commitments under the 
Commonwealth Local Governance Forum declarations/affirmations includes; The 
Singapore Declaration; The Harare Declaration; The Millbrook Action Program; The 
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Latimer House Principles; The Aberdeen Principles; and Trinidad and Tobago 
Affirmation. I use some of these binding documents in my critical discourse analysis. 
Narrowing my data options to four main sets of documents makes sorting relevant 
text easier. It also saves time for data collection and analysis. More importantly, these 
datasets sets the context for Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization process. Like Escobar 
(1995), I also draw on scholarly literature as a minor source of information for 
analysis. 
 
4.3.4 Data Analysis for CDA 
Using knowledge, power and ‗truth regimes‘ as the foundation of discourse creation, 
shaping and reshaping, I trace a genealogy to Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization (see 
Chapter Three for Escobar and Foucault‘s discourse analysis). Using the set of policy 
documents selected, I examine Ghana‘s colonial and post-colonial geopolitical and 
socio-economic position. These examinations occur at different geographical scales, 
namely the local, the national and the international. I identified key themes and 
arguments in the policy texts, and compare and contrast these themes for the four 
different sample policy documents selected. I also look for patterns of association and 
variation in the policy documents. Taking a normative stance, I explain these themes 
in relation to power, knowledge and truth. Here is where Escobar‘s (1995) 
development discourse analysis is very useful. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Escobar revealed how problematization, professionalization and institutionalization 
relate with power, knowledge and truth respectively. I use a similar analytical structure 
in the next chapter. Also, as a critical discourse analyst, identifying the silences in the 
policy documents is equally important as identifying emphatic themes (Hammerlsy, 
2003; Tonkiss cited in Seale, 2012). I therefore identify social issues that are absent 
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from one policy document but present in another, and explain the differences with 
reference to the geographical (social, political and historical) context.  
 
4.3.5 Relevance of CDA to this Research Project 
CDA offer a sophisticated insight into the complex world of fiscal decentralization 
policies. CDA enriches my analysis further by its insistence on close reading in 
conjunction with a broader contextual analysis, including consideration of discursive 
practices, intertextual relations, and sociocultural factors.  It sets the historical context 
for readers to comprehend the various arguments advanced in my research. Likewise, 
it complements my quantitative analysis of archived data by providing insight into the 
geographies of policy implementation.   
 
Also, CDA affords me the opportunity to identify the silences inherent in policy 
documents. This is a complement to my quantitative analysis which is based solely on 
the material evidence/data. While I appreciate that discourse analysis refrains from 
forcing data or text  to say things that are not there, CDA afford me the opportunity 
to reveal what remains ‗unsaid‘ about the fiscal decentralization discourse (Tonkiss 
cited in Seale, 2012: 417). Revealing what fiscal policies in Ghana can say or do 
differently may help to place the fiscal policy discourse in a wider interpretive context 
for me and future researchers. 
 
However, I admit that my approach to CDA has various limitations. Selecting four 
sets of policy documents amidst a wide range of data sources may not be 
representative. My CDA ignores the proximate context of fiscal policies. 
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Understanding socio-political and historical context of policy involves more than 
understanding the distal context. The proximate context offer immediate and micro-
level background assessment of power, knowledge and truth. Time and difficulty in 
accessing micro-scale policy documents (i.e., fiscal policy reports of the 216 MMDAs 
in Ghana) account for my ignoring the proximal context. As already discussed in 
Chapter Two, I make up for this by using ‗averaging‘ to check the internal consistency 
of fiscal decentralization arguments.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter forms the core of the findings and analysis of this research project. I 
present and discuss two sets of results. The first set is a baseline result and discussion 
of the aftermath of fiscal decentralization in Ghana. It involves the use of descriptive 
statistical tools like bar charts and cross tabulations, to complex statistical analyses like 
multivariate regression. I use these quantitative techniques and data gathered from 
CWIQ, IFPRI, MMDAs, GHDS datasets to present results addressing whether fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana actually works or not. The second set of results is based on 
my use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explain why fiscal decentralization is 
held out as a good thing for Ghana. Since Ghana is the case study for this project, all 
policy documents selected have in one way or the other affected Ghana‘s fiscal 
decentralization policies. 
 
 
5.2 Does Fiscal Decentralization Actually Work In Ghana? 
As already discussed in chapters two and four, the attributes of a successful fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana include; 
 Efficient internal revenue generation of MMDAs 
 Equitable and apolitical transfer of DACF from the central government to 
MMDAs.  
 Clearly defined and implemented MMDAs expenditure functions 
 
Based on these attributes, I evaluate Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization performance by 
addressing the following specific research questions: 
 Are MMDAs efficient in generating revenue (IGFs) within their jurisdictions? 
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 Is equity/fairness evident in the disbursement of the DACF in Ghana? 
 Does politics affect DACF disbursement in Ghana? 
 Do MMDAs have a clearly defined and implemented expenditure function? 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Are MMDAs efficient in generating revenue (IGFs) within their jurisdictions? 
 
An efficient fiscal decentralization requires a consistent increase in IGF as a 
proportion of total revenue at the MMDAs‘ level. This is because MMDAs‘ fiscal 
autonomy is closely linked to their ability to generate revenue within their own 
jurisdictions. The more MMDAs improve in generating their own revenue over time, 
the less they depend on inconsistent and untimely external revenue sources in caring 
for their district needs. 
 
As depicted in Figure 5.1, MMDAs per capita IGF has increased from 1994 to 201240. 
Likewise, MMDAs per capita external revenue has increased. However, the increase in 
per capita IGF revenue relative to per capita external revenue is very low. In the initial 
period of fiscal decentralization implementation (i.e., 1994), per capita internal 
revenue were nearly equal to per capita external funds, that is, 0.4 GH Cedis. 
However, at the end of the year 2012, per capita IGF has increased slightly (from 0.4 
GH Cedis to 0.8 GH Cedis) while per capita external revenue increased considerably 
(from 0.4 GH to 7.1 GH Cedis)41. Especially noticeable is the massive increase in 
MMDAs per capita external funds after 2008 (that is, from 4.0 GH Cedis in 2008 to 
6.4 GH Cedis in 2009). This increase occurred because the percentage of GDP 
                                                          
40 In terms of absolute numbers, MMDAs‘ revenue generations (through rates, rent, land, license, fees and fines, 
miscellaneous) increased between 1994 and 2004 (see figures 5.1 a-g). 
41 In terms of proportion, internal revenue sources were nearly equal to external funds in 1994, that is, 46 percent of the 
total local revenue. However, by 2012, MMDAs internal revenue proportion declined to 17.85 percent. Therefore 
MMDAs are increasingly becoming dependent on central government transfers. 
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allocated to MMDAs through DACF transfers increased from 5% to 7.5% in 2008. 
Surely, MMDAs are increasingly becoming dependent on central government 
transfers for their development operations, even after almost 20 years of 
implementing fiscal decentralization in Ghana. Consequently, MMDAs have little say 
or control over their own expenditure and revenue decisions. The implementation of 
their development plans depend largely on external funds, which are usually 
unpredictable in timing and amount. This is not what one would expect in light of 
consistent efforts to deepen decentralization in Ghana, including efforts to strengthen 
the fiscal position of MMDA governments. 
 
Figure 5.1: Proportions of MMDAs Per Capita Revenue: IGF versus External Funds 
 
Source: Authors‘ Construct 2013 (IFPRI datasets; MMDAs Audit Reports). 
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Of equal importance are the regional disparities in the IGF performance. Generally, 
the regions in northern Ghana (Upper East, Upper West, Northern region) 
performed poorly in relation to other regions (see Figure 5.2 for a map indicating this 
disparity).  
 
 
Source: Authors, 2013 (Extracted from MLGRD Report 2008-2011) 
 
On average, all three regions generated less than 6 percent of their annual revenue 
between 2008 and 2011. On the other hand, regions in the southern part of Ghana 
raised more than 20 percent of their annual revenue within their jurisdiction (see 
figure 5.2). I argue that the southern regions performed better than the northern 
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regions because they have more and richer resources (rich minerals, better agriculture 
climate including the sea, and human capital). Consequently, these southern regions 
have been the growth poles of Ghana‘s development prior to decentralization. 
MMDAs in the south have better infrastructure and better economies, hence wider 
tax bases to tap revenue compared to the northern regions. 
 
Granted, I find that all MMDAs were very close to achieving their expected IGF. As 
depicted in figure 5.3, the worst IGF performance was 89.6% (Greater Accra), while 
the best performance came from MMDAs in Volta region (57.3% more than expected 
revenue). Notwithstanding the good IGF performance, most MMDAs did not meet 
their IGF expectations. In contrast to my first proposition, fiscal decentralization has 
not improves IGF performance among MMDAs in Ghana. 
 
Figure 5.3: Average IGF Performance per MMDA (2005-2010) 
 
Source: Author‘s Construct, 2013 (extracted from MMDAs Audit Reports 2008-11) 
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The ‗why this inefficiency question‘ has to do with revenue collection design and 
implementation problems. In Ghana, although adequate legislation has been instituted 
to enable MMDAs to harness IGF, they still face four serious design-efficiency 
problems (Mogue et al, 2012; Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004). First, tax bases of local 
governments are static because of weak databases for determining revenue potentials. 
Areas within regions where revenue could be generated are not well identified and 
therefore the revenue collection level is not optimal. Second, there are complex 
structures in terms of planning for revenue collection in some of the regions. For 
instance, a UN-Habitat (2009) report indicates dual allegiance of decentralized 
departments, and functional duplication of public agencies in performing their 
statutory obligation in the same geographical location as key planning problems in G. 
Accra region. Such poor planning often creates friction and duplication in revenue 
collection services, leading to inefficient revenue performance.  
 
Third, mechanisms for collecting internal revenues are ineffective. For instance, 
revenue collections from property rates are low because properties have not been 
properly valued. Furthermore, there are few revenue collectors in most MMDAs, 
especially in regions with relatively higher populations. The fourth design problem is 
the absence of appropriate sanctions or punishment for tax defaulters. Most residents, 
especially traders, do not feel obliged to pay taxes. While not the thrust of this thesis, 
a question worth considering is ―to what degree do these problems relate to adopting 
procedures developed in old industrialized countries and applying them blindly to an 
industrializing country like Ghana?‖ 
 
Greater Accra, even though was the worst performing region in Ghana, recorded the 
highest absolute average actual IGF. Table 5.1 captures the per capita average IGF 
performance of MMDAs in each region for more recent datasets (2004-2010). The 
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goal is to identify the average contribution of each individual in each MMDAs 
jurisdiction as a way of measuring how efficient such MMDAs are at collecting 
revenue. 
 
Table 5.1: Distribution Quotient for IGF Performance Per Region (2004-2010) 
Region Average 
Population  
Average  
IGF 
% Average 
population 
(X) 
%  Average 
IGF share 
(Y) 
Distribution 
Quotient 
Ashanti 4,085,905 1,968,823.93 19.24 8.54 0.44 
Brong Ahafo 2,017,544 1,352,810.29 9.50 5.87 0.62 
Central 1,835,751 1,566,958.93 8.65 6.80 0.79 
Eastern 2,321,374 1,381,271.79 10.93 5.99 0.55 
Greater Accra 
3,346,188 5,836,421.43 15.76 25.31 1.61 
Northern 2,080,592 1,510,891.73 9.80 6.55 0.67 
Upper East 
974,041 2,028,883.76 4.59 8.80 1.92 
Upper West 
620,910 1,778,074.52 2.92 7.71 2.64 
Volta 1,832,822 1,798,662.87 8.63 7.80 0.90 
Western 2,119,431 3,837,551.43 9.98 16.64 1.67 
Total 21,234,558 23,060,350.67 100 100 
 Source: Author‘s Construct, 2013 (extracted from MMDAs Audit Reports 2008-11) 
 
Table 5.1 clearly indicates differences in DQ, and hence differences in IGF 
performances across MMDAs within the 10 regions of Ghana. Relatively higher 
degree of IGF performance can be found in MMDAs of those regions with DQ 
greater than unity: Upper East, Upper West, Western and Greater Accra. For 
example, Upper West with an average population of 620,910 generated on average 
1,778,074.52 Ghana Cedis per year (2004-2010) and scored a DQ of 2.64 indicating 
the highest level of IGF mobilization. Whereas the Ashanti Region, which in absolute 
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terms is the third highest average IGF generator (that is 8.54% of total average 
revenue from 2004-2010), is now the worst IGF generator when measured relative to 
the size of its population. The question worth addressing is: why the spatial 
differences in regional DQ for IGF performance?  
 
To address this question, I briefly highlight some of the problems that might account 
for poor IGF performance. A report for the World Bank (2000) reveals major 
concerns which determine the magnitude of revenues generated in MMDAs. These 
concerns include the legislative provisions, implementation strategies and designs, 
funding relationships as well as issues about economic efficiency and accountability 
which determine the magnitude of revenues to be generated by sub-national 
governments.  Additionally, inter-jurisdictional variations in revenue performance are 
dependent on the geographically variable tax base of such jurisdiction (Pacoine, 2001; 
Harvey, 2009). This implies that regions in Ghana privileged with relatively more 
resources (minerals, suitable agriculture lands and climate in the case of Ghana) have a 
wider tax base and hence greater IGF. 
 
From Table 5.1, MMDAs of six out of the ten regions of Ghana scored a DQ less 
than unity, indicating their inability to generate sufficient revenue to support their 
administrative functions. Obviously, external transfers, especially transfers from the 
central government (DACF), automatically become a relevant component of effective 
fiscal decentralization. Hence, the question of whether such transfers are equitable 
and apolitical is worth discussing. 
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5.2.2 The Disbursement of DACF in Ghana versus Equity Issues 
Equity as a concept is complex to define and even more difficult to measure. Pacoine 
(2001:10) reiterates this point in his paper on Geography and Public Finance that 
while ‗specification of locational efficiency is relatively straightforward; equity in 
public service provision is more difficult to determine‘. He added that while some 
scholars argue that equity is enhanced when services are distributed in proportion to 
taxes paid; others contend that equity demands allocation of services in proportion to 
need. In the social justice discipline, the concept of equity stems from the idea that 
`one of the more important purposes of government in contemporary western society 
is to offset the burdens imposed on some groups by the operation of the market 
economy so that a greater equality of life chances is achieved' (Rich, 1979:152). Due 
to these complexities, I do not attempt a definition of equity. However, for the 
purpose of this analysis, I consider the difference or otherwise between equality and 
equity. 
The terms equity and equality are often used interchangeably, yet they represent quite 
different, if related, concepts. The Webster's New World Dictionary (1988) relates 
equity with fairness or justice. Equality, on the other hand, suggests the state or 
instance of being equal. This in turn is defined as having the same rights, privileges, 
ability, rank or of being the same quantity, size, number, value, degree, intensity, and 
quality (see Plate 5.1). In geography of public finance, the two terms are related but 
still different. An equitable arrangement is one that promotes greater equality of 
condition (Rich, 1979; Pacoine, 2001). Services are equally distributed when everyone 
receives the same services. They are equitably distributed when citizens who deserve 
more (perhaps because they need more, work harder, or utilize the service wisely) gets 
more, and ultimately are in a more equal life circumstance than before.  I argue that 
equity is better determined by outcome (changes in relevant social conditions brought 
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by a service) rather than output measures of services (the products of agency 
activities).  
 
Plate 5.1: Equality does not mean Equity 
 
Source: Author‘s Construct, 2013 (Adapted from http://www.youth-in-transition-
grant.com/files/2013/02/Slide1.jpg) 
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Based on my argument, I detect concerns for equality and equity in the theoretical 
formulae-based DACF sharing in Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization42.  More recently, 
about 60% of the total DACF transfers are based purely on equality factor, where 
each MMDA is entitled to the same amount of transfer across the country. The equity 
factor is not clearly defined in the formula. But, based on the meaning of equity, I 
argue that the other factors: responsiveness, needs, and service pressure form the 
equity component. My argument is based on three reasons. First, equity is in the sense 
that the formula rewards MMDAs that generate more internal revenue 
(responsiveness factor). Second, equity is evident in the fact that MMDAs that have 
more pressure on social services because of population density receive more DACF 
(Service pressure factor). Third, MMDAs with more pressing development needs 
receive more DACF (Needs Factor).  
 
Figure 5.3 clearly indicates that over time, DACF disbursement has shifted focus from 
equity to equality, even though equity remains the ultimate goal of fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana. Three years after its implementation (1994-1997), 70% of 
the DACF was geared towards achieving equity. This is indicated in the 20% weight 
for the responsiveness factor, 35% for needs factor, and 15% for service pressure 
factor. However, by the year 2009, equity has reduced by a significant 20%, while 
equality has increased in weight from 30% in 1994-1997 to 50%, and was even 60% in 
2004-2005. These trend changes are not expected from a country that seeks to 
improve equity by deepening fiscal decentralization. Therefore, the propositions ‗fiscal 
                                                          
42 According to Fynn (2011), the four main factors that are applied in sharing funds amongst the districts include: 
Equality: This ensures that the assemblies have access to specified funds. It involves a straightforward division of a 
portion of the fund by the total number of MDDAs in Ghana. Need Factor: this factor is meant to address the current 
imbalances in development. It involves health, education, water and road indicators. Responsive Factor: is designed to 
motivate the MMDAs to generate and collect more internal revenue. Therefore, a percentage increase in MMDAs 
owned-source revenue will cause an increase in the responsive factor of the DACF. Service Pressure Factor: is to assist 
in improving existing services, which as a result of population pressures are deteriorating faster than predicted 
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decentralization improves equity in funds disbursement (stated in chapter four) has 
been refuted. A question worth addressing at this point is: are these changes a 
reflection of politically motivated targeting? This is an important question because 
changes in DACF formula usually occur in election years43    
 
Figure 5.4: Formula factor proportion for DACF disbursement (1994-2009) 
Adapted: DACF Annual Proposal to Parliament, 2010; Banful, 2011 
 
With the unpredictable changes in the indicators and weights of the formula, MMDAs 
have essentially no capacity to increase their future allocations by changing their level 
of any particular indicator. Worse yet, because the formula utilizes a comparison of 
the indicator in an MMDA with the level of the indicator in all other MMDAs, an 
                                                          
43 Banful (2011) pointed to changes in the weights as evidence of politically motivated targeting in the DACF transfers. 
Equality became more significant than equity after a changeover in government in 2004. She added that this is because 
politicians capitalize on the equality factor to transfer more funds to their target regions by simply creating more districts 
in regions that favor them.   
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MMDA requires information about the strategies of all other MMDAs in order to 
predict how a change in its own level of a particular indicator can affect its share of 
the DACF. Also, since the data used in the formula is only available from the relevant 
sector ministry after a one or two year lag, MMDAs cannot anticipate when and 
whether any actions they take to affect their level of a formula indicator will be 
relevant. Such unpredictability of which indicator will be relevant is especially 
important for the ‗responsiveness‘ category which is explicitly included in the formula 
to encourage local revenue generation and should comprise of a steady indicator that 
MMDAs can respond to. Unfortunately, the weight of the ‗responsiveness‘ factor has 
fallen drastically, creating little motivation for MMDAs to be fiscally autonomous. 
With such lapses in the DACF formula, fiscal decentralization will be in jeopardy if 
the actual disbursements reveal effect of politically motivated targeting. The next 
section of my analysis explores the relationship between the actual DACF 
disbursement and politically motivated targeting.    
 
 
5.2.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis: DACF Disbursement Determinants 
The multiple regression equation results produced from the two models (see chapter 
four) are indicated in the Table 5.2. Table 5.4, captured in the appendix, display the 
correlations results. The first sign of the reliability of my three models is their 
statistical significance. As depicted in Table 5.2, all three models have an overall 0.000 
significance level (far below the significance level of 0.05), and are therefore 
statistically significant models.  The R-square values in table 5.2 reveal that 36.8% of 
the variations in actual disbursement can be accounted for by fitted models 1 and 2 
(see methodology chapter for models). This means that actual DACF disbursement 
does not change when the effect of politically motivated targeting is added to the 
four-factor formula/DACF model. Of more interest, are the adjusted R square 
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values44, which reveal a difference between fitted model 1 and 2. While 32.2% of the 
variations in actual annual disbursement are explained by the variations in the 
predictor variables for fitted model 1, the introduction of election results as a 
predictor variable decreases the overall influence of the predictors to 30.9% (fitted 
model 2). This difference is consistent with the idea that MMDAs DACF 
disbursement per annum is better accounted for by excluding election results (politics) 
as a predictor.  
 
Of equal importance are the regression coefficients and their relative significance 
levels. Even though all two models have strong overall statistical significance (all the 
models have strong significance level of 0.000 at the 0.05 significance level as depicted 
in Table 5.2), the significance level of individual predictor variables of DACF 
disbursement vary.  
 
As depicted in Table 5.2, the relative contribution of population density, 
responsiveness and election results are not statistically significant (because their sig. 
values are greater than 0.05 at the 0.05 sig. level) for both models. Only the Needs and 
Equality factors are responsible for the overall statistical significance (at the 0.05 
significance level) of all two models. That is an unsurprising result considering the fact 
that 90 to 95 percent of the funds are geared towards the equality and needs factor 
(see Figure 5.4). 
 
Here again, a point of interest is which of these two factors is a better determinant of 
DACF —is it equality or need (which reflect equity)? The beta column of Table 5.2 
                                                          
44 The adjusted R-square values have the same interpretation as the R-square values. However, adjusted R-square is a 
more reliable measure of model quality because it reveals the amount of shrinkage (predictive loss) if the same model is 
applied to a different sample. It helps to predict the expected amount of explained variation in cases were we took new 
samples using an identical procedure from the same ten regions considered for this research.   
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provides the standardized co-efficient for comparing the relative contributions of 
these two factors. It shows that needs factor contributes more (45.6%, and 46.3% for 
fitted models 1 and 2 respectively) than equality factor (32.5% and 32.2% for fitted 
models 1 and 2 respectively). Likewise, the needs factor has slightly greater statistical 
significance (0.000 significance at the 0.05 sig. level for both models) than the equality 
factor (0.006, and 0.009 at 0.05 sig. level for fitted models 1 and 2 respectively). 
 
Table 5.2: Co-efficient from Linear Regression Models Predicting DACF (N=300, 360) 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 (Constant) 812241.150 124900.766  6.503 .000 561934.421 1062547.879 
POPULATION 
DENISTY 
1497.633 1913.145 .109 .783 .437 -2336.396 5331.662 
NEEDS 469990.089 126363.708 .456 3.719 .000 216751.558 723228.619 
EQUALITY  -.178 .062 -.325 -2.87 .006 -.303 -.054 
RESPONSIVENESS  -7395.019 4325.555 -.226 -1.71 .093 -16063.625 1273.587 
 R Square 0.368    .000   
 Adjusted R Square 0.322    .000   
2 (Constant) 816289.414 135329.329  6.032 .000 544970.445 1087608.383 
POP DENISTY 1523.098 1955.369 .111 .779 .439 -2397.181 5443.378 
NEEDS 476504.241 150151.310 .463 3.173 .002 175468.989 777539.493 
EQUALITY  -.177 .065 -.322 -2.72 .009 -.307 -.046 
RESPONSIVENESS  -7433.509 4390.207 -.227 -1.69 .096 -16235.345 1368.327 
ELECTION RESULTS -2226.389 27093.179 -.012 -.082 .935 -56544.943 52092.165 
 R Square 0.368    .000   
 Adjusted R Square 0.309    .000   
1. Predictors: (Constant), Equality, Responsiveness, Needs, Population  Density 
2. Predictors: (Constant), Equality, Responsiveness, Needs, Population Density, Election Results 
Significance is at 0.05 level. a. Dependent Variable: DACF TRANSFERS 
Source: Author, 2013 
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While acknowledging the limitations of my data, politically motivated targeting is the 
most insignificant relative determinant of DACF transfers (with a significance level of 
0.935 at 0.05 sig. level) in the regression analysis. Does this imply that the 
disbursement of DACF is apolitical? Not really. As depicted in table 5.7 (Appendix), 
election results have a relatively strong positive correlation of 0.253 with MMDAs‘ 
DACF transfers. More importantly, the results in Table 5.7 (appendix) also show that 
the correlation between the two is statistically significant (0.025 level at 0.05 sig. level). 
This may imply that as MMDAs that voted more for the ruling party during the 
presidential elections received more DACF. It must be noted however that the 
influence of such election results become insignificant relative to the four-factor 
formula for disbursing the DACF. 
 
This finding is consistent with what Banful (2008) finds. She found that even though 
the effect of election results on DACF increasingly diminishes from 1994 to 2003, 
there was still more subtle evidence of political interference in DACF disbursement. 
Subtle political interference is in the sense that a ruling party creates more MMDAs in 
their stronghold to increase their share of the equality factor. The goal is to reward 
them for their votes but also motivate them for future elections. As a result, she 
found that more funds are actually disbursed just before and after election years. That 
is consistent with my correlations. As depicted in table 5.6, election results and the 
equality factor are positively correlated (0.218) and also statistically significant at 0.04. 
So even though my regression analysis revealed apolitical disbursement of DACF, 
subtle political interference may still exist in Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization. 
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5.2.4 MMDAs Expenditure functions 
My initial proposal included evaluating MMDAs expenditure performance and its 
effect on human development in their respective jurisdiction. This is because 
MMDAs are responsible for the overall development of their jurisdiction (Local 
Government Act (462), 1994). I sought to compare expenditure incurred on health 
and education to human development indicators (HDI) namely literacy, life 
expectancy and economic growth. Upon further research, I realized that MMDA 
expenditure is not the only determinant of development in the jurisdiction. There are 
various expenses by development partners (including NGOs) that do not pass 
through MMDAs‘ financial systems. Such organizations directly implementing their 
programs outside the budgeting framework of the MMDAs could be funding similar 
items like those the MMDAs fund. Indeed, the MMDAs could be aware of the types 
and levels of expenditures by the agencies but they could not have direct control over 
them, and as such it is difficult for reports like this to show the volume of these 
expenditures relative to MMDAs‘ expenses. The situation makes it difficult to assess 
the real volume of financial flows to the jurisdiction of the different MMDAs.  
 
However, as depicted in Figure 5.3, the overall expenditure on both capital and 
recurrent expenditure increased from 1994 to 2002. Since 1994 marked the beginning 
of fiscal decentralization implementation, MMDAs spent more in putting in place a 
functioning administration than actually undertaking development projects (capital 
expenditure). This explains why in 1994, the bulk of MMDAs expenses were recurrent 
(namely personal emoluments, maintenance and repair, transportation cost). Personal 
emoluments such as salaries, wages and allowances of MMDA workers formed the 
greatest proportion of recurrent expenditure (43%).  However, between 1995 and 
1998, MMDAs invested more in capital goods (namely education, health, water and 
sanitation). Even through MMDAs average capital expenditure continually increased, 
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more of their revenue was used to cover recurrent expenditure from 1999 to 2002. 
Overall, MMDAs expenditure has been increasing significantly from 1994 to 2002.   
 
Figure 5.5 Trends in MMDAs Expenditure 1994-2002 
Source: Extracted from IFPRI datasets, 2004 
 
The increase in MMDAs expenditure may have contributed to the improvement in 
socio-economic development indicators, as reported by the CWIQ survey for 1997 
and 200345. As indicated in Table 5.4, development indicators for health, education, 
water and sanitation have improved significantly between 1997 and 2003 for more 
than half of MMDAs in Ghana. MMDAs may be a major contributor to such 
improvement because they increase their capital expenditure between 1997 and 2003 
expenditure (see Table 5.3).  
 
                                                          
45 Access to health care facilities is defined for households who are within 30 minutes of travel to a clinic or hospital. 
Drinking water is defined as safe for the household if it is collected from the following sources: piped into dwelling or 
compound, public outdoor tap, borehole or protected well. Sanitation facility is also defined as safe if a household 
mainly uses either flush toilet to sewer or ventilated improved pit latrine. The computation of proportions and changes 
in the proportions during the period is weighted by size of the districts, where size is defined by population of the 
districts as captured in the 2000 Population and Housing Census. 
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Table 5.3: MMDAs Socio-economic improvement from 1997 to 2003 
Development Indicator 1997 2003 MMDAs with improved 
conditions (out of 110) 
Access to clinic or hospital 42 59 78 
Access and use of safe 
sanitation facilities 
26 53 81 
Use of safe drinking water 66 74 72 
Gross primary enrolment 
ratio 
97 109 94 
Youth literacy ratio 62 68 70 
Adult literacy ratio 48 53 62 
Source: Extracted from CWIQ 1997 and 2003 
 
As already mentioned, these findings may not be conclusive because NGOs and other 
development agencies operating in these localities may have contributed to this 
improvement. Even some deconcentrated ministries and departments in Ghana 
operate independently. They implement their own development project and run their 
own accounts, as branches of central government ministries and departments and not 
subordinates of MMDAs. As reported by Osei-Akoto et al (2011), the total amount of 
money expensed by MMDAs constituted 6.5% of total national government 
expenditure and about 1.8% of total GDP in 2004.  Clearly, the expenditure 
autonomy of MMDAs is still low, while their expenditure responsibilities overlap that 
of other development agencies and deconcentrated central government departments. 
As already mentioned, such unclear delineation of expenditure responsibilities may 
lead to poor accountability, duplication of efforts; conflicts between tiers of 
governments; dissatisfied citizens; and ultimately hesitation and resistance to continue 
and deepen the decentralization process. 
To this point, I have discussed extensively on whether fiscal decentralization actually 
works or not. The results show that fiscal decentralization is not working in Ghana. 
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Granted, there are encouraging outcomes: an increase in absolute internal revenue 
generated by MMDAs over time; the close-to-realization of expected revenue; and the 
use of a DACF formula that captures needs and ensures equality with little political 
interference. On the other hand, there are two disturbing findings. First, over time, 
MMDAs are increasingly depending on unpredictable and untimely external revenue 
(DACF) for their operation. Second, there is subtle political interference in the 
disbursement of the DACF, an interference that pose a threat to the entire fiscal 
decentralization process. A question worth addressing at this point is: Why is fiscal 
decentralization not working as expected? or in other words,  why is fiscal 
decentralization held out as a good thing? The answer is rooted in the discourses that 
produced and shaped fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. 
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5.3 Discourse Analysis of Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana  
One is ―in the true‖ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ―policing‖. 
(Foucault, 1970:61) 
 
In producing knowledge, power produces truth  
(Djokoto-Asem in Tettey et al, 2003:184) 
 
Current discursive practices have failed to recognize the importance of socially 
constructed categories that create and shape fiscal decentralization policies, especially 
in developing economies. As a result, this section is vital to this research project, 
because it provides a geographically (with reference to the historical, socio-economic, 
and political atmosphere in Ghana) grounded answer to one of the key research 
questions that I ask: why is fiscal decentralization policy held out as a good thing in 
Ghana? The simple answer: fiscal decentralization is held out as a good thing because 
of the ‗triangulation of power, knowledge and truth‘. First, I discuss these three 
constitutes of discursive practices by making reference to the genealogy of Ghana‘s 
geopolitical and socioeconomic atmosphere that constructed, enhanced or 
deconstructed decentralization. 
 
5.3.1 The Genealogy of Decentralization: Power, Knowledge and Truth in the 
Histories of Local Government in Ghana  
 
Today‘s and tomorrow‘s choices are shaped by the past … and the past can 
only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution (Douglas North, 
1990:6, 1993 Economics Nobel Prize Winner). 
 
Like other African countries, decentralization was part of Ghana‘s colonial legacy 
(Kasfir 1983: 25)46. Ghana‘s experience of decentralization offers a typical example of 
what Mawhood (1983:8) refers to as the ―pendulum model‖, which was common to 
African countries. The model saw in the terminal colonial period of the 1950s 
                                                          
46 Jesse Ribot (2001) provides an extensive background discussion on African decentralization in his paper titled 
―African Decentralization Local Actors, Powers and Accountability‖.   
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decentralized governments, less decentralized planning and greater central control in 
the 60s, belief in the value of participation and rural development in the 80s, and the 
re-establishment of various forms of decentralized governments in the 90s. It is 
therefore difficult to comprehend the discourses surrounding current fiscal 
decentralization policies in Ghana without reference to how these policies have 
evolved over time.  
 
It is worth emphasizing at this point that decentralization policy reform is a complex 
and dynamic process that transcends the technocratic and managerial approach 
pervasive in many policy documents (Wunsch, 2001). Instead of treating such policy 
documents as a means to exploring some reality about fiscal decentralization, I 
consider the documents as the realities to be explored through CDA. Therefore, a 
discussion of the geopolitical and socio-economic context of successive regimes of 
local government (decentralization) policies must necessarily precede any attempt to 
analyze the discourses that create and shape Ghana‘s current fiscal decentralization 
policies. 
 
5.3.1.1 Colonial Administration Decentralization Discourses: Prior to colonial administration, 
the traditional council (chief and the elders) were considered the ‗Wise men of the 
land‘. They wielded some form of ‗traditional power‘. These chiefs were the source of 
knowledge and what is accepted as truth in their respective jurisdiction.  When the 
colonial masters came to Ghana, they acknowledged the sovereign power vested in 
the chiefs and elders by Ghanaians. ‗Native Authorities‘ emerged at this point as a 
strategic policy by the British government to win the trust and support of these chiefs 
and elders, and by extension their subjects. Via the first Municipal Council Ordinance 
in 1850s and Native Jurisdiction Ordinance passed in 1878, the British introduced a 
local administrative system that centered on so-called customary law and some hand-
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picked chiefs or unit of local royalty, popularly termed the ―indirect rule‖ (Millar and 
Abazaam, 2008: 63). During this period the colonial administration ruled indirectly 
through the native political institution (i.e. the chiefs), by constituting the chief and 
elders in a given district as the local authority, with powers ―to establish treasuries, 
appoint staff and perform local government functions‖ (Nkrumah 2000: 55 cited in 
Crawford, 2004: 6). 
 
However, the power-sharing coexistence between the chiefs and colonial 
administration was short-lived. The colonial government gained the power to 
determine, approve and reward chiefs with leadership positions on municipal and 
native councils. Initially, the British set up local councils as elected bodies responsible 
for the oversight of public health, peace and order in the colony47, but soon realized 
that appointing members to local councils was more amenable to achieving their 
interests and therefore abandoned elections. Of course, the British were guided by 
their quest for total control over power, knowledge and truth. The chiefs, elders and 
natives on the other hand became doubtful as events unfold. The marred relationship 
can be summarized in this quotation: 
The chiefs interpreted the alliance to mean additional authority for taxation. 
Therefore in 1852 when a legislative assembly of chiefs was inaugurated they 
passed a resolution to impose an annual poll (head) tax of one shilling on all 
African citizens. The colonialist later realized that the chiefs did not keep 
proper accounts of the revenues collected. Nor was there any evidence to show 
that the taxes were being used to promote direct public welfare. That 
coupled with public resistance to the tax led to its abolition by the colonial 
administration in 1861. Not unexpectedly, that action created a bad faith 
between the administration and the traditional authorities‖ (Kessey, 1995: 58, 
Emphasis on original).  
 
                                                          
47 For detailed information, see the 1859 Municipal Council Ordinance and the 1878 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 
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Over the next 90 years, the British government (as a sovereign power) withdrew 
administrative, fiscal and judicial responsibility to the traditional authorities they 
chose48.  
 
But as Foucault rightly indicates, ―Where there is power, there is resistance‖ 
(Foucault, 1990:95). The natives of Ghana (including organized political groups, 
chiefs, and ethnic groups) resisted British withdrawal of their local fiscal and judicial 
autonomy.  The resistance heightened, forcing a Colonial Office decision to introduce 
an ―efficient and democratic system of local government in each British dependency‖ 
(Kasfir, 1993: 26-27). Through Arthur Creech Jones, the then British Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, fundamental changes in the practice of government were 
made. Arthur Creech Jones gave the rationale for decentralized governments in these 
words: 
―I use these words because they seem to me to contain the kernel of the whole 
matter: local because the system of government must be close to the common people 
and their problems; efficient because it must be capable of managing the local 
services in a way which will help raise the standard of living; and democratic 
because it must not only find a place for the growing class of educated men, but at 
the same time command the respect and support of the mass of the people‖ (Kasfir, 
1993; cited in Mawhood, 1993:27, emphasis in original). 
 
Based on Jones‘ words, findings of the Watson Commission report on the Accra 
riots49 and later the institution of an all-African constitutional committee headed by 
Justice Coussey in 1949, the colonial government declared: ―Native Authorities should be 
                                                          
48 The 1878 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance formally recognized chiefs as the authorities of Native Councils. This gave 
chiefs the authority to make and enact bylaws enforced in both criminal and civil courts.  While chiefs had always 
collected ‗tribal‘ revenues, the Native Administration Ordinance was passed in 1927, which gave chiefs financial, judicial 
and administrative authority through State Councils. In 1936 and 1939, the Native Treasury Ordinances tightened fiscal 
regulation. In 1944, the Native Authority Ordinance distinguished between State Councils, determined by customary 
law, and Native Authorities who were appointed by the Governor for administrative purposes (much like the District 
Chief Executive of the current system). 
49 The 1948 Accra riots resulted from heightened resistance from natives of Ghana against the British government, 
where Sergeant Adjetey, Corporal Attipoe and others lost their lives. Following that, the Watson Commission was 
appointed to investigate the causes of the riots. 
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replaced by democratically elected councils, which should nevertheless retain a place for chiefs who were 
recognized as having important role in the Gold Coast‖ (Hicks, 1961 cited in Kessey, 1995: 
59). However, how these cardinal principles of local government were to be achieved 
in Ghana remained unclear. Ayee (1994) appropriately argues that ―the emphasis is 
entirely appropriate for the task of implementing a Western institution in a very 
different environment‖. Consequently, the traditional councils were side-stepped 
despite the recognition of their roles, and the indirect rule came to an abrupt end 
resulting in a new local government system introduced in 1951. As expected, 
resistance emerged from the traditional councils and the local people, who described 
the new local government system as ‗alien‘. Ayee (1994) argues that the chiefs saw the 
new local government system as adopting entirely English local government to the 
Gold Coast in a different environment rather than evolving new forms of local 
government that was based on traditions of the Gold Coast. 
 
I argue that Creech Jones‘ dispatch, even though concise and partially successful, 
formed the knowledge-base for the current decentralization practices in Ghana; those 
words formed the power-base of decentralization; and those words created a ‗new 
regime of truth‘ in Ghana.  ‗Power‘ which was initially used as an instrument of 
coercion by the colonial masters, became ‗diffused and embodied in discourse via 
knowledge and ‗regimes of truth‘ (Foucault 1991:63).  So even though the British 
government was forced to give up sovereign power and even leave Ghana completely 
after independence, that power was still operative through the knowledge 
(decentralization policies they introduced) they left behind. The discourses produced 
from the decentralization attempt served as the conduit for power, because it shaped 
or even limited the policy decisions made by successive governments after 
independence. Indeed, ‗power is everywhere‘ and ‗comes from everywhere‘ (Foucault 
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1998: 63). Power is not really an agency or structure in this sense, but constituted 
through accepted forms of knowledge. 
From the foregoing discussion, I can identify three key axes that created and shaped 
the discourse of decentralization in Ghana. The first axis is power. Power in this 
context refers to the progressive identification of problems associated with the ‗chief and 
elders‘ system of ruling in Ghana by the British to be treated with specific 
intervention. In this case, the labeling of the chiefs as wielders of too much power, 
incompetent and embezzlers of local funds within their own jurisdiction by the 
colonial masters gave them more power to intervene.  
 
The second axis is knowledge. I use knowledge to refer to the professionalization and 
recasting of the identified problems into neutral (scientific) terms. This occurred in two main 
ways. First is the setting up of two committees, made up of problem-solving 
professionals50. The second way can be seen in the use of terms like ‗efficient‘, 
‗democratic‘, and ‗local‘ by Arthur Jones to recast the local government system in 
Ghana. The British government at this point was defining what ‗efficient‘ or 
‗democratic‘ should really mean to Ghanaian. Interestingly, they even defined what 
‗local‘ should mean to the locals themselves (i.e. Ghanaians). Power has indeed 
created a ‗field of control of knowledge‘.   
 
The third axis, resulting from the professionalization, and recasting of decentralization 
into neutral scientific terms, is the creation of ‗regimes of truth‘. Creating regimes of 
truth involves the institutionalization of decentralization to treat the progressively 
identified problem with the ‗chief and elder‘ government system. It also involves 
                                                          
50 The two committees are the Coussey and Watson Committees. Watson committee was solely made up of British 
professionals, while the Coussey Committee was an all-African constitutional committee headed by Justice Coussey. The 
Coussey committee was made up of 36 African elite, including the chairman. Interestingly, twenty-three of the members 
including the chairman were nominated by the British governor (Biswal, 1992:44). So even though the Coussey 
committee were all-African, half of them including the chairman were really representatives of the colonial government. 
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creating networks of new sites of power/knowledge that bind people to certain 
behavior and rationalities. In the case of Ghana, the institutionalization started when 
the British government replaced the native authorities with democratically elected 
council. That institution lived on even after Ghana‘s independence from the British. 
Successive governments operated in the context of the laid down decentralization 
rationalities of the colonial masters.  Consequently, different ‗regimes of truth‘ were 
created after independence. These ‗regimes of truth‘ are the result of accepted form of 
knowledge and institutions, and are reinforced (and redefined) constantly through the 
education system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies that 
characterize successive governments after independence. In this sense, the ‗battle for 
truth‘ is not for some absolute truth that can be discovered and accepted, but is a 
battle about ‗the rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific 
effects of power are attached to the true‘… a battle about ‗the status of truth and the 
economic and political role it plays‘ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991). I briefly discuss how 
decentralization have been reinforced or redefined by successive post-independent 
governments in Ghana.  
 
5.3.1.2 Post-Independence Decentralization Discourses: Just after independence in 1957, the 
Convention People‘s Party (CPP) led by Kwame Nkrumah replaced the colonial 
administration as government of Ghana. Nkrumah attempted to sidestep chiefs 
because the most powerful ones supported the opposition party called National 
Liberation Movement/Council (NLM/NLC). The CPP government created five 
regional, autonomous assemblies, but was forced to abolish the policy within a year 
because of resistance from chiefs and the NLM (Knierzinger 2009). In 1961, CPP 
succeeded in reforming the local government via the 1961 Local Government Act of 
the 1960 constitution. The Act made provision for a democratic, representative and 
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financially independent local government. The CPP introduced council elections and 
made the presidents of the councils paramount chiefs. Interestingly, these council 
presidents were appointed by the Ministry of Justice (and by extension the CPP 
government). Just like the British Government, Nkrumah resorted to manipulating 
the chieftaincy to achieve his aims despite reforms meant to democratize local 
government structures (Crawford 2004). Worse yet, Nkrumah‘s socialist policies51 
failed completely, leading to massive resistance from the National Liberation Council 
(NLC), which toppled Nkrumah in a bloodless military coup on February 24th 1966.  
 
The National Liberation Council (NLC) under the leadership of General J. A. Ankrah 
succeeded CPP. NLC acknowledged the power of local elite resistance, and therefore 
allied with the elites from the Ashanti Region, which has historically had the most 
powerful traditional rulers in all of Ghana: the Asanteman led by the Asantehene. To 
win their support, they made several recommendations via reports52 regarding local 
governance which found their place into the 1969 Constitution through the Local 
Administration Act of 1971. According to Ahwoi (2010: 23), the act ―attempted to 
balance a system of quasi-autonomous elected councils and administration by agencies 
of central government.‖ Unlike Nkrumah‘s socialist economic policies, the NLC 
became pro-IMF (Boafo-Arthur, 1999:47), and initiated Ghana‘s first negotiation with 
the Bretton Woods institutions. Its standby agreement with the IMF covered trade 
liberalization, removal of subsidies, fiscal and monetary discipline, and more 
importantly, devaluation of Ghana‘s cedi. However, resistance emerged from a 
                                                          
51 Nkrumah‘s Seven-year Development Policy stressed industrialization through domestic production of import 
substitutes. His centralized policy and planning approach also included state provision of a wide range of social welfare 
services namely free education, health care, and housing. These socialist-oriented policies were centered on the 
continuation of the post-war increase in the prices of raw materials and agricultural goods, particularly cocoa (Hutchful, 
2002:9). Economic problems such as overstaffing of state enterprises, corruption, and incompetence emerged with 
Nkrumah‘s socialist policies. By focusing on redistributing national prosperity, public expenditures soared. When cocoa 
prices fell in the early 1960s, the country‘s export earnings were unable to fund these state-led policies 
52 The reports include the Mills‐Odoi Report on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Service, Siriboe 
Committee on to Enquire into Electoral and Local Government Reform, and the Akufo‐Addo Commission on the 
Constitution of Ghana (Ahwoi 2010) 
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different source. Recognized professional bodies representing teachers, lawyers, and 
industrial workers, as well as the media resisted these market-oriented policies, forcing 
the NLC to hand over to Dr. K. A. Busia‘s Progress Party (PP) in 1969. The 
emergence of unexpected resistance against NLC underscores Foucault‘s words about 
the nature of resistance to power in a given discourse: 
 
 [There is] a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, 
support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere 
in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of 
resistances, each of them a special case (Foucault, 1990: 95-96).  
 
PP sought to implement NLCs policies for strengthening local government. It also 
occupied itself with neo-liberal policies geared towards addressing the weaknesses in 
the private sector as well as reducing inflation. Its austerity budget of 1971 introduced 
taxes on imports, introduced a development levy, withdrew subsidies, liberalized 
trade, and abolished free education and transport. It also devalued the cedi by 44%. 
Again, another ‗point of resistance emerged‘ when major segments of the population 
were discontented, and PP‘s austerity measures were cited by the military as reasons 
for toppling their party on January 13, 1972 by the National Redemption Council 
(NRC). 
 
NRC‘s greatest change to decentralization policy in Ghana was achieved through the 
Local Government Amendment Act (Act 359). Local government power, including 
financial autonomy, was reassigned to the central government. The civil service, paid 
by the central government, subsequently became bloated with loyalists, friends, and 
family members of the NRC. The act abolished elections for local councils. Instead, 
central government appointed two‐thirds while traditional authorities chose the 
remaining one‐third of the local council members. To extend their power further, 
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NRC also created the position of the District Chief Executive (DCE) as the head of 
local governments, which remains today. The NRC government proposed the DCE 
as a technocratic appointment. That was an unrealistic policy venture, knowing very 
well that the civil service largely consisted of NRC loyalists.  
 
Again, resistance emerged. Unlike the external resistance to previous government, this 
emerged from within the NRC government. Internal conflicts between NRC 
loyalists53 lead to the Superior Military Council (SMC) replacing the NRC in 1975. 
This internal resistance to power depicts one of Foucault‘s great contributions to 
understanding of power in a given discourse.  He criticized the traditional conceptions 
of power as something ‗repressive, top-down, and homogeneous or monolithic‘, and 
in contrast stressed that ‗there are irreducibly multiple and heterogeneous forms of 
power flowing in every direction within the social fabric, and offering multiple points 
of resistance‘ (Foucault, 1990:95). Worse yet, the internal resistance of SMC, coupled 
with massive corruption and economic mismanagement lead to their collapse. The 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a group of junior military officers led 
by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, overthrew the SMC.  
 
After a quick election organized by AFRC, the People‘s National Party (PNP) was 
elected. The 20th Chapter of the 1979 constitution that followed introduced elections 
for two‐thirds of local government councilors, with traditional authorities retaining 
the capacity to appoint the other one‐third. Unfortunately, the PNP was not able to 
enact the policy as their regime lasted for only two years. Rawlings and his Provisional 
National Defense Ruling Council (PNDC) overthrew the PNP in 1981. Their charge: 
incompetence in reviving the Ghanaian economy. Mismanagement under the 
NRC/SMC had resulted in an era in Ghanaian social life where destitution and 
                                                          
53 The resistance was in the form of pressure mounted on the government to change from military to civilian rule. 
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despondency became the order of the day (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993:2). The PNP did 
consider seeking external assistance, including IMF loans, to revive the economy. But 
resistance in the form of domestic pressure groups such the Association of Registered 
Professional Bodies (ARPB), the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), and the 
Ghana Bar Association (GBA) compelled the government to withdraw from the 
negotiation. The military concluded that the PNP was incompetent, and therefore 
ended their power in a coup d‘état in December 31, 1981. Until this point, 
administrative decentralization (i.e. deconcentration) has marked all governments54. 
The PNDC military regime wanted a change for devolution55.  
 
 However, three geopolitical and socio-economic conditions stifled a desirable change 
from administrative to political decentralization (i.e. devolution). First, the military 
regime of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Flt. Lt. Jerry John 
                                                          
54 Just like Ghana, decentralization proceeded in the form of deconcentration in almost all African countries. South 
Africa experienced a wave of such ―decentralization‖ in the late 1950s and early 1960s (de Valk 1990:4). Under one-party 
rule, Zambia had decentralization reforms in 1969, 1971 and 1980 in which the party‘s political control over district 
administration gradually increased (Therkildsen 1993:82). Kenya decentralized in 1964, 1970, 1974 and 1982, but created 
a system that reduced the importance of local government. Kenya‘s last decentralization, called ―district focus‖, in 1983, 
―intended to increase efficiency of central government administration rather than promote local autonomy or popular 
participation‖ (Conyers 1993:28). Senegal maintained a system of ruling party control and administrative oversight that 
strangled local autonomy (Ribot 1999). Mali created elected local councils in 1979, but did not give them powers (Diallo 
1994:1). Zimbabwe deconcentrated powers to local administrators in 1984, focusing on creating planning committees 
(Conyers 2001:2). Nigeria began a stop-and-go decentralization process in the 1970s, introducing elected local 
government in 1976, and  devolving major functions including law enforcement, maintenance of roads and bridges, rural 
development responsibilities, agricultural development, health care, and water and housing provision to elected local 
governments in 1976 (Rondinelli et al.1989; Crook and Sverrisson ,  2001:34). Through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
decentralizations across the African continent failed to produce autonomous representative local government units. 
They failed to devolve significant powers to local representative bodies, or budgetary decisions to the local level (Oyugi, 
2000: 17; UNCDF 2000:2). 
 
55 The call for devolution in Ghana was actually a response to the emergence of a pluralist decentralization in discourse 
in Africa at large (Ribot, 2000). The SAPs, requiring a reduction in national spending, forced many governments 
including Ghana towards these reforms. Local resistance was also a facilitator for the call.  ―Political decentralization has 
assumed a new meaning, away from the imposition of centralized monolithic values, towards a much more rights-based 
culture‖ (UNCDF 2000:3). Decentralization is now being promoted in a context of pluralist discourse, emphasizing 
greater representation of citizens as well as state reforms toward market-based development with SAPs in Africa. At that 
point, decentralization was viewed as a way of supporting local governance and improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery to local populations (equity). Policies of decentralization are pursued for both 
developmental and political reasons—emphasizing the plurality of the discourse. De Valk (1990:3–6) argues that 
emphasis has shifted from the political justifications—national stability, garnering popular support, ―petty politicking‖ 
and so forth—of the 1950s and 1960s, to the developmental value of decentralization. 
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Rawlings (1981–92) banned all political party activities.  Second, a deteriorating 
national economy (1980–4) reduced the real income of bureaucrats by more than 50 
percent (De Merode and Thomas, 1994); and third, SAP (1983–8) initiated by the 
World Bank, forced governments to develop decentralization policy reform in order 
to reduce Central Government (CG) size and responsibilities (Mohan, 2002). 
 
After the PNDC seized power in 1981, Flt. Lt. Rawlings announced that ―power will 
not be concentrated at the top anymore‖ (Yeebo 1985:66). Decentralization was 
fundamental to the PNDC‘s ideology, so they introduced the PARDIC (Public 
Administration Restructuring and Decentralization Implementation Committee) to 
review all the changes and initiatives of local governance that had been discussed and 
taken place since independence. The committee issued an 11-point decentralization 
policy designed to promote political decentralization (devolution). However, the 
policy was abandoned in practice. PNDC appointed district secretaries and interim 
management to manage local council on behalf of their military regime (which is 
deconcentration). After transferring many central government ministries and about 86 
functions to the local government units to improve efficiency, they redefined their 
decentralization vision as ‗the devolution of central administrative (not political) authority to 
the local level in order to ensure popular grassroot participation‘ (PNDC, 1983:3). 
 
The second and third factors operated concurrently.  The desire to change from their 
initial conception of political to administrative decentralization was reinforced by the 
prescription of structural adjustment program that was instigated by the World Bank 
in 1983 in a package that included rationalization, retrenchment and divestiture of 
some government services (Awortwi, 2010)56. The bureaucrats who had resisted the 
SAP till this point faced an economic crisis with their worsening real income. The 
                                                          
56 An interesting irony worth pointing out is that the SAP measures designed to enhance efficiency by cutting down 
administrative decentralization and promoting devolution instead  hindered devolution in Ghana 
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SAP looked like the only available option. The SAP conditions to Ghana included an 
administrative reform program—size and structure reform; comprehensive 
restructuring of pay, grading and an incentive system to motivate and attract high-
caliber staff; and an institutional training program to reorient civil servants to the 
changing needs of the service (Awortwi, 2003:116–18; Larbi, 1995). In the absence of 
strong resistance from political parties or labor unions, 47,439 civil servants, many of 
whom worked at the local level, were laid off (Ayee, 1991). 
  
To cut down government expenditure in order to meet the conditions of SAP, the 
PNDC decreed in July 1985 that only 50 percent of the salaries and wages of Local 
Government employees (and recurrent expenditure of 22 deconcentrated government 
departments) would be paid by the Central Government. This caused extreme 
hardship and large arrears accumulated in the Local Governments. Hutchful (1997) 
shows that administrative reforms failed to break the resistance of the senior civil 
servants who were considered responsible for the inefficiencies and shortfalls of the 
old system. Perhaps the PNDC government failed to recognize that ‗power‘ in a given 
discourse is not necessarily sovereign, but can emerge from anywhere, even among 
the commons (Foucault, 1983). As it turned out, the SAP program did influence the 
military regime to still pursue administrative decentralization. It did achieve some of 
its economic goals, but it also produced devastating social consequences. It is 
therefore not surprising that Program Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) policy was introduced to address the social mess created by 
the SAP57.  
                                                          
57 Historical data and logic are vital to understanding development program suitability (Ogbimi, 1992). It has been argued 
so far that SAP is logically not a development program (Ogbimi 1992), because it was adopted as a ‗necessary evil‘ by 
most African countries (Svedberg, 1983). Historical parallels confirm the logic.  After the First World War, Allied powers 
subjected the Germans to mandatory SAP to enable them to pay war reparations. One dollar exchanged for 4.2 marks in 
1914 before the War. In 1920, one year into Germany's SAP, one dollar exchanged for 63 marks. The exchange rate fell 
with time, reducing the purchasing power of the German mark. One dollar exchanged for 2,000 marks in 1922. The 
mark was virtually eliminated in 1923; one dollar exchanged for 4.2 trillion mark (Stolper et al, 1967) Every German was 
impoverished and disgraced. The impact of mandatory devaluation on Germany's economy should be viewed against the 
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In July 1987, PNDC launched a three-tier Local Government system in response to 
pressure from the international donor communities, and pressure groups in Ghana. In 
addition to the existing 65 local councils, it created 45 new Local Government 
territories under the jurisdiction of district assemblies (DAs). Regional councils were 
created to coordinate the Local Governments. Below the MMDAs, PNDC proposed 
to establish sub-district authorities, town councils, and unit committees as the lowest 
structures to provide focal points for discussion of local problems and take remedial 
action. However, with pockets of pressure groups beginning to coalesce around 
remnants of banned political parties, PNDC decreed that elections to the MMDA 
were to be on an individual, not political party, basis (Awortwi, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, chiefs and traditional authorities were not allowed to be involved in 
politics—ostensibly to insulate them from the deception associated with politics, but 
actually to prevent local coalitions from becoming strong enough to negotiate power-
sharing with the regime. At the community level, the regime established populist 
People‘s Defence Committees (PDC) and later Committees for Defense of the 
Revolution (CDR) in every Ghanaian village and town to mobilize support for its own 
agenda and to undermine the authority of the traditional chiefs who were considered 
hostile to the regime. At this point, the PNDC as a military regime recognized 
possible local resistance groups as threats to its administrative decentralization agenda. 
 
In the late 1987, the Akuse group was commissioned and provided a blueprint for the 
development of the local government system (Crawford 2004). The result was the 
introduction of what is termed as ‗proper decentralization‘ in 1988. To that effect, 
about 4,846 councilors (assemblymen and women) were elected for a three-year term. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
backdrop of Germany as a world power even at that time. It is therefore not surprising that the artisan-economies of 
Africa such as Ghana, subjected to the same type of program, yielded devastating social consequences.   
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Most of the elected councilors were members of the CDR. To further strengthen their 
control at the local level, the regime appointed another 2,423 councilors to make a 
total of 7269 nationwide. While the regime justified the need to appoint some 
technocrats and well-respected community members who are put off by the electoral 
process, the appointment of one-third of the councilors was to guarantee a place for 
the supporters of the regime, especially those who were not elected. The appointment 
of the councilors was also to build a locally based political class in anticipation of 
future national democratization process (Gyimah-Boadi, 1990). 
 
PNDC Law 207 was introduced, which made LGs the highest political and 
administrative authority at the local level and responsible for the overall development 
of local areas. Instead of allowing the councilors to elect one of their own to be the 
Mayor in a form of weak mayor system or direct election of Mayors (strong mayor 
system), the regime continued on the path where District Chief Executives (DCEs) or 
Mayors were appointed. The regime appointed politically loyal cadres to head the 
administration of the LGs who can only be removed by Flt. Lt. Rawlings and not the 
elected councilors or the people. 
 
Finally, with international donor pressure and resistance from banned political groups, 
the PNDC was compelled to return the country to multiparty democracy. However, it 
managed to exclude LGs from the multiparty process because donors and political 
groups were more concerned with national politics and less about LGs. As a result, a 
partisan CG political system was superimposed on a non-partisan LG system. The 
1992 democratic constitution endorsed PNDC Law 207 (later transformed to Act 
462). Kwamena Ahwoi—former PNDC Secretary for LGs and an architect of 
Ghana‘s decentralization program sums up the situation as:  
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The regime was not allowed to develop the path that it wanted. The 
introduction of [a] constitutional era distorted the path that we had in mind. 
The PNDC did not have the support of CG bureaucrats; so, instead of 
devolution that we wanted, civil servants found ways of dribbling us into 
implementing [a] deconcentrated system. Though in the spirit of the law the 
current decentralization aims at promoting devolution, actual practice is 
deconcentration or at best nominal devolution. (Ahwoi cited in Arthur, 2012: 
page 50) 
  
It is within these complex historical, geopolitical and socio-economic conditions that 
fiscal decentralization emerged. The discourses take another turn again, this time not 
from administrative to political decentralization or vice versa, but towards fiscal 
decentralization, which is the crux of this research project. What happened next with 
power, knowledge and truth in connection with fiscal decentralization policies and 
practice is worth discussing. 
 
 
5.3.2 Policy Design Process for Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana 
Fiscal reform was the last decentralization policy to be introduced. Until fiscal 
decentralization was introduced in 1994, there was no basis for calculating grants to 
LGs and only small amounts were given at the discretion of the LG ministry. 
Normally the CG would wait until November/December to transfer its unspent 
money to LGs. 
 
In 1990, the CG allowed MMDAs to collect some taxes until then collected by the 
internal revenue service. This revenue was shared by all the local councils according to 
a formula determined only by the LG ministry, at least until 1994.  In 1994 the ceded 
revenue was replaced by a constitutional provision mandating the CG to transfer five 
percent of the national revenue to LGs. An independent common fund administrator 
was appointed to develop a formula for sharing out the fund. 
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Article 204 (2) of the Constitution provides that ―There shall be established for each 
local government unit a sound financial base with adequate and reliable sources of 
revenue‖. Section 252 of the Constitution envisages the establishment of the District 
Assemblies Common Fund, to which should be 5 percent of the total national 
revenue, to be distributed among the districts through a formula approved by 
Parliament. The District Assemblies Common Fund was established with the District 
Assemblies Common Fund Act No. 455 of 1993. 
 
 Two key structural issues underlie this fiscal decentralization policy. First, 85 percent 
of the local government finances were controlled by the central government. Second, 
90 percent of staff operating at the local government level is on the payroll of the 
central government (MLGRD, 2005). These two issues have created tension and 
power struggle between the central government and local government till today. 
 
Interestingly, the central government (CG) questions the knowledge-base and 
management capacity of MMDAs to take care of their own finances, while the 
MMDAs claim that they can only prove themselves when they are allowed to manage 
all their finances (Koranteng, 2008: 123) Also, significant amount of off-budget fiscal 
resources have been channeled to the Districts by donors, thereby escaping the 
MMDAs administrative control (MLGRD/DS, 2005). Another issue is that some 
Ministries (such as education and health) have devolved an increasing proportion of 
their budgets to the local level, but those monies still remains outside of MMDAs 
control. Why has fiscal decentralization eluded the MMDAs?  
 
 It boils down to the fact that the cost of implementing FD to the central government 
bodies (ministries especially Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP)) is a 
loss of significant power. For instance, the MFEP argue that MMDAs will interfere 
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with the SAP when they are given unrestrained spending power. Recall that in the 
preceding section, I highlighted Ghana‘s spending cuts as one requirement of SAP. 
Therefore, the SAP was used as an excuse to control local government spending 
capacity. What really happened with the fiscal decentralization policy process? 
 
Table 5.4 is a summary of the various stakeholders of fiscal decentralization policies 
and practices in Ghana. The stake, level of interest, level of power (capacity for 
mobilization), and attitude toward fiscal decentralization of each stakeholder is 
captured in the Table 5.4. I consider the details of the power struggle by reviewing 
each stakeholder. 
 
MFEP- The control mutants: As mentioned earlier, MFEP resist fiscal decentralization 
because they claim MMDAs do not have the capacity to manage huge financial 
resources. The key question here is: which comes first in policy process, is it capacity 
building towards fiscal decentralization, or fiscal decentralization towards capacity 
building? 
 
MPs-Latent but Influential Power: Members of Parliament (MPs) are constitutionally 
charged with supervisory and oversight roles of their respective districts. The 
constitution provides the MP‘s share of the common fund for this role. Interestingly, 
the public (electorate) consider MPs as the focus of district development, instead of 
MMDAs. More was expected of these MPs than what they actually do, considering 
their constitutional and legal resources, as well as their high capacity for mobilization. 
Instead, MPs have been more concerned with bargaining for an increase in their own 
share of the DACF. They even question having to receive their share from the 
District Chief Executive (DCE), instead of receiving it directly from the central level. 
The power struggle continues. 
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Table 5.4: Stakeholders influence on Fiscal Decentralization policy and practice in 
Ghana 
Stakeholder Stake Interest in 
Legislation 
Resource 
Available 
Resource 
mobilization 
capacity 
Position 
Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
Panning (MFEP) 
Macroeconomic 
stability and 
fiscal discipline 
Low Financial 
organizational 
and legitimacy 
High Opposition 
Negative 
Members of 
Parliament (MPs) 
MPs Share in 
DACF 
Medium Constitutional, 
legal and 
legitimacy 
High Latent, 
Positive 
Sector Ministries 
(such as Health) 
Control over 
sectoral fiscal 
resources 
Low Information, 
Organization 
and 
Legitimacy 
High Opposition 
Negative 
Metropolitan, 
Municipal, District 
Assemblies 
Matching 
resources to 
implement 
transferred 
functions to 
districts  
High Constitutional, 
legal, and 
legitimacy 
Low Promoters, 
Positive 
Ministry of Local 
Government and 
Rural Development  
Centralization 
and control 
over resources 
Lukewarm/ 
medium 
Technical, 
information 
and  
legitimacy 
Medium Promoter 
Positive 
DACF administrator Fair allocations 
of DACF to 
DAs 
High Constitutional, 
legal and 
legitimacy 
High Promoter 
Positive 
Donors/development 
patners 
Strengthening  
the overall 
capacity of DAs 
High External 
networks, 
financial, 
technical 
High Promoter 
Positive 
 Source: Adapted from Koranteng, 2008 
    
Sector Ministries-bureaucratic conservatives: Sector ministries (like health, education) argue 
that fiscal decentralization is not economically or financially viable, considering the 
many MMDAs and sub-divisions (town, urban and zonal councils) in each 
jurisdiction. To these ministries, fiscal decentralization works against economies of 
scale, having to divide resources into smaller fragments. The ministries argued that 
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with such greater financial fragmentation, accountability will be poor while corruption 
worsens at the local level. However, the counter argument from MMDAs is that 
corruption has always been worse at the central level relative to the local level. Such 
sector ministries prefer deconcentration of their centralized sector activities to the 
local level. They mobilize their information (knowledge), organization and legitimate 
resources to oppose fiscal decentralization policies and practice. 
 
Metropolitan Municipal District Assemblies-General without Armies: MMDAs of course, 
argued for fiscal decentralization. They consider themselves as more responsive and 
accountable to the needs of their localities. Their interest in local level development is 
high. Unfortunately, their mobilization capacity is low because their activities have 
been legitimately premised on unpredictable and conditional DACF transfers. Also, 
they have faced resistance from MFEP and sector ministries, which fail to yield to 
their request. Notwithstanding, they have contributed positively towards fiscal 
decentralization. 
 
MLGRD-The Centralized Caricature: As the supervisory ministry responsible for 
planning, monitoring and evaluating fiscal decentralization, MLGRD issue written 
financial and management instruction to MMDAs after consulting the Minister of 
Finance.   MLGRD play this role reluctantly. They still lean towards centralization, 
because of their failure to relinquish significant amount of district infrastructure and 
investment they control (Koranteng, 2008). Even though MLGRD have the mandate 
to promote Fiscal decentralization, their position is lukewarm. 
 
 
DACF Administrator-Just another Central Representative: Even though selected as an 
independent body, the DACF administrator is constitutionally appointed by the 
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President of Ghana, with approval of Parliament. The DACF disbursement formula 
devised by the Administrator (RENS factor) has been apolitical. Per my multivariate 
regression analysis, politically motivated targeting is the most insignificant relative 
determinant of DACF transfers (with a significance level of 0.935). So, it is only fair to 
rank their contribution as positive promoter of fiscal decentralization. 
Notwithstanding, the appointment of the administrator by the President inspire some 
form of political agenda. This may explain why equality, instead of equity, has 
dominated the DACF formula. Subtle political interference exists in the sense that a 
ruling party creates more MMDAs in their stronghold to increase their share of the 
equality factor, which the administrator allocates a greater proportion of DACF. As 
already discussed, and depicted in Table 5.7, election results have a relatively strong 
positive correlation of 0.253 with the MMDAs‘ DACF transfers. More importantly, 
the results in Table 5.7 also show that the correlation between the two is statistically 
significant (0.025 level). However, the contributions of such political intervention 
diminish relative to the four factor DACF formula. 
 
Donors and Development partners: Whenever donor and development partners provide 
financial assistance, they require deconcentrated implemented policies (as in the case 
of SAP). As a result, donors rely more on the sub-ministries, departments and 
agencies, instead of the MMDAs. Donors use structures and approaches that do not 
enhance fiscal decentralization policy in Ghana. For instance, donors in Ghana 
support separate health and education programs via coordination between the health 
and education ministry, which strengthen the capacity of the sectoral ministries. As 
already discussed, these ministries are opposed to decentralization. Jutting et al (2004) 
rightly noted that donors have simultaneously supported decentralization and sector-
wide-approaches (SWApS) that tends to recentralize power. 
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5.3.2.1 The Composite Budget Policy: The Way Forward for Ghana‘s Fiscal Decentralization? 
To improve accountability, efficiency and equity in Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization, 
revenue and expenditure assignments should be clearly defined. In practice, the 
involvement of different local development stakeholders (as depicted in table 5.8), 
each with their own agenda undermines the autonomy of MMDAs. In recognition of 
these problems, MMDAs were directed to prepare what is termed as ‗composite 
budget‘ for the 2013 fiscal year. The composite budget seeks to harmonize the budget 
of all decentralized departments and bring them under the ambit of the MMDAs‘ 
budgeting process. 
 
Even though composite budget was fully implemented in 2013, the policy dates back 
to 1993. It is defined under Section 92 (3) of the Local Government Act of 1993 as: 
‗The budget for a district shall include the aggregate revenue and expenditure of all departments and 
organizations under the District Assembly and the District Co-ordinating Directorate, including the 
annual development plans and programmes of the departments and organizations under the 
Assembly.‘ In 2003, a pilot was implemented in 3 districts namely Dangme West, 
Dangme East and Akuapim North, and was extended to 25 districts in 2005. In 
2006/07 all districts in the country prepared their Composite Budgets but never 
implemented them. It was not until 2011 that a vital step were taken to enable 
Composite Budgets to be prepared and implemented by all MMDAs. 
 
The step involved the creation of a composite budget manual designed to facilitate 
and guide the preparation, approval, execution, monitoring and evaluation of 
composite budget at the local level. In terms of process, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MFEP) set up National and Regional Technical Working groups 
to put together the manual. Also, other stakeholders who influenced the preparation 
of the manual are Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), 
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Controller and Accountant General‘s Department (CAGD), Auditor General‘s 
Department (AGD), National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), Local 
Government Service (LGS) and Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS), and 
Regional Budget Officers.  Also noteworthy is the influence and suggestions provided 
by MFEP‘s Development Partners, (especially, EU in collaboration with German 
Society for International Cooperation-GIZ).  This policy initiative manual would 
upscale full implementation of fiscal decentralization and ensures that the utilization 
of all public resources at the local level takes place in an efficient, effective, 
transparent and accountable manner for improved service delivery. The degree to 
which this composite budget can achieve its goal in practice remains a big research 
question for the future.  
 
However, I anticipate a few problems based on the policy design process. First, 
missing from the list of stakeholders who created the manual are the MMDAs 
themselves. While MMDAs are charged with the actual creation of the budget, they 
were exempted from the creation of the budget manual. The exemption of MMDAs 
reinforces MFEP as control freaks—freaks who view MMDAs as technically incapable 
of contributing towards preparing their own budgeting manual. Second, the manual 
for the composite budget might be vividly drafted, but not exhaustive. It still does not 
capture the budgets of NGOs, donors, development partners who are very vital 
sources of revenue for local government financing. However, I must admit that the 
details of the manual look quite promising. It involves MMDAs more in the 
implementation process, and even creates different platforms for individuals of all 
education levels to contribute towards the budget. However, time will tell us more 
about the essence of the composite budget towards Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization.  
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5.3.3 Summary of CDA 
  Much has been discussed in this section, especially because of the messy genealogy 
that forms the foundation of Ghana‘s fiscal decentralization. Figure 5.4 captures the 
key axes of these decentralization discourses. 
 
Figure 5.6: The Axes of Decentralization Discourse in Ghana 
 
 
I identify two key lessons from the detailed historical and socio-economic analysis of 
decentralization in Ghana. First one is ―in the true‖ only by obeying the rules of a 
discursive ―policing‖. (Foucault, 1970:61) As noted by Foucault, these rules and 
policies of government are not defined by traditional notions of sovereignty, neither 
the rule of law nor political domination, which are themselves elements of a pervasive 
discourse of the state, but the rules of knowledge and power operating within the 
practice of government. That explains why each governmental regime faced some 
resistance from chiefs, professionals (lawyers, academicians, and health practitioners), 
international communities, even from Party loyalist. Also, that explains why even in 
the absence of colonial administration after independence, the British approach to 
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decentralization policy design was still implemented. Just like the British government, 
post-independence governments set up committees and commissions to review and 
reform local government (see Table 5.5). It is striking to note that as if by design, with 
the exception of SMC1, the other three governments each established three 
Commissions/Committees. What is quite common among the various reports that 
were issued by the Commissions/Committees was the recognition of the chiefs‘ role 
in local government, although not all the governments implemented the findings of 
the reports.  
 
Table 5.5: Commissions and Committees into local government reforms in Ghana, 1957-1982 
Regime Head of State Year Name of Commission/ 
Committee 
CPP 
CPP 
CPP 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
1957 
1958 
1965 
Greenwood 
Van Lare 
Boison 
NLC 
NLC 
NLC 
Gen J.A. Ankrah 
Gen J. A. Ankrah 
Gen J.A. Ankrah 
1967 
1968 
1968 
Mills-Odoi 
Akuffo-Addo 
Siriboe 
SMC1 Gen. I.K. Acheampong 1974 Okoe 
PNDC 
PNDC 
PNDC 
Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings 
Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings 
Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings 
1982 
1982 
1982 
Kufuor 
Sowu 
Kaku-Kyiamah 
Source: Adapted from Aryee (1994) 
 
The point here is that fiscal decentralization is not a totally ‗alien policy‘, even though 
it originated with colonialism. The creation and recreation of its various discourses 
occur as a result of struggles at the international, national and local level. The 
international bodies like IMF, World Bank, UN-Habitat, NGOs, AU (Victoria 
Declaration), and European Charter have contributed to the theory and practice of 
fiscal decentralization in Ghana. National bodies like MFEP, MLGRD, Sector 
Ministries, political parties‘ National committees (as depicted in Table 5.4) and 
ministries have all contributed to the shaping of fiscal decentralization discourses. At 
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the local level, resistances from organized professionals like teachers, lawyers, and 
community groups have also shaped these policies.   
  
Second, this historical review of Ghana‘s geopolitics of decentralization challenges the 
notion that policy making is a ‗rational‘ process based on incontestable evidence or 
truth. Evidence or information used in policy making is created within the confines of 
the discursive formations, so that the ‗truth‘ conforms to the rules and norms of the 
discourse.  Foucault terms these processes ‗the will to truth’, the effect of which is to 
mask the discursive formations. However, this review reveals that it is equally vital to 
understand how the policies came to be. The current decentralization policies (as 
captured by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana) emerged from long historical regimes of 
policies, with colonial administration policies being the foundation. It emerged from 
the shaped and reshaped discourses of decentralization through time. It emerged from 
the identification of policy problems, setting up of committees of society-recognized 
professionals to produce recommendation that deal with the problems. It emerged 
from creating formal institutions to implement the recommendation, as well as local, 
national and international resistance that followed each policy. Without such detailed 
analysis, ―all that appears to our eyes is a truth conceived as richness, fecundity, a 
gentle and insidiously universal force, and in contrast we are unaware of the will to 
truth, that prodigious machinery designed to exclude.‖ (Foucault, 1970: 56)  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research project has been a challenging but rewarding academic experience. I 
have gained a lot of experience—from the shaping of the research project topic, to 
the visiting of MMDA head offices in Ghana to collect data, to being interrogated by 
Municipal/District Chief Executives who were reluctant to release jurisdictional 
financial reports, to dealing with missing datasets, to a first-time engagement in 
applied regression and discourse analysis, and finally writing and shaping the thesis.  
However, this research project did more than add to my personal research experience. 
More importantly, it contributed to knowledge in two broad areas: the fiscal 
decentralization or largely the public policy literature, and geographical knowledge 
production. 
 
6.1 Contributions to the Fiscal Decentralization Literature and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
First, I have contributed to the fiscal decentralization literature, using Ghana as a case 
study. I answered two key fiscal decentralization questions in this thesis. ‗Is fiscal 
decentralization working in Ghana?‘ is the first question I addressed. My answer to 
that question is ‗no‘. Fiscal decentralization is a partially successful policy in Ghana. 
This is broadly consistent with the findings of other studies. While other scholars 
have reached similar conclusions in their evaluations, this research project still adds to 
knowledge in three ways. First, conclusions from former studies in Ghana were based 
on old datasets and policy reports (1994-2004) only. However, I added to the 
literature by using more recent datasets (2005-2012). Second, previous studies focused 
either on revenue only or expenditure only in evaluating fiscal decentralization while 
my study evaluated both. My quantitative data analysis revealed the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with both revenue and expenditure fiscal decentralization in 
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Ghana. Third, I addressed the question from a geographical perspective. I used a 
time-series and regional comparisons (which reveal spatial differences as in the case of 
my using the distribution quotient) in my analysis, making this research project 
‗spatio-temporal‘. 
 
The second question, ‗why was Ghana compelled to adopt fiscal decentralization?‘ has 
been answered through a critical discourse analysis. By drawing lessons from 
Foucault‘s genealogy and Escobar‘s development studies via discourse analysis, I have 
revealed how power, knowledge and truth have created and shaped the fiscal 
decentralization discourse in Ghana. Not only did I trace a historical origin of fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana, but discussed how multiplicities of power (many versions 
of power) have created different knowledge and practices which created or shaped 
fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. My CDA revealed that fiscal decentralization 
is not an entirely ‗alien‘ policy to Ghana. While various international powers (influence 
of colonialism, European-Charter on Fiscal Decentralization Principles, UN-Habitat, 
IMF, World Bank, Victoria Declaration) played influential roles in the introduction of 
fiscal decentralization in Ghana. Both local and national powers/resistances (including 
ministries, local governments, Member of Parliament, local elite, chiefs, and 
academics) have contributed to the knowledge, and truth-regimes that shaped fiscal 
decentralization in Ghana. Also, the geopolitical and socioeconomic climate in Ghana 
was very influential in the creation and shaping of fiscal decentralization discourse in 
Ghana. In conclusion, Ghana was compelled to implement fiscal decentralization 
through a ‗multiple triangulation of power, knowledge, and truth-regimes‘. I use 
‗multiple‘ in the sense that ‗power, knowledge and truth‘ operates at the international, 
national and local scales to create and shape fiscal decentralization policies.  
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Here lies the need to rethink fiscal decentralization policies in developing economies. 
Instead of solely blaming the international community for the ‗unmaking of the third 
world‘ via their subtle imposition of policies such as fiscal decentralization,  policy 
makers/development experts, academicians should look and address the problems 
that arise within their own boundaries, and between their own people as far as the ‗so-
called alien policies‘ are involved. The issue is more about country-specific adaptation 
to fiscal decentralizations policies than a mere adoption of ‗alien‘ policies. Therefore, a 
whole new research window opens here. The research task involves identifying or 
even comparing how country-specific ‗triangulation of power, knowledge and truth‘ 
shape fiscal decentralization over time. The future research task also include 
identifying/comparing how such country-specific adaptation to fiscal decentralization 
policies creates an effective geopolitical economy or otherwise.       
 
 
6.2 Contribution to Geographical Knowledge Production 
Apart from contribution to the fiscal decentralization literature, this thesis has added 
to geographical knowledge production.  I have contributed to applied geographical 
knowledge in three specific areas.  First, I have demonstrated how geographers can 
apply ‗Simandan‘s wise stance in human geography‘ to their own geographical 
research. Building on ‗Simandan‘s wise stance‘ arguments and Grix‗s work on the 
basic concepts of social science research design, I have developed a conceptual 
framework (refer to chapter 3, page 56), and demonstrated how the framework can be 
applied to geographical research. In the case of this thesis, the framework guided my 
analysis chapters, by addressing two key questions about the need to rethink fiscal 
decentralization policies in Ghana. ‗A wise stance‘ for me is one that is based on 
plural ontologies, epistemologies, methodologies, methods and data; one that does 
not esteem the normative above the positive approach but consider all as relevant to 
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addressing my research question. I suggest that this ‗wise stance‘ should not be limited 
to human geographers only.  All geographers (including geomatist and physical 
geographers) can all benefit from this stance. The so called ‗traditional/conservative‘ 
research methods are still useful to the geographer. Likewise is a strong prescriptive 
component in geographical research.  
 
Second, I have re-echoed Ron Martins‘ plea for ‗unity in geographical research‘ 
through this thesis. While there is nothing wrong with specialisms in the geography 
discipline because of its broad and diverse nature, forming non-communicating 
cliques in the discipline is detrimental. Consider the situation of a graduate student 
who is caught between implementing suggestions made by three different supervisors, 
each with a different ontological/epistemological positions. While the student will 
benefit from the rich and diverse suggestions, he/she will be faced with a dilemma 
when each supervisor insists on his suggestion by pointing out and downplaying the 
weakness of the other two ontologies. While this student can exploit this diversity to 
his advantage, he/she becomes more confused when each supervisor insists his 
approach is the only way out.  In my case, it seemed ‗suicidal‘ for me to use 
quantitative analysis alongside a discourse analysis for my project at the early stages of 
this thesis. But it all worked out. In fact, using these two seemingly contrasting 
approaches have been very helpful in addressing my two key research questions and 
ultimately making my case. Therefore, I re-emphasize Ron Martins call for 
geographers to come together, and exploit their specialisms/diversity to advance 
geographical knowledge, instead of forming non-communicating cliques. This is 
especially important now, considering the increase in specialisms in the discipline.   
 
Third, I have highlighted the need for geographers to engage themselves more in 
public policy research. One less researched aspect of geographical knowledge 
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production is public policy. It is therefore vital that I point out that public policy 
research is not a monopoly of economics or political science. It is an avenue of 
research to which geographers can make significant contribution.   Public policy 
should be of concern to geographers since it has ‗SpaceTime‘ characteristics. The city, 
avalanches, climate change are of interest to the geographer because they have spatial 
structures and processes. And so does public policy. Structured policies exist by virtue 
of some underlying spatial processes, and therefore should interest geographers. I 
therefore invite geographers to explore some of my suggestions on the direction 
future research on fiscal decentralization/all public policies in developing economies 
should take.   
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Appendix I: Detailed IGF performances of MMDAs per region (1994-2004)   
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Appendix II:  Preliminary Multivariate Regression Analysis 
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Table 5.7: Correlations of DACF Factors formula 
 
Source: Authors’ construct, 2013 
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Appendix III: Detailed Datasets for DACF formula-based calculations 
REGIONS/ 
MMDAs  
YEAR DACF POPDEN NEEDS MMDA EQUALITY POL RESP 
ASHANTI 2004 12667117.6 152.0 13.0 18.0 14026909.0 74.61 15.7 
 2005 14157948.3 156.0 15.0 18.0 11485636.0 74.61 18.0 
 2006 11927651.6 160.0 15.0 23.0 23193333.0 74.61 15.23 
 2007 8947866.8 165.0 16.0 23.0 28890000.0 74.61 12.1 
 2008 18030529.0 196.0 19.0 27.0 34466294.1 25.0 24.0 
 2009 28926462.0 201.0 12.0 27.0 29949352.9 25.0 25.0 
 2010 17237712.0 205.0 13.0 30.0 54063529.4 25.0 22.0 
EASTERN 2004 9166413.2 111.0 30.0 16.0 12468363.0 60.27 13.5 
 2005 9767317.7 114.0 24.0 16.0 10209454.0 60.27 14.3 
 2006 8481414.1 116.0 25.0 20.0 20168115.0 60.27 16.5 
 2007 6758529.4 118.0 22.0 20.0 25121739.0 60.27 11.9 
 2008 12257144.0 136.0 14.0 21.0 26807117.7 43.0 18.0 
 2009 21184828.0 143.0 18.0 21.0 23293941.2 43.0 19.0 
 2010 13205909.0 152.0 26.0 26.0 42049411.8 43.0 17.0 
WESTERN 2004 7881581.3 82.0 22.0 9.0 7013454.0 56.64 22.6 
 2005 8552387.2 84.0 25.0 9.0 5742818.0 56.64 16.9 
 2006 7630637.2 86.0 28.0 10.0 10084057.0 56.64 17.3 
 2007 6577899.0 88.0 27.0 10.0 12560869.0 56.64 18.8 
 2008 11421156.0 99.0 29.0 17.0 21701000.0 52.0 26.0 
 2009 19100169.0 108.0 17.0 17.0 18857000.0 52.0 13.0 
 2010 11671806.0 119.0 28.0 22.0 34040000.0 52.0 12.0 
CENTRAL 2004 7480884.4 167.0 17.0 10.0 7792727.0 58.57 7.8 
 2005 8103758.2 172.0 15.0 10.0 6380909.0 58.57 6.9 
 2006 6447132.8 178.0 16.0 16.0 16134492.0 58.57 8.62 
 2007 4394319.1 183.0 15.0 16.0 20097391.0 58.57 12.5 
 2008 9942791.0 224.0 16.0 17.0 21701000.0 54.0 15.0 
 2009 18669247.0 241.0 13.0 17.0 18857000.0 54.0 11.0 
 2010 10769597.0 263.0 18.0 20.0 34040000.0 54.0 9.0 
VOLTA 2004 8378499.9 81.0 10.0 13.0 10130545.0 14.26 7.9 
 2005 8085545.5 84.0 9.0 13.0 8295181.0 14.26 8.5 
 2006 6874179.4 86.0 9.0 16.0 16134492.0 14.26 8.1 
 2007 4981745.0 88.0 10.0 16.0 20097391.0 14.26 10.63 
 2008 10162295.0 103.0 15.0 18.0 22977529.4 86.0 10.0 
 2009 18790935.0 121.0 8.0 18.0 19966235.3 86.0 8.0 
NORTHERN 2010 12734174.0 132.0 13.0 25.0 36042352.9 86.0 12.0 
 2004 12574765.7 27.0 34.0 13.0 10130545.0 36.2 2.8 
 2005 14221804.8 27.0 32.0 13.0 8295181.0 36.2 3.6 
 2006 12611560.0 28.0 31.0 12.0 12100869.0 36.2 4.3 
 2007 5441360.7 29.0 31.0 12.0 15073043.0 36.2 4.8 
 2008 13277698.0 35.0 27.0 21.0 26807117.7 62.0 5.0 
 2009 22670389.0 38.0 25.0 21.0 23293941.2 62.0 7.0 
 2010 14916734.0 42.0 29.0 26.0 42049411.8 62.0 5.0 
UPPER WEST 2004 5978089.5 32.0 24.0 5.0 3190454.0 32.23 4.3 
 2005 5070031.2 33.0 23.0 7.0 7058840.0 32.23 4.1 
 2006 10384164.1 33.0 23.0 7.0 8792608.0 32.23 3.7 
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 2007 11417600.6 37.0 23.0 7.0 11689090.0 51.96 10.7 
 2008 693092.0 38.0 23.0 9.0 28083647.1 62.0 5.0 
 2009 1160639.0 41.0 11.0 9.0 24403176.5 62.0 3.0 
 2010 6196489.0 44.0 21.0 11.0 44051765.0 62.0 2.0 
BRONGAHAFO 2004 9888486.7 49.0 19.0 18.0 18151304.0 51.9 18.3 
 2005 6993990.6 50.0 20.0 18.0 22609565.0 51.96 12.9 
 2006 4107826.4 51.0 21.0 22.0 28083647.0 51.96 39.41 
 2007 4538232.8 53.0 21.0 22.0 3896363.0 51.99 49.1 
 2008 11627702.0 58.0 18.0 22.0 12765294.1 53.0 16.0 
 2009 21944190.0 61.0 14.0 22.0 11092352.9 53.0 29.0 
 2010 15029026.0 64.0 18.0 27.0 20023529.0 53.0 24.0 
G. ACCRA 2004 5551160.4 981.0 28.0 8.0 8067246.0 51.99 46.2 
 2008 9983424.0 1009.0 31.0 10.0 10212235.3 54.0 27.0 
 2009 14850837.0 1024.0 26.0 10.0 8873882.4 54.0 29.0 
 2010 10106063.0 1042.0 29.0 16.0 16018824.0 54.0 24.0 
Source Authors construct, 2013 (Computed from IFPRI, CWIQ, MLGRD reports, GSS reports) 
 
REGIONS/MMDAS: since the number of MMDAs ranged between 110 and 216 
between 2004 and 2010. It was difficult because of the bulkiness of datasets and 
variations in number of MMDAs between the years considered. Therefore, I used the 
mean (averages) as data reduction technique and a standardizer. Therefore, the data 
used for the regression analysis (presented in appendix III) are MMDAs averages per 
year at the regional level. Further explanation follows 
YEAR: The datasets covered 2004-2010. However, the independent variable datasets 
was lagged by a year. That is, I used 2003 datasets on the needs, service 
pressure/population density, responsiveness, election results, and equality factors to 
explore 2004 DACF. 
DACF: I calculated DACF by dividing the total amount transferred to each region by 
the total number of MMDAs for each year between 2004 and 2010. 
POPDEN: Population density is used to measure service pressure. For every year 
(2004-2010), average population (total population for each region divided by the total 
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number of MMDAs) was divided by average land area per square km (total land area 
per region divided by number of MMDAs per region). 
MMDAs: These refer to the total number of MMDAs per region per year. 
EQUALITY: Based on the proportion of DACF allocated to equality factor per year 
(2004-2010), I calculated the total amount of DACF that is equally shared. Then I 
calculated each MMDAs share by dividing the total amount shared by total number of 
MMDAs. I then calculate the average share at the regional level (total share of 
MMDAs for each region/number of MMDAs for that region)   
POL: To determine evidence of politically motivated targeting, I used the percentage 
of votes cast during the presidential election for each MMDA averaged at the regional 
level. The 2004 and 2008 election results were used for 2004-2008 and 2009-10 
respectively  
 
NEEDS: Relative total needs per region (based on availability of health facilities, 
population per doctor, population per nurse, educational facilities, pupil teacher, and 
tarred roads) were used based on CWIQ rankings. A region with the lowest 
availability of each development indicator (which is equivalent to more needs) is 
ranked 10, while a region with greatest availability of development indicator 
(equivalent to fewest needs) is ranked 1. The details are captured in the table below. 
NEED INDICATOR 
/YEAR 
REGIONAL (PER MMDA) RANK 
ASHANTI BRONG 
AHAFO 
CENTRAL EASTERN GREATER  
ACCRA 
NORTHERN UPPER 
EAST  
UPPER 
WEST 
VOLTA WESTERN 
2009 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
 
1 
2 
8 
 
 
2 
 
7 
4 
7 
 
 
8 
 
8 
5 
6 
 
 
9 
 
4 
3 
4 
 
 
7 
 
2 
1 
5 
 
 
5 
 
5 
10 
10 
 
 
4 
 
9 
8 
3 
 
 
6 
 
10 
9 
1 
 
 
1 
 
6 
6 
3 
 
 
3 
 
3 
7 
9 
 
 
10 
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Source: Computed from CWIQ, GSS surveys (2003, 2004, 2010) 
 
 
 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
13 
 
26 
 
28 
 
18 
 
13 
 
29 
 
26 
 
21 
 
18 
 
29 
2008 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
 
2 
8 
 
 
2 
 
12 
 
 
4 
7 
 
 
7 
 
18 
 
 
5 
3 
 
 
9 
 
17 
 
 
3 
6 
 
 
4 
 
13 
 
 
1 
4 
 
 
3 
 
8 
 
 
10 
10 
 
 
5 
 
25 
 
 
8 
5 
 
 
8 
 
21 
 
 
9 
1 
 
 
1 
 
11 
 
 
6 
2 
 
 
6 
 
14 
 
 
7 
9 
 
 
10 
 
26 
2007 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
 
2 
10 
 
5 
2 
 
19 
 
 
4 
2 
 
3 
5 
 
14 
 
 
6 
7 
 
7 
9 
 
29 
 
 
3 
3 
 
2 
8 
 
16 
 
 
1 
1 
 
9 
4 
 
15 
 
 
10 
8 
 
6 
3 
 
27 
 
 
7 
4 
 
10 
6 
 
27 
 
 
9 
5 
 
8 
1 
 
23 
 
 
5 
5 
 
1 
7 
 
18 
 
 
8 
9 
 
4 
10 
 
31 
2006 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
 
2 
9 
 
3 
2 
 
16 
 
 
4 
7 
 
7 
4 
 
22 
 
 
7 
6 
 
5 
9 
 
27 
 
 
3 
2 
 
2 
8 
 
15 
 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
7 
 
10 
 
 
10 
8 
 
10 
3 
 
31 
 
 
6 
3 
 
9 
5 
 
23 
 
 
9 
5 
 
8 
1 
 
23 
 
 
5 
4 
 
6 
6 
 
21 
 
 
8 
10 
 
4 
10 
 
32 
2005 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
 
2 
9 
 
2 
2 
 
15 
 
 
7 
8 
 
6 
4 
 
25 
 
 
8 
6 
 
5 
9 
 
28 
 
 
3 
2 
 
3 
8 
 
16 
 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
6 
 
9 
 
 
10 
7 
 
9 
5 
 
31 
 
 
5 
5 
 
8 
3 
 
21 
 
 
9 
4 
 
9 
1 
 
23 
 
 
4 
3 
 
7 
7 
 
21 
 
 
6 
10 
 
4 
10 
 
30 
2004 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
 
2 
9 
 
2 
2 
 
15 
 
 
6 
7 
 
6 
5 
 
24 
 
 
5 
6 
 
5 
9 
 
25 
 
 
3 
2 
 
3 
7 
 
15 
 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
6 
 
9 
 
 
10 
8 
 
10 
4 
 
32 
 
 
4 
5 
 
8 
8 
 
25 
 
 
9 
4 
 
9 
1 
 
23 
 
 
7 
3 
 
7 
3 
 
20 
 
 
8 
10 
 
4 
10 
 
32 
2003 
Health Facilities 
Population/Doctor 
Population/Nurse 
Education facilities 
Pupil teacher 
Water coverage 
Tarred roads  
Total Needs 
 
 
2 
7 
 
2 
2 
 
13 
 
 
8 
10 
 
6 
6 
 
30 
 
 
7 
4 
 
5 
9 
 
22 
 
 
4 
2 
 
3 
8 
 
17 
 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
7 
 
10 
 
 
10 
9 
 
10 
5 
 
34 
 
 
3 
6 
 
8 
3 
 
20 
 
 
9 
5 
 
9 
1 
 
24 
 
 
5 
3 
 
7 
4 
 
19 
 
 
6 
8 
 
4 
10 
 
28 
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